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Preface
These working papers on the South Korean economy are the product of an annual conference series on Korean affairs hosted by Stanford University’s Korean Studies Program (KSP), and made possible by the 
generous support of the Koret Foundation. KSP’s 2009–2010 Koret Fellow, 
Byongwon Bahk, a former vice finance minister and chief economic adviser 
to Korean president Lee Myung-bak, played a leading role in organizing the 
2010 conference, authored a major paper, and co-edited this volume.1 
In March 2010 a score of top Korean and American experts convened 
at Stanford’s Bechtel Conference Center for a two-day workshop explor-
ing “South Korea and the Global Economy in Transition.”2 Duck-Soo Han, 
Korean ambassador to the United States, delivered the keynote address on 
“Economic Globalization and U.S.-Korean Relations.”3 
The editors believe that the study of the South Korean economy holds, 
or should hold, interest not only for Koreans but also for Americans and the 
international community as a whole. Korea has become a major player in the 
global economy, ranking thirteenth in GDP and seventh in exports among 
the world’s nearly 200 countries.4 This should no longer come as much of 
a surprise to consumers across the globe who use Korean cell phones, drive 
Korean cars, and, increasingly, enjoy Korean pop music and movies. 
The Korean economy is also important as a leading model of  develop-
ment. In only two generations and despite national division and the devasta-
tion of civil war, South Korea has transformed itself from a largely agricul-
tural economy to a world leader in manufacturing, which in turn facilitated 
its emergence as a dynamic democracy. The Korean experience holds many 
lessons for countries throughout the world as they also struggle to modern-
ize in a highly competitive, globalized economy. 
Korea’s success in navigating the turmoil caused by the global finan-
cial crisis and recession of 2008–2009 is yet another reason for studying its 
economy. Despite its economy being an astounding 85 percent dependent on 
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international trade, Korea has been among the world’s leaders in recovering 
from the crisis.5 Korea owes that success in part to the very hard lessons it 
learned from the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998.
The five chapters selected for this compendium focus on some of the 
timeliest and most important issues involving the Korean economy. 
Taeho Bark, a professor and former dean of the Graduate School of 
International Studies at Seoul National University, begins the volume with a 
review of “The Changing Global and Korean Economies.” As he notes, the 
“fundamental issue” raised by the current economic and financial crisis is 
“whether the world economy can establish a new framework for sustainable 
and balanced growth.” As one of Korea’s leading economic experts and pub-
lic intellectuals, he argues that the problems Korea faces due to globalization 
can only be resolved by embracing globalization more fully and effectively. 
In his chapter on “An Odyssey of the Korean Financial System and the 
September 2008 Financial Shock,” Thomas F. Cargill, professor of econom-
ics at the University of Nevada, Reno, examines the history of Korea’s fi-
nancial system and how the lessons Korea learned from the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–1998 have contributed to its success in dealing with the cur-
rent global financial crisis. Like Taeho Bark, Professor Cargill offers insight-
ful, concrete recommendations to South Korean officials for dealing with 
Korea’s long-term economic and financial challenges. 
With South Korea’s emergence as a leading economic power, it is also 
playing a larger role as a provider of official development assistance (ODA) 
across the globe. In their contribution, Professor Eun Mee Kim and Ji Hyun 
Kim of the Graduate School of International Studies at Ewha Womans Uni-
versity analyze “South Korea’s Official Development Assistance Policy Under 
Lee Myung-bak: Humanitarian or National Interest?” They review Korea’s 
history both as a recipient and as provider of ODA, and they seek to discover 
if Korea’s ODA orientation changes significantly depending on whether the 
executive branch is led by progressives or conservatives. While their conclu-
sions are perforce tentative, they point the way to further research that could 
make for increased, and more effective, Korean ODA.
In “Policy Recommendations for the Korean Economy,” former Korean 
vice finance minister and 2009–2010 Koret Fellow Byongwon Bahk offers 
authoritative analysis and advice on dealing with the long-range challenges 
facing the Korean economy. He contrasts the modernization and globaliza-
tion of Korea’s enormously successful manufacturing sector with its still 
weak services sector. Based on a lifetime of economic and financial leader-
ship experience, Bahk makes a powerful argument that Koreans can also 
succeed globally in the services sector, if they only believe in themselves. 
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Finally, Professor Gi-Wook Shin of Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein 
Asia-Pacific Research Center and Dr. Joon Nak Choi of the Hong Kong Uni-
versity of Science and Technology argue in “Economic Globalization and 
Expatriate Labor in Korea” that Korea can help to overcome its weakness 
in the services sector by making use of global talent in the form of highly 
skilled expatriate workers. They offer rigorous analysis and detailed recom-
mendations to the Korean government on how to use global talent to bolster 
Korea’s engineering, finance, and general business sectors. 
The editors hope that this volume will prove useful to officials, scholars, 
and business people in Korea, the United States, and throughout the world. 
They reiterate their gratitude to the Koret Foundation and to the staff mem-
bers of Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center for conference 
and publication support; they also acknowledge the generous support of the 
Korea Development Institute (KDI) and express sincere appreciation to its 
president, Dr. Oh-Seok Hyun, who was a valuable participant in the 2010 
conference. 
Byongwon Bahk
Seoul, Korea
Gi-Wook Shin
Stanford University
February 2012
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The Changing Global and 
Korean Economies1 
Taeho Bark
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the world economy seems to be reaching a turning point as of mid-2010. With world GDP and glob-al trade both in the process of recovering to pre-crisis levels, focus has 
turned to how long it will take the economy to fully recover. Meanwhile, 
reforms in global financial markets as well as in national regulatory and 
supervisory regimes are being carried forward. Based on the result of such 
reforms, the global financial system and national financial industries could 
face a dramatically new operating environment. Furthermore, the mul-
tilateral trading system is facing the biggest crisis since the launch of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in the mid-1990s. The Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) negotiations, initiated in 2001, have not been finalized despite 
six years having lapsed since the original deadline. This lack of progress 
currently makes it very difficult to predict when the DDA negotiations will 
be completed. As a result, the multilateral trading system is giving way to re-
gionalism and an ever-increasing collection of free trade agreements (FTAs).
The fundamental issue that has gained prominence in the current global 
financial crisis is whether the world economy can establish a new framework 
for sustainable and balanced growth. At the center of this question lies the 
long-discussed yet controversial issue of global imbalances; this debate is 
presently occurring in a number of guises, such as the current account im-
balance between the United States and China, as well as the developmental 
gap between industrialized and developing countries. Such questions will 
not be answered in the short-term, but will instead require a comprehensive 
approach based on a longer-term perspective.
1 The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Tae-Ho Cho and Joon 
Lee, graduate students at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) at Seoul 
National University.
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Recently, a great shift has occurred in the global leadership structure. 
As the G7 system, formed in the 1970s, lost its international status and le-
gitimacy due to the rise of emerging economies, the G-20 emerged as a new 
international mechanism for dealing with the world’s economic problems. 
Since its launch, the G-20 system has gained the world’s trust by success-
fully leading efforts in coordinating and implementing stimulus packages. 
Though it is somewhat premature to predict the G-20’s definitive position 
among global governance bodies, the system could become the de facto in-
ternational body for managing the world economy.
The range of global issues that the world faces has greatly expanded 
and now includes matters as diverse as climate change, energy security, raw 
materials prices, and food security. The transnational nature of these prob-
lems means that adverse effects arising regionally will inevitably spread and 
impact the overall world economy. As such, there exists a significant degree 
of uncertainty among participants in the global economic system. Such un-
certainty needs to be managed properly through international cooperation 
and, as evinced by the G-20’s efforts, such cooperation is more essential now 
than ever.
Below I provide an overview of the state of the global economy and ma-
jor issues affecting it; next, I evaluate the current state of the South  Korean 
economy and analyze ongoing changes in South Korea’s (hereafter simply 
Korea) external economic relations. Finally, I will interpret a new set of 
broad visions under the banner of a “Global Korea” recently promoted by 
the Korean government and propose a number of external economic strate-
gies for Korea’s future.
Global Economy: Current State and Major Issues
Current State of  the Global Economy
The world economy seems to be recovering from the 2008 global financial 
crisis. As recently as October 2007 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
was projecting world GDP to record negative growth rates. However, thanks 
to coordinated stimulus measures and other cooperative efforts undertaken 
by major nations, negative growth was successfully avoided. Nevertheless, 
despite a positive improvement in GDP, growth rates have been the lowest 
since World War II and the aftershocks of the financial crisis will affect the 
world economy in the foreseeable future.
A full recovery will likely be a gradual process and, according to the 
World Bank and IMF, the appropriate response to the current state of world 
affairs is tempered optimism. Since mid-2009, stock markets worldwide have 
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recovered approximately half their value, interbank lending rates have re-
turned to normal, and stock market volatility has diminished. Moreover, 
signs of recovery are spread across both developed and emerging econo-
mies. Developing-country sovereign interest rate premiums have declined to 
around 300 basis points and developing-country stock markets have netted a 
more vigorous recovery than high-income ones.2
However, financial recovery is by no means a guaranteed outcome. Due 
to financial weaknesses in many institutions and growing deficits, the situa-
tion in many European countries such as Poland, Italy, Greece, and Spain re-
mains precarious. The future of the American financial system, meanwhile, 
is under debate and scrutiny. Following serious losses by major companies 
like AIG and Citigroup, many are even investigating the possibility for gov-
ernment ownership of various financial institutions. As for developing coun-
tries, bond market and bank lending have only recently begun reopening to 
private-sector borrowers from developing nations and many uncertainties 
continue to plague the short-term forecasts for these economies. Though a 
majority of analysts do not expect a severe double-dip recession and return 
to negative growth rates, how private sector consumption and investment 
demand in emerging economies will respond to the recent influx of fiscal 
and monetary stimulus activity is unclear. Due to such uncertainties, the 
World Bank warns that developing-country growth could come in as low 
as 5.1 percent in 2010.3 Although expansionary fiscal and monetary poli-
cies cannot be sustained indefinitely, it would be premature to implement 
exit strategies without ensuring that private sector activity meets baseline 
projections.
Alongside financial markets, the real economy is also exhibiting a sub-
dued recovery. Global industrial production netted a growth of over 12 per-
cent in the third quarter of 2009 and exports of developing countries were 
expanding at a 36 percent annualized pace in October 2009. Total volume 
of trade, however, remains 10 percent below the pre-crisis trend growth rate 
and, despite a more balanced recovery in developing and developed econo-
mies, output remains depressed worldwide.4 In the United States and Eu-
rope, unemployment remains over 10 percent, and as unemployment rates 
continue to rise in many countries, private consumption has only shown 
weak signs of recovery.
2 World Bank, Global Development Finance: Charting a Global Recovery (Wash-
ington, DC: World Bank, 2009).
3 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2010: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009).
4 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2010.
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Perhaps more significantly, as positive contributions from stimulus pack-
ages and the inventory cycle wane, decreased spending by households and 
banks, as well as sluggish recovery in the U.S. housing market, is expected 
to slow growth. The IMF expects 0.5 percent GDP growth for 2009 and, as-
suming a 1 percent increase for advanced economies and 5 percent for newly 
emergent economies, a growth rate of 3 percent for 2010. World trade is also 
forecasted to show a modest 3 percent increase in 2010.5 Meanwhile, the 
World Bank projects global GDP growth to be a modest 2.7 percent in 2010 
and 3.2 percent in 2011, as shown in Table 1.1.6
Major Issues Facing the Global Economy
In subsequent post-crisis years, a variety of issues will likely test the capa-
bilities and resolve of participants in the global economy. The importance 
of prudent macroeconomic policies was on display during the 2008 crisis 
as countries suffering the largest declines in output also had the largest cur-
rent account imbalances. Moreover, global consensus has yet to be reached 
on how to resolve large current account imbalances between emerging and 
advanced economies. Redressing this imbalance will be especially significant 
for China and the United States, as many have cited America’s trade deficit 
and China’s equally formidable surplus as root causes behind the current 
financial crisis.
The multilateral trading regime, meanwhile, will also face a variety of 
challenges in years to come. Following the 1995 establishment of the WTO, 
trade ministers initially had high expectations for future rounds of trade lib-
eralization. However, despite concerted efforts by various parties over several 
years, progress in the DDA negotiations has been excruciatingly slow. Reasons 
5 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: October 2009 (Wash-
ington, DC: IMF, 2009).
6 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2010.
TAble 1.1
Change in Projected Real GDP Growth (2010 and 2011;  
from previous year, %)
2010 2011
World 2.7 3.2
High-Income Countries 1.8 2.3
Developing Countries 5.2 5.8
Developing Countries (excluding China and India) 3.3 4.0
Source: World Bank.
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behind Doha’s failure are numerous. The proliferation of WTO members in 
recent years in conjunction with overreliance on consensus-based procedures 
in the WTO has led to stalemate, political brinksmanship, and even outright 
confrontation during trade talks. Moreover, a lack of leadership has plagued 
negotiations, and unless common ground can be reached between wealthier 
and poorer nations, the future of Doha does not seem bright.
The plight of multilateralism, however, has been accompanied by redou-
bled enthusiasm for regional and bilateral trade liberalization. Such rising 
regionalism shows little sign of abating. Since the WTO’s inception, the num-
ber of reported regional trade agreements has dramatically increased, and as 
evinced by ASeAN and the discussions surrounding a potential ASeAN+3 FTA, 
nowhere has this trend been more pronounced than in East Asia. Regional-
ism is not without controversy, however, as some scholars have asserted that 
regional arrangements inherently discriminate against nonmember trading 
partners, thereby endangering the progress garnered from nearly 60 years of 
multilateral talks.
Alongside signs of recovery in financial markets, commodity markets 
staged a rally in 2009 after collapsing in late 2008. This rebound in com-
modity prices despite high inventories, which occurred earlier than in pre-
vious global downturns, reflects both renewed investment in commodity 
assets and changing fundamentals, with many believing the worst of the 
global recession had ended. The IMF’s near-term outlook expects commod-
ity prices to show modest upward movement as global demand, especially 
from emerging economies, will weigh against both above-average inventory 
and spare capacity.7
Nevertheless, as with global trade and finance, certain uncertainties 
remain. Particularly in regards to oil, while recession-related setbacks to 
capacity expansion are likely to be temporary and costs of oil investment 
have declined in recent quarters, prices are above the average for the past 
decade and could rise further as the dollar weakens or demand from emerg-
ing economies skyrockets. Rising oil prices, moreover, can not only threaten 
economic recovery but also destabilize related commodity markets. For in-
stance, while food prices enjoyed a broad-based, albeit modest, recovery in 
2009, higher oil prices will drive up farming costs and incentivize the diver-
sion of food crops towards biofuel production.8 Thus, to ensure continued 
post-crisis recovery, care should be taken to maintain an appropriate balance 
7 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update: January 2010 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2010).
8 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: October 2009.
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between supply and demand in all major commodity markets.
Just as international coordination of stimulus policies was critical in 
prompting recovery in 2009, such coordination will also be vital for the im-
plementation of exit strategies in 2010 and beyond. But with differing policy 
environments and economic circumstances surrounding each economy, glob-
al cooperation between nations will be difficult to achieve. Through various 
forums such as the IMF, World Bank, and G-20, however, various parties are 
collaborating on resolving issues that affect the twenty-first century global 
economy, such as strengthening the post-crisis international financial regula-
tory system; reforming the mandate, mission, and governance structure of 
various international financial institutions; promoting energy security and 
sustainable development; and strengthening support for the world’s poorest 
countries. Therefore, a major concern for advanced and emerging econo-
mies alike will not only be achieving mutually beneficial outcomes through 
these forums, but buttressing the forums in which these issues are discussed 
so they may continue to function as viable channels for coordination and 
recovery.
Korean Economy: Current State and  
Changes in Its External Economic Relations
Korean Economy at a Glance
From mid-2008 to early 2009, East Asian and Pacific economies were par-
ticularly affected by the collapse of global business investment and declines 
in trade. As dollar-based exports dropped 25 percent and production plum-
meted between 15 to 30 percent, high-income economies such as Japan, Sin-
gapore, Taiwan, China, and Korea were not immune from the downturn in 
capital goods demand.9 (See trade volumes and percentage change in trade in 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2.) However, East Asia’s rebound from the global recession 
in 2009 was also quicker and more robust than other regions, and Korea’s 
economy has likewise successfully navigated the global economic crisis. GDP 
grew by 0.2 percent in 2009 and, along with Poland and Australia, Korea 
is expected to be only one of three OeCD member countries that avoided 
economic contraction in 2009.10 Moreover, the Korean won significantly re-
couped against the U.S. dollar.11 These positive developments partly reflect 
9 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2010.
10 Kim Jae-kyoung, “Korea’s GDP Growth Ranks Third in OeCD,” Korea Times, 
March 8, 2010, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2010/05/123_62032.html.
11 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2010.
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Korea’s proactive participation in the G-20 process and, as per understand-
ings reached with fellow members, the subsequent implementation of stimu-
lus packages. Compared to the G-20 average of 2 percent,  Korea’s stimulus 
amounted to 3.6 percent of its GDP.12
12 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultation with 
the Republic of Korea,” Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 09/103, August 9, 2009, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2009/pn09103.htm.
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Korea’s recovery, however, does not seem firmly entrenched, as private 
sector demand is not yet healthy enough to drive consumption and invest-
ments. Joblessness continues to be a problem as overall unemployment rose 
to 3.6 percent in 2009 while unemployment among twenty- to twenty-nine-
year-olds jumped to 7.3 percent, as shown in Figure 1.3. Moreover, while 
Korea netted a trade surplus of $41 billion in 2009, both exports and im-
ports declined by 13.8 percent and 25.8 percent respectively.13 As exports to 
advanced economies are predicted to shrink and the Korean won is expected 
to strengthen versus the dollar, Korea’s surplus will likely decrease, while 
trade levels in 2010 are not expected to recover to pre-crisis levels. These may 
prove to be significant barriers to recovery, as trade accounts for over 70 per-
cent of the nation’s GDP. Thankfully, Korea’s economy is currently expected 
to improve in 2010 as a majority of government agencies, international or-
ganizations, global investment banks, and domestic research institutions are 
predicting a GDP growth rate of 4 to 5 percent, as shown in Table 1.2.14
13 Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
14 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultation with the 
Republic of Korea”; Kim Seyoon, “Bank of Korea Raises 2010 GDP Growth Forecast,” 
Bloomberg, December 10, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchi
ve&sid=aJMl79RbLwjI.
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Changes in Korea’s External Economic Relations
In the past twenty years, Korea’s international trade has changed dramati-
cally in several respects. The dollar value of Korea’s total trade grew almost 
6.5 times, increasing from approximately $134.9 billion in 1990 to over 
$857.3 billion in 2008. This number took a noticeable dip in 2009 due to the 
global recession. Nonetheless, Korea ranks as the eleventh largest trading 
nation in the world and accounted for approximately 2.6 percent of total 
world trade in 2008. The composition of Korea’s trading goods has also 
transformed and reflected the country’s progression across various stages of 
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TAble 1.2
Forecasts of Korea’s GDP Growth Rate (2010)
Institution GDP Forecast for 2010 (%)
IMF 4.5
OECD 4.4
Bank of Korea 4.6
Ministry of Strategy and Finance 5.0
KDI 5.5
Samsung Economic Research Institute 4.3
Source: 2009 reports from individual institutions listed.
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TAble 1.3
Korea’s Top Ten Export Products (2000 versus 2009)
Top Ten Export Products (2000) Top Ten Export Products (2009)
Product
Volume  
(USD 100 millions)
Weightb Product
Volume  
(USD 100 millions)
2000 2009 Changea 2000 2009 Changea Weightb
Integrated circuit 
semiconductors
246 282 14.6 14.3 Ships 79 423 435.4 11.6
Cars 119 224 88.2 6.9 Integrated circuit 
semiconductors
246 282 14.6 7.8
Ships 79 423 435.4 4.6 Flat panel display 3 251 8266.7 6.9
Cordless phones 56 181 223.2 3.3 Cars 119 224 88.2 6.2
Computer parts 52 19 -63.5 3.0 Cordless phones 56 181 223.2 5.0
Synthetic resins 50 133 166.0 2.9 Synthetic resins 50 133 166.0 3.7
Monitors 36 22 -38.9 2.1 Car parts 21 117 457.1 3.2
Diesel oil 32 88 175.0 1.9 Wireless telecom.b 11 106 863.6 2.0
Polyester fabric 31 13 -58.1 1.8 Diesel oil 32 88 175.0 2.4
Computers 29 5 -82.8 1.7 Jet fuel / kerosene 19 52 173.7 1.4
Top Ten Subtotal 730 1390 90.4 42.4 Top Ten Subtotal 636 1857 192.0 51.1
2000 Total Exports 1723 3635 111.0 100.0 2009 Total Exports 1723 3635 111.0 100.0
Source: Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
Notes: a) “Change” is percent change from 2000 to 2009 
b) “Weight” is weighted percentage 
c) Wireless telecommunication equipment parts
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economic development. In terms of exports, as shown in Figure 1.4, Korea 
used to be heavily concentrated in light manufacturing goods, which made 
up 38 percent of total exports as late as in 1990. In 2008, however, 90 percent 
of Korea’s exports came from heavy industry and chemical goods. Exports 
from Korea’s IT industry are also rapidly increasing, and products from 
the automobile, shipbuilding, semiconductor, home appliance, and mobile 
phone industries together account for close to 60 to 70 percent of exports. 
As for Korea’s import composition, there have not been many noticeable 
changes. Petroleum accounted for 19.8 percent of imports in 2008, while 
imports of parts and components intended for the production of exporting 
goods accounted for 41 percent. Meanwhile, consumer goods accounted for 
less than 10 percent of imports (see Figure 1.5), a figure that decreases to ap-
proximately 4 percent if grains and foodstuffs are excluded.15 Korea’s top ten 
export and import products are shown in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.
15 Data from Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
TAble 1.4
Korea’s Top Ten Import Products (2000 versus 2009)
Top Ten Import Products (2000) Top Ten Import Products (2009)
Product
Volume  
(USD 100 millions)
Weightb Product
Volume  
(USD 100 millions)
2000 2009 Changea 2000 2009 Changea Weightb
Crude oil 252 508 101.6 15.7 Crude oil 252 508 101.6 15.7
Integrated circuit 
semiconductors
179 219 28.8 10.6 Integrated circuit 
semiconductors
170 219 28.8 6.8
Natural gas 39 139 256.4 2.4 Natural gas 39 139 256.4 4.3
SC equipmentc 34 31 -8.9 2.1 Naphtha 34 107 214.7 3.3
Naphtha 34 107 214.7 2.1 Bituminous coal 20 90 350.0 2.8
Computer parts 34 24 -29.5 2.1 Synthetic materiald 22 48 118.2 1.5
Gold 23 11 -52.2 1.4 Misc. plates 4 41 925.0 1.3
Synthetic materiald 22 48 118.2 1.3 HR plate 15 40 166.7 1.2
Individ. device SC 21 34 61.9 1.3 Other plastic prod. 11 39 254.5 1.2
Bituminous coal 20 90 350.0 1.2 Iron 9 35 288.9 1.1
Top Ten Subtotal 649 1211 86.6 40.4 Top Ten Subtotal 576 1266 119.8 39.2
2000 Total Exports 1605 3231 101.3 100.0 2009 Total Exports 1605 3231 101.3 100.0
Source: Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
Notes: a) “Change” is percent change from 2000 to 2009 
b) “Weight” is weighted percentage 
c) Equipment for manufacturing semiconductors 
d) Miscellaneous synthetic chemistry base material
The Changing Global and Korean Economies
30
Korea’s comparative advantages in relation to other international econ-
omies have evolved significantly in the past decade and a half, as shown in 
Figure 1.6. With economic development and the consequent movement to-
ward higher value-added activities, Korea has increasingly specialized in the 
manufacture of high-tech devices (e.g., cellular telephone sets and lCD dis-
plays) as well as ships. At the same time, Korea’s traditional advantage in 
automatic data processing machines, monitors and projectors (not including 
televisions), synthetic fabrics, and unwrought gold has diminished consider-
ably. In fact, for automatic data processing machines and unwrought gold, 
the revealed comparative advantage has sunk below 1, which indicates these 
products have turned from comparatively advantageous products to com-
paratively disadvantageous products in the span of thirteen years. On the 
other hand, the revealed comparative advantages in oils from bituminous 
minerals (diesel) and motor vehicles have remained relatively constant.
The composition and relative importance of Korea’s major trading part-
ners have also changed over time. While Korea initially focused on the Unit-
ed States, Japan, and Europe as key destinations for its expanding exports, 
exports to China began increasing in the early 1990s, with China finally 
overtaking the United States as Korea’s biggest export market in 2003. With 
the expansion of the European Union (EU) in recent years, Korea’s major 
trading partners are now ranked in the following order: China, the EU, the 
United States, and Japan. In addition, trade with emerging economies has 
also dramatically increased, with Korea having trade relations with over 220 
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countries in 2008.16
Trade with the United States
Total trade between the United States and Korea amounted to approxi-
mately $84.7 billion in 2008, through which Korea netted a trade surplus 
of $8.6 billion. The trade intensity index (see Figure 1.7) between the two 
countries has shown a notable decrease every year since the early 1990s.17 
In particular, Korea’s export intensity index to the United States has fallen 
below 1, which signifi es that Korea is now exporting less to the United States 
relative to world exports to the United States. Meanwhile, the import in-
tensity index is hovering barely above 1, which demonstrates that Korea is 
not importing much more from the United States compared to the rest of 
the world. At its current pace, Korea’s import intensity index may even fall 
below 1 in the near future. In 2008, Korea mainly exported globally-compet-
itive products such as road vehicles, telecommunication and sound recording 
equipment, and electrical machinery to the United States while importing 
electrical machinery, specialized machinery, transportation equipment, and 
organic chemicals. The Korea-U.S. trade composition consequently shows a 
high level of intra-industry trade between the two economies.18
16 Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
17 We have calculated the trade intensity index between countries i and j in the 
world w, using the following formula:  where X stands for import, export, 
or total trade values depending on which intensity we were looking at. The index value 
of 1 means that the relative importance of country j for country i’s trade is the same as 
it is for the rest of the world. 
18 Data from Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
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China
Since the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and 
 China in 1992, the volume of trade between the two nations has expanded 
at an extremely rapid rate. The total trade value between Korea and China in 
1992 amounted to $2.8 billion. By 2008, that figure had increased by nearly 
sixty-fold to over $168 billion and Korea recorded a trade surplus of near 
$14.5 billion. Trade volume growth of such magnitude is hard to find any-
where else in the world, and the Korea-China bilateral relationship has been 
lauded as a substantial achievement by both countries. Reflecting recent de-
velopments in total trade, Korea’s export and import intensity indices scored 
well above the world average: in 2008, Korea’s export intensity index was 
over 3 while import intensity was above 2, as shown in Figure 1.8. These 
figures suggest that Korea’s reliance on China as an export market is more 
than three times as heavy as the rest of the world’s level of reliance, while 
Korea’s dependence on China as a source of imports is more than double 
the rest of the world’s dependence on China. Geographical proximity of the 
two countries as well as significant “complementarities” of the two coun-
tries’ economic capabilities are two possible reasons for such intensive trade 
between Korea and China.19
In 2008, Korea’s main exports to China consisted of electrical machin-
ery, professional and scientific apparatus, organic chemicals, and telecom-
munication and sound recording equipment. In the same year, Korea’s main 
imports from China included products such as iron and steel, electrical ma-
19 Data from Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
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chinery, telecommunication and sound recording equipment, apparel, coal, 
and textiles. This trade composition shows that intra-industry trade is quite 
active between both nations; furthermore, the overall pattern of trade indi-
cates that Korea currently exports more capital goods to China while im-
porting more raw materials. It has been reported that a considerable portion 
of Korean exports are accounted for by firms of Korean origin located in 
Chinese territory, for purposes of importing capital goods, parts and com-
ponents from Korea. These firms, furthermore, export finished products 
mostly to the United States or Europe. Therefore, most of Korea’s exports 
to China never reach China’s domestic consumption markets. 20
Japan
Total trade between Korea and Japan recorded a historical high of $89.2 
billion in 2008 and Korea netted a trade deficit of nearly $32.7 billion in the 
same period. This deficit was the largest recorded since the two countries 
began serious bilateral trading relations in the 1960s. This almost-lopsided 
trading pattern is also reflected in trade intensity indices: the export inten-
sity index is steadily falling (from approximately 2.7 in 1990 to below 1.5 in 
2008) while the import intensity index remains extremely high (at around 3), 
as shown in Figure 1.9. These numbers speak directly to Korea’s heavy reli-
ance on Japanese imports. Due to geographic proximity, even if the actual 
trade volume is not remarkable, the proportion of Korea’s exports to Japan 
is moderately higher than the corresponding average proportion of exports 
from rest of the world. Between Korea and Japan, intra-industry trade in 
electric machinery, iron and steel, and general industrial machinery indus-
tries was most prominent.21
Aside from intra-industry trade, Korea exported telecommunication 
and sound recording equipment, and petroleum and related products to Ja-
pan, while importing chemical materials and products, plastic, and road ve-
hicles. Korea also imported sizeable volumes of high quality materials, parts 
and components from Japan and currently relies heavily on such imports 
to produce its export goods. Thus, structurally, Korean exports depend on 
Japanese imports and as Korea’s exports to the world increase in the foresee-
able future, its imports from Japan will also likely increase. In 2009, Korea 
registered a $27.7 billion trade deficit against Japan.22
20 Data from Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
21 Data from Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
22 Data from Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
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Europe
In 2008, Korea and the EU recorded a total trade of $98.4 billion from 
which Korea recorded a trade surplus of $18 billion. Trade intensity between 
 Korea and European nations was very high in the early 1990s, yet both ex-
port and import intensity indices have steadily declined since, as shown in 
Figure 1.10. Currently, both numbers are higher than the world average, 
yet it is unclear whether the figures will remain above unity considering the 
downward trend of the last twenty years. Between Korea and Europe, there 
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is active intra-industry trade in automobiles and related parts, and semicon-
ductors. Meanwhile, Korea exported comparatively more products from the 
shipbuilding, flat screen display, and wireless phone industries while Euro-
pean economies exported more pharmaceutical goods, equipment necessary 
to produce semiconductors, and chemicals.23
Rest of  the World
Korea has been rapidly expanding and intensifying trade with more mi-
nor trading partners, a diversification that has led the nation to establish 
bilateral trading relations with countries and regions as diverse as ASeAN, 
India, Latin America, and Central Asia. However, Korean trade with the 
African continent has remained minimal compared to trade with other parts 
of the world (see Figure 1.11). Korea’s level of trade with Latin America is 
also low, although both absolute trade volume and the export intensity index 
have been increasing in recent years, as shown in Figure 1.12. Total value of 
trade with Latin America amounted to less than $4 billion in 1990. In 2008, 
however, Korea-Latin American trade amounted to $47.0 billion—a leap of 
almost twelve times the original amount. Moreover, the export intensity in-
dex from Korea’s perspective reached 1.27 in 2008, compared to 0.94 in 1990, 
demonstrating that an increasing portion of Korean exports are targeting 
Latin America as a final destination.24
23 Data from Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
24 Data from Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
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Within this “rest of the world” category, Korea’s relationship with India 
has demonstrated remarkable jumps in terms of absolute volume of trade. 
In 1990, trade with India was worth approximately $0.7 billion, but by 2008 
the figure had increased by almost 22 times to $15.6 billion. Similar mag-
nitudes of increase were experienced in both exports and imports: Korean 
exports to India leaped from $0.44 billion to $9.0 billion while imports from 
India swelled from $0.28 billion to $6.6 billion. This impressive increase in 
trade occurred smoothly over the last twenty years. Trade in 1993 was the 
single outlier year to this overall trend, when imports increased moderately 
(by about 9.4 percent) from 1992 while exports more than quadrupled, going 
from $0.44 billion to $1.8 billion. This hike was also reflected in the trade 
intensity indices as Korea’s export intensity index in 1993 spiked from 0.92 
to 3.84, thereby pulling the total trade intensity index up from 1.04 to 2.49, 
as seen in Figure 1.13. Beyond this singular anomaly, trade intensity indices 
have remained fairly stable around 1, except for a recent surge that may re-
flect the free trade agreement between the two countries taking effect.25
External Economic Strategies for a Global Korea
Korea has recently made concerted efforts to raise its status in the interna-
tional community. Reflective of such efforts, the government recently pro-
posed a new set of broad visions under the banner of a “Global Korea.” 
25 Data from Korea International Trade Association (KITA).
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There have not been many details revealed at this point in time. Nonetheless, 
here I recommend three objectives that should be pursued in order to realize 
such a global Korea. First, the nation should liberalize domestic markets and 
integrate its economy with the global environment in order to become glob-
ally competitive; second, Korea should fulfill the responsibilities and duties 
that correspond to its rising economic status; and, finally, Korea should exert 
appropriate leadership on issues in which it has expertise. In this area, Korea 
must play a proactive role in bridging the interests of industrialized and de-
veloping countries. To achieve these three objectives, the following external 
economic strategies should be undertaken.
Further Liberalize the Economy
If Korea’s developmental past is any indication, its future lies in proactively 
liberalizing markets as opposed to protecting domestic industries and firms. 
Thus, Korea’s current liberalization rate is nearly 100 percent while the aver-
age tariff rate is 12.4 percent. However, while Korea’s policy has been primar-
ily export-driven and outward-looking, with trade-distorting substitutions 
subsidies having been largely phased out in past decades, one glaring excep-
tion is in agricultural products. Moreover, despite regular praise from the 
GATT/WTO review mechanism, Korea’s policies need to be harmonized with 
internationally-recognized intellectual property protections, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, technical standards, and safety standards that befit 
an advanced economy. The opening of trade in goods and services through 
multilateral, regional, and bilateral arrangements, as well as facilitation of 
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foreign investment and upgrading of domestic measures to global standards, 
will ultimately induce competition, improve the competitiveness of domes-
tic firms abroad, and strengthen the nation’s overall economic performance.
A larger problem for Korea, meanwhile, is market liberalization’s ef-
fect on consumer welfare. Thus far, despite significant lowering of barriers 
for trade, Korea’s preponderance of raw materials, intermediary, and capi-
tal goods imports for production purposes has meant that final consumer 
goods from abroad have failed to effectively penetrate the domestic market. 
Furthermore, such disparity between production-oriented versus consumer-
oriented imports is aggravated by the fact that affiliates of Korean conglom-
erates are monopolizing production, importation, and distribution, which 
additionally blocks competitors from entry and allows for price-discriminat-
ing strategies. Thus, protectionism should be disavowed and Korea’s domes-
tic focus should be oriented towards enhancing consumer welfare.
The liberalization policies outlined above will, of course, entail costs 
for certain industries. Therefore, reasonable compensation schemes and gov-
ernmental support programs will be required to pave the way for troubled 
sectors and firms during industrial restructuring. Such policies, if appropri-
ately designed and implemented, will go a long way towards persuading the 
private sector to support market liberalization.
Improve Korea’s Business Environment
Since the advent of globalization and proliferation of transnational corpora-
tions, a nation’s economic health is no longer tied to conventional notions 
of national borders and competition. Increasingly, growth and development 
will depend on a nation’s ability to maintain an attractive business environ-
ment and invite constructive investment from abroad.
For a variety of reasons, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into 
 Korea remain unimpressive compared to the rest of East Asia. High real es-
tate prices, uneasy relations between labor and management, and a lack of 
intellectual property protections and enforcement have all contributed to a 
relatively unattractive business environment. Businesses are often hampered 
by excessive government regulations related to Korea’s trade and investment 
regimes, an underdeveloped financial services sector and capital and foreign 
exchange markets, and market access restrictions. Finally, Korea’s develop-
mental policy has traditionally been focused on promoting trade rather than 
investment. In the future, however, the nation needs to take bold steps in 
resolving these problems or risk being left behind by competitors.
Taeho Bark
39
Diversify Korea’s International Economic Relations
To both reflect and adapt to the coexistence of multilateralism and regional-
ism in the world trading environment, Korea’s trade strategy should adopt 
a two-pronged approach that includes maintaining healthy relations within 
the WTO as well as balancing individual regional relations. While proactively 
participating in DDA negotiations and supporting the existing multilateral 
trading regime, Korea needs to pay special attention to strengthening trade 
with the U.S., EU, and East Asian economies.
This strategy, at least in the foreseeable future, will necessitate the suc-
cessful completion of current FTA negotiations along with ratification of the 
United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KOruS FTA) and finalization of 
the Korea-EU FTA. Furthermore, Korea should seriously investigate the pos-
sibility of integrating bilateral FTAs into regional ones such as the proposed 
China-Korea-Japan FTA, ASeAN+3 FTA, ASeAN+6 FTA, or APeC FTA. Until such 
regional arrangements are realized, Korea should actively promote and par-
ticipate in functional cooperation among neighboring economies in various 
fields such as currency swaps, energy security, and environmental protection.
Increase Korea’s ODA
Korea’s status as a large economy based on nominal GDP cannot sufficiently 
explain its unique potential to assist developing countries. As a newly-indus-
trialized nation that transitioned from official development assistance (ODA) 
recipient to donor nation in 1987, Korea has firsthand experience in navigat-
ing the precarious evolution from less-developed to advanced-nation status. 
Thus, Korea not only has the international capacity to aid less fortunate 
countries, but also has the requisite knowledge to serve as a guide to devel-
oping economies and the credibility to serve as an intermediary between 
developed and less-developed nations.
Korea’s present commitments, however, remain woefully small and as of 
2008 Korea’s ODA was only .09 percent of gross national income (GNI). Al-
though Korea officially joined the OeCD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) in January 2010, the nation’s ODA/GNI ratio remains far below the DAC 
average of .3 percent. Moreover, according to the OeCD Special Review from 
2008, 98 percent of Korean bilateral aid is either tied or partially tied, an ex-
tremely high proportion at odds with key DAC recommendations. However, 
there has been progress: Korea has steadily increased its ODA since 2000 and 
set an explicit target of increasing ODA/GNI to .25 percent by 2015, repre-
senting a six-fold increase in aid in just seven years; furthermore, Korea has 
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presented a Roadmap on Untying, a positive step towards untying its aid.26
Promote Green Growth at Home and Abroad
Like many newly-developed Asian economies, Korea has a mixed record in 
regards to promoting environmental protection and such neglect has ad-
versely affected its international rankings. The 2010 Environmental Perfor-
mance Index, assembled by Yale and Columbia Universities in conjunction 
with the World Economic Forum, recently ranked Korea 94th out of 161 
nations based on internationally recognized environmental health and re-
source indicators. While its score on this index approximated the average for 
East Asian and Pacific countries, the country lagged behind the average for 
 Korea’s income group.
Recent developments, however, indicate a greener future for Korea. The 
Presidential Commission on Green Growth, established in February 2009 
in hopes of transforming Korea into a “Model Green Nation,” announced 
a Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009-2013) that includes programs to 
combat climate change, secure energy independence, create sustainable 
growth engines based on green technologies, and annually invest 2 percent 
GDP into green projects.27 Additionally, Korea has taken initiative on a global 
scale. As a non-Annex I nation, it notified the Secretariat of the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (uNFCCC) of its intent to 
participate in the Copenhagen Accord. Meanwhile, Korea’s leadership made 
a unilateral pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent below 
its 2020 business-as-usual emissions28 and proposed to raise $200 million for 
an East Asian Climate Partnership Program that will encourage green ODA 
abroad.29
Enhance Korea’s Role in the International Community
Korea is now a mature economy and ready to assume a more proactive lead-
ership role on the world stage. In a global context, befitting its special posi-
tion as a newly-developed economy with a post-war developmental success 
story, Korea’s future role lies in being a constructive mediator between ad-
vanced and developing nations on contentious issues. In G-20 Summit meet-
26 OeCD, Development Co-operation of  the Republic of  Korea, DAC Special Review 
(Paris: OeCD, 2008).
27 Xavier Leflaive, Eco-Innovation Policies in the Republic of  Korea (Paris: OeCD, 
2008).
28 Ramstad Evan and Jung-Won Shin, “South Korea Sets Its Own Car-
bon Goal,” Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB125842928229651665.html.
29 Korea International Cooperation Agency.
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ings, President Lee Myung-bak indicated Korea’s willingness to play such a 
role as he emphasized the need to guard liberalization against protectionism 
while simultaneously advocating currency swaps and expansion of the IMF 
Short-term Liquidity Fund to help less developed economies during the fi-
nancial crisis.
Korea’s newfound willingness to be a leader is also evident in the nation’s 
increasingly dynamic presence on the world stage. The country chaired the 
2009 OeCD Ministerial Council Meeting in June and is host of the G-20 Sum-
mit in 2010, the Bureau International des Expositions (bIe) Expo in 2012, 
and the 22nd World Energy Congress in 2013.30 These activities are comple-
mented by Korea’s continual active participation in numerous international 
forums such as ASeAN+3, APeC, ASeM, OeCD, and the WTO.
Hold a Successful G-20 Summit
When President Lee Myung-bak spoke at the January 2010 World Economic 
Forum in Davos, he highlighted the importance of the Seoul G-20 Sum-
mit. As the first meeting where post-crisis international cooperation will be 
the focal point of discussion, the Seoul gathering is an opportunity for the 
G-20 to establish itself as an independent global governance body. While 
the implementation of exit strategies will unquestionably be one of the cen-
tral issues surrounding discussions, delegations can be expected to debate a 
broader range of topics based on mid to long-term perspectives.
President Lee also underscored the need for parties to faithfully imple-
ment agreements reached in previous meetings. These include reforming 
financial regulations and the supervision system, strengthening early warn-
ing and surveillance capabilities of key financial institutions, restructuring 
governance structure of international financial organizations such as the IMF 
and World Bank, supporting an early conclusion to the DDA negotiations, 
and combating protectionism worldwide. Upon these preexisting initiatives, 
however, Lee also promised to develop agenda items to help bridge the de-
velopmental gap between countries. Specifically, the president mentioned 
the construction of a “global financial safety net,” through, for example, 
strengthening bilateral financial cooperation between advanced and develop-
ing economies, and establishing regional financial cooperation mechanisms. 
In addition, Lee also pledged to work towards a more inclusive summit and 
has invited input from non-member states, regional cooperation bodies, 
international organizations, and even the private sector. In particular, the 
president foresaw creative contributions from world business leaders to be 
30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Diplomatic White Paper 2009 (Seoul: MO-
FAT, 2008.
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especially vital in producing post-crisis sustainable growth and employment.
Concluding Remarks
The world economy is at a crossroads and the most important task is finding 
a new framework to promote sustainable and balanced growth. The current 
global financial crisis illustrates that international cooperation and policy 
coordination are the only means of successfully achieving this goal. History 
shows that financial crises can be averted or effectively managed when par-
ties achieve international coordination, and that lacking such cooperation, 
crises are more likely to be accompanied by a prolonged recession. There-
fore, it is hoped that the newly established G-20 can sustain the world’s trust 
and play a vital role in managing the world economy. The first steps towards 
this end will be successful outcomes in the 2010 G-20 Summit Meetings to 
be held in Canada and Seoul.
Due to Korea’s heavy reliance on foreign markets, some have argued that 
it should expand its domestic market to decrease the nation’s vulnerability 
to external shocks. However, there is a limit to the Korean domestic market; 
for Korea’s economy to grow further, the nation’s leadership must continue 
implementing externally-oriented economic strategies. It is therefore com-
mendable that the current government has proposed the new set of globally-
minded visions to achieve a so-called Global Korea. However, Korea’s future 
economic direction cannot be interpreted under this banner as simply in-
creasing exports, as has been the case in the past. A true global Korea will 
entail the opening of domestic markets, the diversification of trade to differ-
ent regions, the upgrading of domestic policies, institutions, and customs to 
global standards, and the expansion of Korea’s scope of responsibilities in 
the international community.
An Odyssey of the Korean Financial 
System and the September 2008 
Financial Shock1
Thomas F. Cargill
In late 2008, the U.S. financial system appeared to be at the abyss. The collapse of securities markets in general, and mortgage-backed securi-ties in particular, was the result of an accumulation of stress caused by 
over two years of declining residential house prices, deteriorating household 
and financial sector balance sheets, and reduced availability and increasing 
cost of credit. The sudden collapse of securities markets and bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, led to unprecedented lender of 
last resort policies by the Federal Reserve and public injection of funds by 
the U.S. Treasury directed toward large financial institutions (banks, invest-
ment companies and insurance companies) in an attempt to avoid another 
1930s Great Depression. The financial shock occurred in an already declin-
ing real economy that had turned from expansion to contraction in Decem-
ber 2007. The economic and financial distress spread rapidly to the rest of 
the world through international linkages and because many countries had 
large amounts of dollar-denominated assets, especially securities backed by 
residential mortgages. As a result, the period from late 2008 through 2009 
is referred to as the “great recession” in the United States, while from the 
international perspective the period is known as the “global financial crisis” 
of 2008. 
The 2008 global financial crisis profoundly impacted and tested South 
Korea’s (hereafter simply Korea) financial system; the “September shock” 
generated a sense of panic throughout it, rekindling memories of the 1997 
crisis that had brought Korea close to economic and financial collapse as 
1 This paper was prepared for the OECD as a background paper for the 2009 
Economic Survey of  Korea, and some elements of it form part of the financial chapter 
in the 2009 Survey and an OECD working paper authored by Randall Jones, Masahiko 
 Tsutsumi, and myself. The author expresses appreciation to Randall Jones for comments 
on the paper. All errors remain the responsibility of the author, however.
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a result of capital flight and the collapse of the export sector. News media 
accounts in September and October anticipated the worst,  and suggested 
Korea was on the verge of another 1997-type crisis.2 The financial shock 
occurred as Korea was already dealing with a slowing economy, downward 
trending profitability, rising housing prices, and increasing debt in the house-
hold and small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sectors.
The government reacted rapidly by: (1) injecting public funds into banks; 
(2) requiring banks and other financial institutions to increase capital; (3) 
guaranteeing foreign debt owed by banks and providing some banks with 
dollar reserves; (4) decreasing the policy interest rate and expanding the 
Bank of Korea’s lending facilities; (5) increasing credit guarantees and other 
support for SMEs, and; (6) providing frequent and transparent information 
through the Bank of Korea, Financial Services Commission, and Financial 
Supervisory Service about the government response to the crisis. At the same 
time, the government affirmed its commitment to continue corporate gover-
nance reform, liberalization of financial markets, and the institutional rede-
sign of government financial and regulatory institutions.
The dire predictions in the news media proved incorrect, however. A 
number of indicators reported by the Bank of Korea3 suggest that the finan-
cial system stabilized by March 2009 and continued to improve throughout 
the year, in tandem with the real economy. By the end of 2009, the finan-
cial sector still had not achieved its pre-crisis levels of performance, but ap-
peared to be on the road to recovery; however, the financial system remains 
weaker than in the pre-crisis period in terms of nonperforming loans (NPLs) 
and delinquency rates for banks and non-bank financial institutions. 
As of the first quarter of 2010, Korean financial policy discussion was 
progressing in a calmer environment and focused on seven areas:
•	 Improve financial regulation and supervision to limit imprudent 
risk-taking by financial institutions in general.
•	 Limit risk-taking by both financial institutions and the household 
sector in mortgage lending and borrowing, to limit potential hous-
ing bubbles.
•	 Increase the ability of financial institutions to absorb declines in as-
set values.
•	 Monitor and implement policies to restrain and improve the quality 
of household and SME debt.
2 “South Korea–Second time around,” The Economist, October 25, 2009, 52–53.
3 Bank of Korea, Financial Stability Report: November 2009, http://www.bok.
or.kr/broadcast.action?menuNaviId=737.
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•	 Improve the foreign exchange demand-supply structure to reduce 
the susceptibility of banks to capital flight and internalize this risk 
into the bank decision-making process.
•	 Improve corporate governance at both financial and non-financial 
entities to improve efficiency.
•	 Design exit strategies for public injections of capital and purchases 
of nonperforming assets to limit moral hazard. 
As an export-oriented and non-reserve currency country, like many 
Asian countries, Korea is relatively sensitive to external shocks, whether fi-
nancial or real. The economy remains susceptible to capital flight and rapid 
currency depreciation; hence, establishing a transparent and sound finan-
cial system is a necessary condition for sustained economic growth. Like the 
1997 Asian crisis, the September 2008 global financial crisis revealed how 
vulnerable Korea was to capital flight. Korea’s foreign investment portfolio 
declined by 173.9 hundred million won in the fourth quarter of 2008, but 
returned to an upward trend from January 2009 and increased to 219.9 hun-
dred million won in the third quarter of 2009, reflecting the rapid restoration 
of confidence. This vulnerability to external shocks presents policy makers 
with both short- and long-run problems.
In the short run, Korea needs to establish policies and make institutional 
changes to enable the financial system to absorb external shocks. Judged 
by the response to the September 2008 shock, Korea has made significant 
progress in this regard compared to the 1997 crisis. At the same time, longer-
run issues remain. In the long run, Korea would benefit from reorienting its 
export-based development strategy from manufacturing-oriented exports to 
service/information-based exports as well as relying more on domestic de-
mand. Moreover, it should reduce its reliance on foreign currency financing 
and provide greater incentives for internal sources of funding by increasing 
the household saving rate and focusing more on domestic investment. How-
ever, the policy discussion of the longer-run problem has not progressed 
much beyond a general recognition there is a problem. The majority of the 
policy effort is directed toward the short run. While Korea is successfully 
dealing with the short-term issue, the financial system will remain exces-
sively susceptible to external developments if Korea’s economic structure 
remains unchanged; despite its relative size, as long as Korea stays commit-
ted to an export-growth strategy, it will be vulnerable to capital flight risk.
In this paper I examine the impact of the September 2008 shock on 
 Korea’s financial system in 2009 from several perspectives. First, I discuss the 
evolution of the Korean financial system in three stages (1953–1980; 1980–
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1997; and 1997–present) to provide a historical perspective on the Septem-
ber 2008 shock and rapid recovery of the financial system. Next, I consider 
pre-September 2008 issues in the Korean financial system. The attention of 
regulatory authorities was occupied by the increasing levels of household 
and government debt, housing price developments, and continued weak con-
dition of SMEs. In the next section I look at the impact of the September 2008 
shock on the financial system, its recovery and stabilization. Then, I identify 
those factors that enabled Korea’s financial system to absorb the shock and 
review the response of the Korean government to the September 2008 shock. 
I continue with a discussion of continuing concerns and challenges and con-
clude with a broad overview of the past decade.
Placing the September 2008 Crisis in Historical Context
To properly understand the accomplishments of Korean financial reform, as 
manifested by the events since September 2008, it is important to place them 
in the context of Korea’s financial evolution from 1953 up to the Septem-
ber 2008 crisis. The financial system (defined to include private depository 
institutions, private markets, government regulatory agencies, and central 
banking institutions) has experienced three major transitions4 since 1953.
Phase 1: 1953–1980
The first phase covers Korea’s nondemocratic and interventionist govern-
ment period. The industrial structure was dominated by large business 
groups (chaebŏl) with close ties to the government that controlled the fi-
nancial system. Industrial policy was directed toward heavy industry and 
chemicals. Korea grew rapidly, although unevenly, during this phase, accom-
panied by high and variable inflation and the accumulation of unsustain-
able imbalances in both the real and financial sectors. Korea’s NPL problem 
was large long before it emerged as a problem in the United States (1980s) 
and Japan (1990s). The financial system was an instrument of government-
directed industrial policy subject to extensive credit allocation and interest 
control policies directed toward favored sectors of the economy. Policy con-
flicts between the government and the central bank on occasion resulted in 
4 These three periods are also used to review the development of Bank of Korea 
policy in the postwar period. Thomas F. Cargill, “The Bank of Korea in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective,” Academic Paper Series on Korea 3 (2010), Korea Economic 
Institute and the Korea Institute of International Economic Policy.
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dismissal of Bank of Korea governors.5 Price stability and prudential policies 
took second place to government industrial objectives. The Bank of Korea, 
under the administration of the government, contributed to wide swings in 
the rate of inflation, supported financially weak corporations by making 
policy loans to specific sectors of the economy, and operated its discount 
window with the objective of preventing failures of financial institutions 
(mainly banks) and markets. The effects of unstable prices, support of fi-
nancially weak corporations, and the moral hazard implicit in Korea’s in-
dustrial policy were masked by rapid economic development through the 
1970s; however, by 1980 economic and financial distress accumulated to a 
point whereby regime change was necessary.
Phase 2: 1980–1997
Poor macroeconomic performance and international pressure to liberalize 
led to the second phase, commencing in the 1980s, which included a ma-
jor shift in political structure from authoritarian to more democratic insti-
tutions. Gross domestic product (GDP) declined in 1980, trade and current 
account deficits increased, foreign borrowing increased, and the consumer 
price index (CPI) inflation rate reached 28.6 percent. At the same time, Korea 
was being advised and pressured to liberalize its real and financial sectors to 
establish a more sustainable base for economic and financial stability. The 
Korean government officially adopted a liberalization policy in its Fifth Five-
Year Plan (1982–1986) and implemented it in two steps: first, to stabilize 
macroeconomic performance and second, to commence liberalization. The 
banking system was denationalized followed by interest rate deregulation 
and the initial development of money and capital markets. The Presiden-
tial Commission for Financial Reform, established in January 1997 on what 
would turn out to be the eve of the Asian financial crisis, released reports 
in April, June, and November of that year. The pace of financial liberaliza-
tion up to this point had been slow and most observers regarded the gov-
ernment’s commitment to liberalization weak. Liberalization was pursued 
more in response to external pressure, and many government officials found 
it difficult to understand why regime change was required when GDP growth 
was high and inflation moderate. The Presidential Commission was criti-
cal of the slow pace and recommended a much bolder policy to modernize 
 Korea’s financial system. At the time the Commission’s reports were released 
there was little impact, with only one exception: an intense debate emerged 
5 Bernhard Seliger, review of The Bank of  Korea: A History of  Fifty Years, by 
Myung-Chang, Chung, ed., Korean Studies Review 1 (2002), http://koreaweb.ws/ks/ksr/
ksr02-01.htm.
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in summer 1997 between the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy over moving bank supervision from the central bank to the 
ministry. However, this debate had more to do with labor union politics than 
financial reform. The impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on Korea dra-
matically changed both the context of the debate on financial liberalization 
and the attitudes of the Korean government on the need for regime change.
Phase 3: 1997 to September 2008
The 1997 crisis begins the third phase. The swiftness and magnitude of the 
economic and financial distress starting in late 1997 and the need to seek 
a $58 billion credit line from the IMF made the weakness of the financial 
system, the inadequacies of past liberalization efforts, and the need for re-
gime change apparent to the Korean authorities. The government launched 
a series of major structural reforms in the financial system, including: (1) 
a major injection of public funds into the banking system; (2) a dramatic 
decline in the number of financial institutions, achieved through closures 
and mergers; (3) increased capital requirements; (4) the purchase of NPLs by 
the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO); (5) institutional rede-
sign of the financial and regulatory regime to consolidate oversight, reduce 
political influence, and enhance transparency; and (6) institutional redesign 
of the Bank of Korea to reduce political pressure and increase transparen-
cy. Financial-sector reforms were accompanied by industrial restructuring 
to make large corporations and the chaebŏl system more market oriented 
and reduce their control over financial institutions, while reducing the role 
of government credit allocation policies. The bold approach recommend-
ed in early 1997 by the Presidential Commission on Financial Reform was 
made politically feasible by the crisis that erupted later in the year. Korea’s 
wide range of policy responses was followed by a return to rapid economic 
growth by late 1998. The nation’s aggressive efforts to resolve the NPL prob-
lem, close insolvent institutions, devote significant financial resources, and 
make significant institutional redesign of its financial system are remarkable.
Resolving the nonperforming loan problem
KAMCO played the major role in resolving Korea’s large NPL problem 
in the wake of the 1997 crisis, as shown in Table 2.1. KAMCO’s purchases 
rapidly reduced NPLs, both as a share of total loans and GDP for both banks 
and non-bank financial institutions, between March 1998 and December 
2002. KAMCO’s success was due to the fact that it was a “garage sale” in-
stitution rather than a warehouse. This provided an important signal the 
government’s response to the crisis would not be based on forgiveness and 
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forbearance, an approach pursued in some countries, including Japan. In-
stead, public funds would be used for a rapid resolution of the problem. KA-
MCO disposed the NPLs by bulk or pooled asset-backed securities (ABS) sales, 
individual sales, foreclosure and public auction, and joint partnerships. The 
pooled or ABS sales not only disposed of the NPLs, but also helped establish a 
secondary financial market that contributed to Korea’s increasingly sophis-
ticated money and capital markets.6
Institutional redesign
Four institutional reforms of the regulatory and central banking institu-
tions occurred that rendered the government’s role in the financial system 
and economy more transparent and less subject to political interference as 
in the past.
The establishment of the Financial Supervisory Commission in 1998 
and the Financial Supervisory Service in 1999 provided prudential regula-
tion over the financial system by increasing capital standards, reducing NPLs, 
introducing a meaningful system of classifying NPLs, reducing politicization 
of bank credit allocation, and increasing overall financial system transparen-
cy. The Financial Supervisory Service now provides timely and transparent 
6 He Dong, “The role of KAMCO in Resolving NPLs in the Republic of Korea,” IMF 
Working Paper, no. 04/12 (September 2004).
TABLE 2.1
NPLs and KAMCO Purchases of NPLs (1997–2002)
Mar-98 Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02
NPLs as Percentage  
of Total Loans
17.7 14.9 10.4 5.6 3.9
Banks 16.8 12.9 8.0 3.4 2.3
Nonbanks 20.5 23.0 23.6 13.7 9.8
NPLs as Percentage of 
GDP
26.6 18.2 12.4 7.2 5.3
Nov-97 to 
Mar-98
Mar-98 
to Dec-99 2000 2001 2002
KAMCO Purchases of 
NPLs (won trillions)
13.9 48.3 33.0 6.0 9.0
Banks 8.4 44.1 4.4 4.9 0.2
Non-banks 5.5 4.2 28.6 1.1 8.8
Source:  He Dong, “The role of KAMCO in Resolving NPLs in the Republic of Korea,” IMF Work-
ing Paper, no. 04/12 (September 2004).
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information on the financial performance of the most important financial 
institutions. These regulatory institutions established a prompt correction 
action framework to move aggressively against troubled financial institu-
tions; established an asset quality rating system for financial institutions; 
imposed a variety of prudential regulations regarding loans to individuals 
and business groups; improved corporate governance by requiring an out-
side director system for many financial institutions (including permitting 
foreigners to serve as directors); and enhanced accounting standards to pro-
vide a meaningful disclosure system.
The formal independence of the Bank of Korea was enhanced in 1998 
and 2003, and central bank policy became more transparent.7 The intro-
duction of an inflation-targeting framework established a firmer foundation 
for anchoring inflation expectations in the economy and reduced political 
influence on central bank credit allocation policies. The 2003 changes also 
provided the Bank of Korea with greater flexibility to support the payments 
system and be a lender of last resort.
The Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), established in 1996, 
was given the task of insuring deposits of banks, securities companies, in-
surance companies, merchant banks, and savings banks, thereby limiting 
systemic risk. This explicit form of government deposit guarantees is more 
transparent and less sensitive to political pressures than the previous implicit 
system.
KAMCO was originally established in 1962 to remove nonperforming as-
sets from the Korea Development Bank and its role was expanded to other 
financial institutions in 1966. In November 1997, KAMCO was reorganized to 
deal with the NPL problem, which increased significantly as a result of the 
1997 crisis. KAMCO is classified as a public nonbank financial corporation 
under the supervision of the Financial Supervisory Commission. It has been 
elevated to important safety-net position in the Korean financial system.
Recapitalization and restructuring financial institutions
The Korean government devoted significant public funds to restructur-
ing financial institutions, increasing prudential regulation, and increasing 
capital adequacy (see Table 2.2). According to the Bank of Korea,8 five banks 
that did not meet the eight percent Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
7 Thomas F. Cargill, “Central Bank Independence in Korea,” Journal of  the Ko-
rean Economy (Spring 2001): 1–33; and Thomas F. Cargill, “The Bank of Korea in His-
torical and Comparative Perspective,” Academic Paper Series on Korea 3 (2010), Korea 
Economic Institute and the Korea Institute of International Economic Policy.
8 “Recent Changes in the Financial System,” Bank of Korea, accessed November 
1, 2011, http://www.bok.or.kr/broadcast.action?menuNaviId=647.
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capital adequacy standard were closed in 1998, nine banks were merged into 
four banks in 1999, and two of these were merged into one bank in 2000. 
Eight banks were nationalized, some were sold, and the equity of some still 
remains with the KDIC. Even among the healthy banks, the government en-
couraged mergers. In the case of non-bank financial institutions, the govern-
ment closed 29 merchant banks, 15 securities companies, 15 asset manage-
ment companies, and 22 insurance companies from 1998 to June 2007. The 
total injection of public funds from November 1997 through June 2008 was 
168.5 trillion won (32 percent of GDP), of which 38.6 trillion won was the 
purchase of NPLs by KAMCO. The bulk of this injection was made from 1997 
to 2000.
Significant Commitment of  Public Funds
He in 2004 compared the fiscal costs of resolving the Korean banking crisis 
with nine other countries, including Japan and the United States.9 Of the 
four OECD economies, Korea’s fiscal response over the period from 1997 to 
9 He Dong, “The role of KAMCO in Resolving NPLs in the Republic of Korea,” IMF 
Working Paper, no. 04/12 (September 2004).
TABLE 2.2
Capital Adequacy and Profitability of Financial Institutions
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2006
Banks BIS Capital Ratio 9.3 7.0 10.8 10.8 10.4 12.4 12.3
NPL Ratio 5.2 6.0 13.6 3.3 2.7 1.3 0.9
ROA 0.3 -0.9 -1.3 0.8 0.1 1.2 1.1
ROE 4.2 -14.2 -23.1 15.9 2.2 20.3 15.6
Insurance 
Companies
Capital Ratio 0.1 -0.1 -5.4 1.2 6.5 8.3 8.3
NPL Ratio 5.3 4.1 3.4 3.0
ROA -0.1 -0.1 -4.4 -0.5 1.8 1.1 0.9
ROE -114.8 91.2 122.3 -111.4 34.1 13.7 12.9
Securities 
Companies
Capital Ratio 45.7 36.3 33.3 20.5 17.8 30.9 36.8
NPL Ratio 29.4 11.9 5.6
ROA 2.0 2.0 2.1 -0.8 -1.7 0.1 3.4
ROE 5.0 -5.7 9.3 -3.3 -7.3 0.3 14.3
Source:  Joon Ho Hahm, “Ten Years after the Crisis: Financial System in Transition in Korea,” in 
Ten Years after the Korean Crisis, eds. Meral Karasulu and Doo Yong Yang (Korea Institute for 
Economic Policy, 2008), 64–97.
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2000 was the largest as a share of GDP. Korea’s fiscal response was 32 percent 
of GDP;  in comparison, over the same period Japan’s fiscal response was 7 
percent of GDP, and the U.S. response to the 1984–1991 savings and loan 
crisis was 4 percent. As of 2004, the recovery rate of the public injection of 
funds (32 percent) compares favorably with Japan (16 percent) and is not far 
below the recovery rate in the United States (43 percent). Korea’s recovery 
rate as of early 2010 is estimated to be about 51 percent; however, recovery 
rates of other countries considered by He are not available for comparison.
As a result of the aggressive resolution of the NPL problem, restructur-
ing of the banking system, institutional redesign of regulatory and central 
banking institutions, and commitment of significant public funding, the Ko-
rean financial system emerged from the 1997 crisis more balanced and more 
reliant on commercial-based models. Moreover, foreign banks under foreign 
control have become a permanent and competitive part of the Korean finan-
cial system.10 The return to a stable financial and monetary environment, 
as illustrated in Table 2.2, was accompanied by recovery of the real sec-
tor. Korea’s GDP increased 12.8 percent in 1999 and 4.8 percent in 2000. By 
2005, most observers concluded that Korea had made significant progress in 
financial and corporate reform, especially in comparison with the limited 
progress before 1997.
Korea and Japan
Korea’s progress after 1997 stood in sharp contrast to Japan’s slow response 
to the collapse of asset prices in 1990/1991 that generated a “lost decade and 
a half” of economic and financial development;11 Korea’s recovery from the 
September 2008 shock likewise contrasts strongly with Japan’s. The com-
parison between these two countries is important because many regarded 
Korea as being in the shadow of Japan, partly because so many of Korea’s 
economic institutions were strongly influenced by that nation. Korea was 
often referred to during the 1980s and 1990s as “Asia’s next giant,” with the 
current giant being Japan. That comparison is no longer relevant. Korea 
in many respects is on a different and more sustainable development path, 
partly because of its greater willingness to make significant institutional 
changes and adapt more international perspectives than Japan.
Cargill and Patrick in 2005 attributed the differential response to the 
10 Thomas Byrne, “The Post-Crisis Transformation of Korea’s Banking System,” 
in Korea’s Economy 2005 (Seoul: Korea Economic Institute and the Korea Institute of 
International Economic Policy, vol. 21, 2005), 9–12.
11 Thomas F. Cargill and Takayuki Sakamoto, Japan Since 1980 (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008).
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1997 crisis to five factors: (1) the Bank of Korea established price stabil-
ity in contrast to the Bank of Japan, which permitted deflation after 1994; 
(2)  Korea relies more on external borrowing and has lower international re-
serves than Japan, giving it more incentive than Japan to reform its financial 
institutions to prevent capital flight; (3) the national consensus to end the re-
liance on an IMF bailout as soon as possible provided the Korean government 
with not only the will to make significant structural changes but the political 
power to overcome entrenched interests in the old regime; (4) Korea benefit-
ed from more effective leadership while Japan’s political distress in the 1990s 
matched its economic and financial problems; and (5) the macroeconomic 
decline in Korea was larger than in Japan and its geopolitical position rela-
tive to North Korea generated more intense pressure to reestablish stability.12
Additional factors now seem relevant. Japan lacked political leadership 
during the first few critical years of the crisis starting in late 1997 until early 
2001 when Junichiro Koizumi became prime minister. Politicians in Japan 
were focused more on adapting to a new electoral system (introduced in 
1994) than resolving the nation’s economic and financial problems. In con-
trast, Korea possessed a more stable political leadership. Japan, except in 
1997 and 1998, did not believe its economy to be in crisis, whereas Korea’s 
attitudinal change was remarkable after 1997 and has been more permanent. 
Japan was not as willing as Korea to devote public funding to resolving NPLs 
and recapitalizing the banking system, nor was Japan as willing to set off a 
“garage sale” for NPLs, but more inclined to rely on forgiveness and forbear-
ance. Japan already had a large amount of accumulated government debt, 
and conflicts between the Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance over mon-
etary policy reduced policy coordination; whereas Korea’s regulatory and 
central banking institutions cooperated to a high degree while at the same 
time enhancing the formal independence of the Bank of Korea. Koizumi pro-
vided the leadership, but not until 2003 did signs of recovery begin in Japan; 
however, the recovery was weak, deflationary trends continued through 2005 
and were dependent on exports to China. After the departure of Koizumi in 
September 2006, political distress returned to Japan; the new Japan Demo-
cratic Party appears willing to reduce the pace of structural reform and, in 
the case of Japan’s large postal savings system, to reverse the direction of 
structural reform that had been the hallmark of Koizumi’s reform program.
The different responses to the 1997 crisis are clearly apparent in how 
each country was impacted by the September 2008 crisis. Korea’s “V” shaped 
12 Thomas F. Cargill and Hugh Patrick, “Response to Financial and Economic Dis-
tress: South Korea and Japan,” in Korea’s Economy 2005 (Seoul: Korea Economic Insti-
tute and the Korea Institute of International Economic Policy, vol. 21, 2005), 17–22.
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recovery is impressive, while Japan continues to struggle with political and 
economic distress, and most recently the impact of the March 2011 tsunami.
Continuing Financial Concerns after the 1997 Crisis up to the 
September 2008 Shock
Korea’s economy and financial system recovered rapidly after the 1997 cri-
sis and meaningful institutional redesign of the financial system continued. 
Nevertheless, new problems emerged in the financial system, including ris-
ing household consumer and mortgage debt, increasing housing prices, and 
higher government debt.
The government encouraged domestic credit expansion, especially for 
consumer spending, to replace foreign borrowing as a demand driver af-
ter 1999 (see Table 2.3). It encouraged banks to expand credit to SMEs and 
consumers, and provided tax incentives to consumers making payments by 
credit cards.13 Consumer credit card use and credit card debt expanded rap-
idly, contributing to the run-up in household debt from 40 percent of GDP at 
the beginning of 2000 to more than 70 percent by the end of 2002. Moreover, 
the household saving rate fell sharply. Household loans increased at an aver-
age annual rate of 28.4 percent from 2001:1 to 2002:4 (see Table 2.3). The 
credit expansion bubble burst in 2003 in response to a rising rate of personal 
bankruptcy, financial problems in many credit card companies, and the rise 
in the central bank’s policy interest rate in May 2002 from 4 to 4.25 percent. 
GDP growth slowed to 3.6 percent in 2003 and the government bailed out a 
number of credit card companies, while allowing others to fail. 
Although the financial distress resulting from the collapse of the credit 
card bubble was relatively minor compared to the 1997 crisis, it demonstrat-
ed the need for greater prudential regulation over household and business 
credit. It illustrated the risk of credit-led expansion and heightened concern 
over increasing mortgage debt and rising housing prices (shown in Figures 
2.1 and 2.2). Nationwide house prices in real terms began to increase in 
2000, though with considerable volatility, after falling during most of the 
1990s. The increase after 2000, however, was moderate relative to the rapid 
increase in real housing prices in the late 1980s. Prices stabilized by 2005 and 
have declined only slightly in the two-year period 2008–2010. 
Nevertheless, the government became increasingly concerned in light of 
Japan’s experience with real estate prices in the second half of the 1980s 
13 Diego Valderrama, “After the Asian Financial Crisis: Can Rapid Credit Expan-
sion Sustain Growth?” FRBSF Economic Letter (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
no. 2004–38, December 24, 2004), http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/let-
ter/2004/el2004-38.pdf.
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TABLE 2.3
Household Debt (2001–2009)
Date
Loans to 
Households 
(won billions)
Change from 
previous 
quarter (%)
Housing-
related loans 
(won billions)
Change from 
previous 
quarter (%)
2000 1 199,399
2000 2 215,189
2000 3 227,073
2000 4 241,069
2001 1 249,491 25.12
2001 2 265,020 23.16
2001 3 283,213 24.72
2001 4 303,519 25.91
2002 1 328,829 31.80
2002 2 354,400 33.73
2002 3 379,940 34.15
2002 4 391,119 28.86
2003 1 396,754 20.66
2003 2 402,566 13.59
2003 3 409,558 7.80
2003 4 420,938 7.62
2004 1 425,689 7.29
2004 2 433,759 7.75
2004 3 441,197 7.73
2004 4 449,398 6.76
2005 1 453,111 6.44
2005 2 468,678 8.05
2005 3 480,650 8.94
2005 4 493,469 9.81 208,422
2006 1 500,846 10.53 212,139  
2006 2 516,662 10.24 222,091  
2006 3 529,453 10.15 228,607  
2006 4 550,431 11.54 240,951 15.61
2007 1 555,278 10.87 243,569 14.82
2007 2 564,723 9.30 242,979 9.41
2007 3 578,496 9.26 244,044 6.75
2007 4 595,397 8.17 245,764 2.00
2008 1 604,981 8.95 244,820 0.51
2008 2 622,895 10.30 248,748 2.37
2008 3 637,708 10.24 251,990 3.26
2008 4 648,327 8.89 254,736 3.65
2009 1 647,689 7.06 260,444 6.38
2009 2 661,514 6.20 266,485 7.13
2009 3 675,584 5.94 270,049 7.17
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System (ECOS).
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FIGuRE 2.1 Korean Housing Prices Index (1988–2008)
Notes: 1. Data includes single-family homes and apartments. The index is deflated by the overall 
consumer price index  2. December 2008=100  3. Kangnam is an area of Seoul.
Source: Kookmin Bank, National Housing Price Survey, and 2009 Economic Survey of  Korea, 
OECD.
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FIGuRE 2.2 Percentage Change in Korean Housing Prices (1988–2008)
Notes: 1. Data includes single-family homes and apartments.  2. Percentage change is year-on-year, 
adjusted for inflation  3. Kangnam is an area of Seoul.
Source: Kookmin Bank, National Housing Price Survey, and 2009 Economic Survey of  Korea, 
OECD.
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and the more recent concern about housing price developments in a wide 
number of countries, including the United States. The trends shown in 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2, when compared internationally, suggest that housing 
price developments in Korea were not as troubling as in other countries.14 
In addition, Korea’s housing price increases cannot be attributed directly 
to monetary policy,15 as was the case in Japan during the second half of the 
1980s, or in the United States during the first half of the 2000s. Instead, they 
are more the outcome of fundamentals shaped by the government’s housing 
policy. The Bank of Korea “leaned against” the credit expansion starting in 
late 2005 when it increased the base rate from 3.25 to 3.5 percent in October 
2005 and continued to increase the base rate until it reached 5.25 percent in 
August 2008. In addition, regulatory authorities adopted a large number of 
policies, aimed at both the demand and supply sides of the housing market, 
to limit price increases.16
Along with the growth of household debt, there was concern over the 
significant increase in government debt. Before the 1990s, there was little 
government debt, but by the end of 2005 it had reached 31 percent of GDP. 
Much of the increase resulted from the infusion of public funds into the 
banking system in 1998 and 1999. Although the ratio was low compared 
to the OECD average of 77 percent, the increase prompted a major change 
in the role of government debt in the financial system. Much of the debt 
accumulation was the result of recapitalizing the banking system, assisting 
in closures and mergers, and purchasing NPLs. A total of 168.5 trillion won 
of public funds were injected into the financial system from November 1997 
through June 2008: 63.5 trillion won for recapitalization, 38.6 trillion won 
for purchases of NPLs, and 30.3 trillion won for deposit insurance claims.17 
These funds were distributed mainly through the KDIC and KAMCO. 
Although the major chaebŏl adopted more commercial-based corporate 
governance structures and have improved in productivity and profitability, 
there is continued concern over the financial condition and sustainability of 
SMEs. They have not been as aggressive as the chaebŏl in reforming their busi-
ness model, and government subsidization of the SME is deep and increas-
ing. In addition, the labor union relationship with the SMEs makes struc-
14 OECD, “Reforming housing and regional policies in Korea,” in Economic Survey 
of  Korea, 2007 (Paris: OECD, 2007), 61–89.
15 Song Joonhyuk, “House Prices and Monetary Policy: A Dynamic Factor Model 
for Korea,” Journal of  the Korean Economy 9 (December 2008): 467–496.
16 OECD, Economic Survey of  Korea, 2007.
17 Bank of Korea, “Recent Changes in the Financial System,” accessed November 
1, 2011, http://www.bok.or.kr/broadcast.action?menuNaviId=647. 
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tural reform difficult. This is an issue not only for the SMEs but also for the 
banking system, as banks have a large exposure to SME loans. The share of 
banks’ loans to large companies has steadily declined since the early 1990s as 
corporations took advantage of expanding money and capital markets and 
reduced their reliance on bank credit. More recently, large companies relied 
on internal sources of funds. At the same time, the share of banks’ loans to 
SMEs has steadily increased.
The September 2008 shock, recovery and stabilization
Korea’s economy was already slowing prior to the September 2008 shock 
as a result of the recession that had begun in the United States in Decem-
ber 2007, increasing oil prices, and tighter monetary policy as the Bank of 
Korea “leaned against” housing price increases. There was little evidence of 
financial stress, however, and little advance warning the U.S. financial system 
would unravel so quickly following the September 2008 shock. The Septem-
ber shock dramatically impacted Korea’s financial system with spillover ef-
fects on the macro economy that continue to the present. The immediate 
effect on Korea’s financial system included: (1) an increased spread between 
corporate and Treasury bond yields as investors shifted to safer assets; (2) 
capital flight and rapid depreciation of the won; (3) the reduced ability of 
Korean banks to borrow in the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
market; (4) reduced availability and increased cost of bank credit; and (5) 
increased bankruptcy risk for households and SMEs. A mild depreciation of 
the won in the first half of 2008 accelerated, and between September 2008 
and March 2009 the won depreciated rapidly. Bond and stock prices also fell 
significantly and bank risk increased dramatically, as measured by the LIBOR-
OI spread and the TED spread.
Despite fears of a repeat of the 1997 crisis, the Korean financial sys-
tem stabilized by March 2009 and by the end of the year had overcome the 
September 2008 shock without the type of damage resulting from the 1997 
crisis. Nonetheless, the condition of the financial system at the start of 2010 
remained weaker than before September 2008, and there is a risk of moral 
hazard problems because of the large government injection of funds and 
guarantees to stabilize financial markets and institutions. In spite of this, 
2009 is a success story for the Korean financial system, demonstrating the 
effectiveness of the extensive set of financial reforms enacted in response to 
the 1997 crisis. Considering Korea’s financial system in the 1960s and how it 
responded to the September 2008 shock, the evolution is an odyssey from an 
unsustainable to sustainable financial and monetary environment.
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The Bank of Korea’s November 2009 Financial Stability Report con-
cluded: 
The Korean financial system, which had suffered severe instability 
following the global financial crisis in the latter half of 2008, regained 
stability at a rapid pace from the beginning of 2009. Stability returned 
to the financial markets and there was an overall improvement in for-
eign exchange soundness against the background of the reduction of 
systemic risk in the international financial markets. There was also an 
improvement in the soundness of financial institutions’ management.18
The official conclusion is supported by a wide range of indicators, nota-
bly the condition of financial institutions in general and banks in particular. 
The greatest concern was the condition of the banking system, which by 
2008 had reemerged as the primary source of indirect finance. Despite sig-
nificant growth in bond and commercial paper markets, Korea’s financial 
system remains “bank-centered” and the banking system has become more 
concentrated over the past decade.19 Non-bank financial institution share in 
indirect financing peaked at a little over 50 percent prior to the 1997 crisis. 
As a result of closings, mergers, and acquisitions, non-bank financial insti-
18 Bank of Korea, Financial Stability Report: November 2009.
19 Joon Ho Hahm, “Ten Years after the Crisis: Financial System in Transition in 
Korea” in Ten Years after the Korean Crisis, eds. Meral Karasulu and Doo Yong Yang, 
(Korea Institute for Economic Policy, 2008), 64–97.
TABLE 2.4
Loans, Loan Quality and BIS Capital Adequacy Ratio for Nationwide Banks
Date
Total 
Loans 
(won 
trillions)
Change 
(%)
Substandard 
or Below to 
Total Loans 
(%)
Loan Loss 
Reserves to 
Substandard 
Loans or 
Below (%)
BIS Capital 
Adequacy 
Ratio (%)
After-
Tax 
Profit 
(won 
trillions)
2002 432.2 2.40 83.50 10.46 2.90
2003 463.9 7.33 2.80 82.10 10.34 0.20
2004 473.0 1.96 2.00 96.60 11.31 5.90
2005 503.0 6.34 1.30 115.40 12.51 8.60
2006 591.3 17.55 0.90 160.40 12.41 8.10
2007 670.9 13.46 0.70 191.80 12.00 9.40
2008 784.7 16.96 1.20 151.60 12.75 5.20
Jun-09 778.5 -0.79 1.60 125.40 14.29 1.50
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, December 2009.
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tutions’ share in indirect finance declined to a little over 30 percent by 2005. 
The share of bank finance increased to its pre-crisis level.
Total loan growth of nationwide banks, which account for about 90 per-
cent of total bank deposits and loans, declined sharply between the end of 
2008 and June 2009 (Table 2.4). The ratio of substandard or below loans 
to total loans had increased as of June 2009, although it is still lower than 
2002–2004. The ratio of loss reserves to substandard or below has declined 
since 2007 but remains 25 percent above substandard loans as of June 2009, 
TABLE 2.5
Loans, Loan Quality and BIS Capital Adequacy Ratio for Specialized Banks
Total 
Loans (won 
trillions)
Change 
(%)
Substandard 
or Below to 
Total Loans 
(%)
Loan Loss 
Reserves to 
Substandard 
Loans or 
Below (%)
BIS Capital 
Adequacy 
Ratio (%)
Sep-08 417.2 0.83 184.77 11.24
Dec-08 432.9 3.76 1.11 147.78 11.59
Mar-09 453.0 4.64 1.34 135.46 12.16
Jun-09 451.6 -0.31 1.41 131.61 12.91
Sep-09 447.2 -0.97 1.41 131.87 13.51
Source: Bank of Korea, ECOS—Economic Statistics System.
TABLE 2.6
Total Loans, Loan Quality and Net Profit of Non-Bank Financial Institutions
Loans (won 
trillions)  Change (%)
Substandard 
Loans or 
Below to Total 
Loans
Net Profit 
(won billions)
2002 189 5.2 3,280
2003 177 -6.50 6.2 9,905
2004 180 1.86 5.3 198
2005 202 12.20 5.2 3,056
2006 230 13.64 4.1 5,096
2007 266 15.57 3.4 5,380
2008 278 4.63 3.6 3,765
Jun-09 297 6.94 4.0 2,310
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea.
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thanks to the upward trend in reserves from 2002 to 2007. The Bank for In-
ternational Settlements (BIS) capital adequacy ratio has generally increased 
in recent years and, as of June 2009, was higher than at any time since 2002. 
This reflected the government’s infusion of public funds to ensure public con-
fidence in the banking system, government pressure for banks to strengthen 
their capital base, and the slower growth of loans. After-tax profits declined 
in 2008–2009, but remain positive.
The two largest specialized banks, Korea Development Bank and Indus-
trial Bank of Korea,20 have performed much the same as nationwide banks in 
2009 with respect to loans and loan quality, as seen in Table 2.5. Capital ad-
equacy has increased and profits have remained positive. The performance 
of non-bank financial institutions is much the same with the exception of 
the savings bank sector (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7). The savings bank sector 
and nonbank credit card companies have been the weak sectors of nonbank 
financial institutions. After the collapse of credit companies in 2003 and 
the subsequent reforms, credit card companies improved and were in a bet-
ter position to absorb the September 2008 shock. However, savings banks 
remain a problem. Net income for savings banks declined by 81 percent and 
the already-high delinquency rate increased further after September 2008. 
20 Korea has four specialized banks: Korea Development Bank, Industrial Bank 
of Korea, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, and the National Federation 
of Fisheries Cooperatives. The Korea Development Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea 
are by far the largest of the specialized banks. These are policy banks supported by the 
government to target certain sectors of the economy to achieve specific policy objectives. 
These banks are regulated separately from commercial banks because of the policy loan 
objectives, although they are subject to the general application of the Banking Act. 
TABLE 2.7
Net Income, Delinquency Ratio and BIS Capital Adequacy Ratio
Jun-08 Jun-09
Savings Banks
Net Income (Won Billions) 3,782 725
Delinquency Ratio 14.00 15.80
BIS Ratio 9.16 9.80
Nonbank Credit Card Companies
Net Income (Won Billions) 11,133 9,806
Delinquency Ratio 3.43 3.10
BIS Ratio 25.40 28.20
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea.
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Savings bank delinquency rates are higher than at banks because many of 
their customers (households and SMEs) are unable to secure credit from the 
banking sector. 
In sum, the September 2008 shock reduced loan growth at all types of 
Korean financial institutions and in general lowered loan quality. However, 
bank capital adequacy increased, reserves exceeded substandard or below 
loans at banks, and institutions were profitable by end of 2009. While these 
institutions will need to deal with reduced loan quality, they appear finan-
cially sound and, in the absence of another shock, should continue to im-
prove their performance in 2010. The weak financial condition of the savings 
banks is the exception.
Accounting for Korea’s Success
There are three factors accounting for the Korean financial system’s success 
in absorbing the September 2008 shock. First, the policies and institutional 
redesign of Korea’s regulatory and central banking institutions in response 
to the 1997 crisis rendered the financial system more efficient, transparent, 
flexible, and stable. Second, large corporations and financial institutions 
were sound at the time of the September 2008 crisis in terms of NPLs, loan 
loss reserves, and profitability. Third, the government response was rapid, 
substantial, and in most cases, transparent. Each will be discussed in turn. 
The elements of the first factor have been covered above and they pro-
vided the foundation for the second factor in Korea’s success. Corporations, 
banks, and non-bank financial institutions were sound and well positioned 
to absorb the shock in late 2008. The numerous reforms of the financial 
system, corporate governance, and institutional redesign of government 
regulatory and central banking institutions established a more sound, trans-
parent and flexible financial structure. At the time of the September 2008 
shock, profitability, return on assets, ratio of substandard or below loans, 
delinquency rates for SME and household loans, and BIS capital adequacy all 
indicated a sound financial system. Although the government was concerned 
about housing price increases, there was little probability of a rapid decline 
in prices, and any decline would not have the effect on the financial or real 
sectors as occurred in some OECD countries because of government-imposed 
prudential regulations on mortgage lenders since 2002, in the form of loan-
to-value (LTV) ratios of 40 to 60 percent and debt-to-income ratios of about 
40 percent. Some news accounts suggested Korean banks had funded do-
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mestic lending with foreign borrowing21 as in 1997; however, this was not 
correct, according to government officials.22 The loan-to-deposit ratios at 
year-end 2007 and year-end 2008 were 104.4 and 101.6 percent, respectively, 
if deposits include CDs. Excluding CDs, the respective ratios were 123.9 and 
118.8 percent. In addition, Korean officials pointed out that foreign currency 
liabilities are balanced with foreign currency assets. However, these state-
ments were misleading and masked a serious problem discussed below.
The risk of prolonged won depreciation in 2008 appeared smaller than 
a decade earlier, given the improved foundation of the Korean banking sys-
tem and larger holdings of international reserves.23 At the end of June 2008, 
Korea’s external debt was $420 billion, of which almost one-third was not 
subject to repayment burdens (pre-foreign direct investment funding, for-
eign exchange forward hedging of pre-contracted future cash flows, and ad-
vanced receipts for shipbuilding contracts). In 1997, international reserves 
were small relative to the size of external debt and much of the international 
reserve holdings were of low quality and difficult for outsiders to evaluate. 
The situation in September 2009 was different. The size of reserves—at 
about $250 billion—was large relative to external debt, most reserves were 
held in bonds rated AA or above, and the government was transparent about 
its holdings of international reserves. At the same time, Korea’s financial 
system remained sensitive to foreign borrowing. Finally, fiscal and monetary 
policy instruments were in a strong position to respond to the adverse im-
pacts of the shock. While the position of fiscal policy was similar to that in 
1998, monetary policy during the decade had matured and become a more 
flexible instrument of policy. The institutional redesign of the Bank of Ko-
rea toward greater formal independence and transparency rendered it better 
able to response to the crisis than in 1998. 
The Korean government response was rapid, aggressive and, in contrast 
to the 1997 crisis, transparent.24 Stabilization of the financial system and the 
21 Martin Fackler, “Financial Crisis Spreads to Emerging Nations,” New York 
Times, October 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/worldbusiness/ 
24won.html.
22 Financial Services Commission and Financial Supervisory Service, “Domestic 
Banks’ Loan to Deposit Ratio,” October 13, 2008.
23 Financial Supervisory Service, “Text of Governor Kim Chang’s Conference Call 
with Institutional Investors,” October 14, 2008; and Financial Services Commission, 
“Korea’s Financial Market and Economy: Resilience Amid Turbulence,” December 2008.
24 Reports, news releases and conferences with market participants by high rank-
ing regulatory officials of the Financial Supervisory Service, the Financial Supervisory 
Commission, and the Bank of Korea provided detailed information to the public and 
especially the foreign sector to assess the condition of the financial system and economy.
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real sector was achieved by a combination of fiscal policy, monetary policy 
(including unorthodox measures) and financial-regulation policy.
The Bank of Korea sharply eased monetary policy by cutting the policy 
interest rate six times from 5.25 percent in September 2008 to the current 
2010 level of 2 percent. In addition, it increased open market operations, 
broadened the range of assets eligible for open market operations, raised 
the ceilings on their credit ceiling program, paid interest to banks on their 
required reserve balances and contributed to the Bond Market Stabilization 
Fund and the Bank Recapitalization Fund. To support the won, the Bank 
of Korea entered into dollar swaps with the U.S. Federal Reserve and yuan 
swaps with the People’s Bank of China in November 2009, and expanded the 
yen swap arrangement with the Bank of Japan. The Bank provided a $100 
billion guarantee on foreign bank liabilities in October 2008, when they were 
estimated to be about $80 billion. In May 2009 this guarantee was extended 
to cover newly acquired foreign liabilities through the end of the year. 
Financial and regulatory policy was designed to remove NPLs from the 
balance sheets of financial and non-financial institutions, and achieve re-
capitalization of banks and stabilization of capital markets. The most note-
worthy elements of this policy are programs to assist SMEs. The Korean gov-
ernment instructed banks to automatically roll over existing loans to SMEs. 
In October 2008, the government increased the loan guarantee percentage 
for SMEs from 85 to 95 percent, provided 100 percent guarantees for targeted 
sectors (exports, green growth, start-ups and high technology), and intro-
duced a Fast Track system for SME access to bank credit. As of July 2009, 
nearly 18 trillion won (2 percent of GDP) had been provided to almost 10,000 
SMEs under the Fast Track system.25 Finally, the government established a 
“win-win guarantee program” in January 2009. The program involves con-
tributions by large corporations or local governments to the Korea Credit 
Guarantee Fund and other funds that guarantee loans to SMEs. The govern-
ment’s policies toward SMEs were intended to prevent large-scale bankruptcy 
by encouraging continued bank lending. 
The government established a 40 trillion won (4 percent of GDP) Cor-
porate Restructuring Fund to address the NPL problem. KAMCO will play a 
leading role in purchasing nonperforming assets from financial institutions 
and companies through this fund.26 As of October 2009, KAMCO and the 
25 Financial Services Commission and Financial Supervisory Service, “SME Loans 
& Credit Guarantees in the First Half of 2009,” July 17, 2009.
26 Financial Services Commission, “Bank Recapitalization Fund: Timetable and 
Operational Plan,” February 25, 2009; and “Notice of Amendments to the Korea Asset 
Management Corporation (KAMCO) Act’s Enforcement Decree,” May 4, 2009.
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fund had spent 4.1 trillion won, of which half was to purchase NPLs (1.2 
trillion won by KAMCO and 0.8 trillion won by the fund) with the remain-
der for purchases of physical assets and to support corporate restructuring. 
In December 2009, the government established a 20 trillion won (2 percent 
of GDP) Bank Recapitalization Fund to purchase subordinated bonds, pre-
ferred stock, etc. Banks, holding companies, the Industrial Bank of Korea, 
National Agricultural Co-operative Federation and the National Federation 
of Fisheries Co-operatives can apply for funds. One of the goals of the fund 
is to support SMEs by extending new credit lines, rolling over existing loans, 
and expanding credit guarantee schemes. The Korean government created 
the Stock Market Stabilization Fund and the Long-term Corporate Bond 
Fund as temporary measures to support the capital markets. The two funds 
are relatively small and were a waste of resources given the size of the mar-
kets.
Assessment and Areas of  Concern 
Despite Korea’s success story in responding to the 2008 financial crisis, a 
number of longer-run issues continue to present challenges to the Korean 
government. These include: housing and mortgage debt; non-mortgage con-
sumer debt; SME credit risk; susceptibility to capital flight; and the need to 
develop an exit strategy to minimize moral hazard.
After falling in late 2008, housing prices resumed their upward trend 
in nominal terms by mid-2009; however, in real terms housing prices have 
stabilized. Mortgage debt continues to increase, supported by the expecta-
tion of higher housing prices and the liquidity injected into the financial 
system by the government response to the September 2008 shock. The pace 
of house price increases is moderate compared to the rates seen during hous-
ing bubbles in other OECD countries. The housing situation is not as unstable 
or unsustainable as in Japan in the late 1980s or in the United States in the 
2000s, but for different reasons.27 The Bank of Korea “leaned against” up-
ward pressure on housing prices and the government reacted in 2005–2006 
to limit the demand for housing and to stimulate the supply. 
The most important step toward reducing the potential of a housing 
bubble was the introduction of regulations on LTV and debt-to-income (DTI) 
27 In Japan, the housing (and equity) bubble was supported by the close relation-
ship between bank capital, bank lending, equity prices and land prices combined with 
easy monetary policy and weak regulatory oversight. In the United States, the housing 
bubble was supported by the social contract to support housing through government 
sponsored agencies (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) combined with easy monetary policy 
and weak regulatory oversight. 
TABLE 2.8
LTV ratio on Bank Lending (February 2010)
Type of  
district
Type of  
collateral
Loan maturity and amount
(Korean won)
LTV ceiling 
(%)
Speculative 
area
Apartment
10 years or less 40
More than 
10 years
> 600 million 40
≤ 600 million 60
Non-apartment 
home
3 years or less 50
More than 3 years 60
Non-
speculative 
area
Apartment
3 years or less 60
More than 3 years 60
Non-apartment 
home
3 years or less 60
More than 3 years 60
Seoul 
Metropolitan 
area 
(excluding 
speculative 
area)
Apartment
10 years or less 50
More than 
10 years
> 600 million 50
≤ 600 million 60
Non-apartment 
home
3 years or less 50
More than 3 years 60
Source:  Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea.
TABLE 2.9
Korean Government SEM Support Programs 
Year Won Billions
1997 3,073
1998 5,163
1999 6,248
2000 5,005
2001 5,031
2002 5,567
2003 6,245
2004 6,322
2005 6,172
2006 6,104
2007 5,698
2008 5,680
2009 10,120
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea.
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ratios. In 2002, the government imposed LTV ratios for bank mortgage lend-
ing in both speculative and non-speculative zones. Speculative zones were 
areas where housing price increases were the most rapid and appeared to be 
driven more by expected price increases than fundamentals. There were 92 
speculative zones covering 37 percent of Korea’s regional districts in 2002; by 
2010, this had shrunk to only three speculative zones within Seoul represent-
ing 1.2 percent of regional districts. The LTV ratios for banks and insurance 
companies (shown in Table 2.8) are identical, ranging from 40 percent in 
speculation zones to 60 percent in other areas. However, savings banks and 
other financial institutions operate with lower restrictions. The LTV ratios 
are enforced by a combination of regulatory oversight and self-regulation 
for some sectors. The LTV and DTI ratios were the most stringent in the OECD 
area, thus explaining why housing prices in Korea have been relatively stable 
compared to other OECD countries. Self regulation may have contributed to 
a stable housing market; however, self regulation is a weak reed for pruden-
tial policy in the future.
Thus, while housing and mortgage credit will be a continuing concern 
to the Korean government, this is not a major long-run issue that threatens 
the stability of the financial system as it did in Japan or the United States. 
TABLE 2.10
SME Bank Loans and Percent Guaranteed by Public Institutions
SME Bank Loans 
(won trillions) Guaranteed (%)
December-03 238.0
June-04 247.9
December-04 244.1
June-05 250.0
December-05 256.5 14.1
June-06 279.1 13.0
December-06 301.8 11.1
June-07 339.8 10.4
December-07 370.0 9.4
June-08 405.2 9.0
December-08 422.4 9.1
March-09 432.2 10.6
June-09 438.6 11.8
Source:  Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea.
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Nonetheless, this does not reduce the growing concern over the general in-
debtedness of the average Korean household. Household debt is about 150 
percent of disposal income and growing relative to income. 
SME credit risk is a more serious problem than housing and mortgage 
debt. Korean SMEs have long been supported by the Korean government and 
recent policy actions have extended that support. They are a major part of 
Korean’s industrial structuring, accounting for up to 50 percent of manufac-
turing output and 32 percent of exports.28 Table 2.9 indicates the amount of 
government spending on SME support programs from 1997 to 2009. Table 
2.10 indicates the total bank loans to SMEs and the percent guaranteed by 
public institutions from December 2003 through June 2009.
Despite extensive government support even before the September 2008 
shock, SMEs in Korea did not perform as well as large corporations, as is 
the case for SMEs in many countries. Their limited access to finance and 
lack of economies of scale make it more difficult to compete; however, the 
situation is somewhat unique in Korea. SMEs have long received government 
support and despite post-1997 crisis reforms, support has not declined sig-
nificantly—in fact, it increased in 2009. The large corporations which were 
part of the chaebŏl structure were the focal point of corporate reform after 
1997 because the chaebŏl were at the center of a credit allocation system 
that had weakened Korea’s financial system and generated an inefficient al-
location of credit. In order to prevent widespread bankruptcy among SMEs 
and potential labor union problems at that time, the government essentially 
bailed out these institutions rather than requiring the aggressive restructur-
ing applied to the large corporations.29 This differential approach, combined 
with generous support from the government for the SME sector, generated 
a moral hazard problem that continues to the present. One of the reasons 
for the relatively poor performance of SMEs is their dependence on govern-
ment guarantees that have been extended in response to the September 2008 
shock.
Korea continues to be susceptible to currency flight, and Deputy Gov-
ernor Kyungsoo Kim of the Bank of Korea recently summed up Korea’s 
problem in this regard.30 After the 1997 crisis, Korea’s foreign debt problem 
28 Stijn Claessens and Dongsoo Kang, “Corporate Sector Restructuring in Korea: 
Status and Challenges,” in Ten Years after the Korean Crisis, ed. Meral Karasulu and 
Doo Yong Yang (Korea Institute for Economic Policy, 2008), 103–148.
29 Ibid., 125.
30 Kyungsoo Kim, “Global Financial Crisis and Korean Economy” (paper, pre-
sented at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Asia Economic Policy Conference, 
October 2009), http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/aepc/2009/09_Kim.pdf.
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was not one of balance between external debt and external assets (shown in 
Table 2.11), but one of asymmetry in that the majority of assets were held 
by the monetary authority and the majority of debt held by the banking 
system. This situation has remained much the same since 2005 and was the 
reason some viewed the Korean banking system at the edge of the abyss be-
cause the risk of foreign debt was concentrated there. As I suggested earlier, 
this is one case in which the Korean government’s news releases were less 
than transparent. As Korea’s economy expands, banks become increasingly 
dependent on foreign borrowing but lack the foreign assets to offset the debt. 
As a result there is a tendency for bubble and burst cycles. The foreign debt 
supports domestic spending, which manifests itself in outlets like increasing 
housing prices, and when the inevitable decline comes because of some ex-
ternal or internal shock, the reversed capital inflow causes financial distress. 
External liberalization in Korea has increased its economy’s sensitivity to 
sudden capital outflows.
Deputy Governor Kim indicated three possible solutions: increase hold-
ings of international reserve assets by the monetary authority; use capital 
controls; or internalize the risk of foreign borrowing to the banking system 
TABLE 2.11
External Debt and Assets (period end, USD billions)
2005 2006 2007 2008:2 2008 2009:1
External Debt 187.9 260.1 382.2 419.8 381.3 369.3
(Short Term) 65.9 113.7 160.3 176.2 151.1 148.1
Banks 83.4 136.5 194.0 210.5 171.7 161.9
(Short Term) 51.3 96.1 134.0 146.7 113.0 103.8
External Assets 308.6 366.7 417.7 422.5 348.2 345.6
(Short Term) 212.4 242.8 266.3 261.8 279.6 278.8
Banks 53.0 63.2 76.4 84.5 83.0 77.3
(Short Term) 39.0 39.9 45.5 51.9 52.4 47.2
External Debt to External 
Assets
0.61 0.71 0.92 0.99 1.10 1.07
External Debt to External 
Assets (Short Term)
1.32 2.41 2.95 2.83 2.16 2.20
External Debt to External 
Assets Held by Banks
1.57 2.16 2.54 2.49 2.07 2.09
Source: Kyungsoo Kim, “Global Financial Crisis and Korean Economy” (paper, presented at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Asia Economic Policy Conference, October 2009), http://
www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/aepc/2009/09_Kim.pdf.  Ratios computed from original 
data.
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to provide incentives to monitor this source of funds more carefully. The 
first two would be ineffective, while the third option has potential: much like 
risk-based deposit insurance premiums or capital asset requirements, impos-
ing a risk premium on bank foreign debt would provide incentives for banks 
to manage foreign borrowing more prudently. 
The large injection of public funds, guarantees, government purchases 
of bank-subordinated debt and, especially, expanded support of the SMEs, 
present Korea with a difficult policy problem. History has shown there is a 
tendency for governments in the face of financial distress to first deny the 
problem; after denial is no longer possible, to understate the problem with 
creative accounting, etc.; and, after understatement is no longer credible, to 
engage in policies of forgiveness and forbearance. This scenario has been 
repeated many times in the past three decades; even the United States, with 
one of the world’s most transparent and open financial systems, presented a 
classic example of this sequence during the savings and loan crisis. The sce-
nario describes a common response to financial crisis in many countries, in-
cluding Korea’s own response up to the 1997 crisis. The September 2008 cri-
sis demonstrated a major change in Korean policy: Korea clearly recognized 
the crisis, in most cases did not understate the crisis, and took aggressive and 
transparent action to support the financial system. It would be a mistake to 
characterize the extensive government support of banks, non-bank finan-
cial institutions, and SMEs as forgiveness and forbearance as practiced in the 
past; however, there is a moral hazard problem. The greater the government 
role in supporting the financial system, the less likely institutions will adopt 
market principles. Bankruptcy plays an important role in the allocation of 
real and financial resources and the more extensive the government effort 
to prevent or limit bankruptcy, the longer the period of distress. This is a 
difficult position for Korean authorities (and Asian governments in general) 
where the financial system is seen more as a social matrix of participants as 
much as it is an economic matrix.31
Conclusion
The transition of the Korean financial system from the early years of postwar 
development to a mature system that capably responded to the September 
2008 shock and returned to stability after only a few months is a remarkable 
odyssey. The response of Korea’s financial system to the U.S. September 2008 
crisis demonstrated the success of the policies and institutional redesign of 
31 Chang Lee, “The State and Institutions in East Asian Economic Development,” 
Journal of  the Korean Economy 3, no. 1 (2002): 1–17. 
Thomas F. Cargill
71
Korea’s financial and monetary institutions following the 1997 crisis. The 
institutionally-stronger financial system was a conducive environment for 
the aggressive and generally transparent government reaction in terms of 
regulatory, fiscal, and monetary policy. Korea’s financial system in the year 
following the crisis has in general been a success story.
Korea has turned from crisis management to dealing with more longer 
run issues. On December 16, 2009, the Financial Services Commission an-
nounced an agenda for financial policy in 2010 consisting of five objectives: 
funding economic revitalization; establishing a robust financial system; im-
proving competitiveness of the financial sector; increasing support for low-
income households and making financial markets more accessible to mid- to 
low income households; and increasing Korea’s recognition in the global 
financial market.32
The Korean government is clearly continuing the liberalization of finan-
cial markets. This is a positive sign. Korea has not been part of the backlash 
against liberalized financial markets in the United States or Japan. It is no-
table the Korean government recognizes the need to reduce and internalize to 
banks the risk of reliance on foreign sources of funds; to improve transpar-
ency in reporting by financial institutions; to enhance prudential regulation 
over lending such as LTV and DTI ratios; and to encourage continued corpo-
rate governance reforms in both the real and financial sectors. 
At the same time, Korea, like many Asian economies, views the finan-
cial system more than just a market for funds but, just as importantly, as a 
social matrix of support for businesses and households as part of the social 
contract between the people and the government—hence, the willingness of 
the Korean government to subsidize lending and provide loan guarantees as 
aggressively as pursued in late 2008 and early 2009. The greater government 
support, however, the more pervasive moral hazard and less incentive to ra-
tionally allocate resources. The Korean government recognizes the need for 
an exit strategy and appears to be making tentative steps in that direction. 
Overall, the odyssey of the Korean financial system is impressive, but at 
the same time, the continuing support of the rather extensive SME sector and 
large expansion of liquidity in response to the September 2008 shock expose 
Korea to serious moral hazard problems. Continued reliance on export-led 
economic growth exposes Korea to shocks and limits the nation’s flexibility 
to respond to shocks. Reducing the support system and changing develop-
ment strategy have been a challenge and to date, Korea has made little prog-
ress on these issues. 
32 Financial Services Commission, “2010 Financial Policy Agenda,” December 16, 
2009.
South Korea’s Official Development 
Assistance Policy Under Lee Myung-bak: 
Humanitarian or National Interest?1
Eun Mee Kim and Ji Hyun Kim
South Korea was admitted as the twenty-fourth member to the Develop-ment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2010, a milestone that sym-
bolized South Korea’s entry into the ranks of advanced industrialized coun-
tries as an important donor of development assistance. Further evidence of 
South Korea’s rising global status is its role as host of two important global 
meetings, the G-20 meeting in November 2010 and the fourth and final High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in fall 2011.
For a nation that emerged from the ashes of the Korean War in the 1950s 
and was a major recipient of worldwide aid totaling $12.7 billion between 
1945 and 1995, this indeed was a sea change. Once one of the poorest na-
tions in the world with a gross national product (GNP) per capita of less 
than $100, in 2010 South Korea boasted the thirteenth largest economy in 
the world, with the fastest projected recovery from the global financial cri-
sis that began in the United States in 2008. However, when President Lee 
Myung-bak announced in his 2008 Independence Day speech the plan to 
honor the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s commitment to increase South 
Korea’s official development assistance (ODA)2 as a share of gross national 
income (GNI) to the OECD/DAC average of 0.25 percent and increase the vol-
ume of ODA threefold by 2015, it didn’t seem to resonate with his adminis-
1 This research was supported by the WCU (World Class University) program 
through the National Research Foundation of Korea funded by the Ministry of Educa-
tion, Science and Technology of the Republic of Korea (Grant No.: R32-20077). The 
authors wish to express their gratitude for the helpful comments for revision received at 
the conference and from the editors. Please direct all inquiries to Eun Mee Kim, who is 
the lead and corresponding author, at emkim@ewha.ac.kr.
2 ODA is defined as grants or loans provided to developing countries and multilat-
eral agencies undertaken by the official sector with the purpose of promoting economic 
development and welfare of the recipients. ODA consists of (1) grants; (2) concessional 
loans with at least a grant element of 25 percent; and (3) technical cooperation (OECD/
DAC Glossary of terms and concepts).
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tration’s other policies. Some members of Lee’s presidential transition team 
had openly criticized the preceding decade under presidents Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun as the “lost decade.” The Lee administration was even 
criticized by political analysts for the number of policies and programs it 
overturned that had been set in place by the Roh administration. Thus, it 
seems out of place that the Lee administration would promote the rapid 
increase of ODA, itself a hallmark of the more liberal Roh regime.
In this paper we attempt to compare the Lee administration’s ODA poli-
cies and activities with those of the Roh administration, using aid determi-
nants studies. The realist view on foreign aid argues that donor governments 
use aid to enhance their national interests (Black 1968; Eberstadt 1988). The 
humanitarian perspective on ODA, on the contrary, refers to aid more fo-
cused on humanitarian assistance for poverty reduction and development of 
the recipient nations (Kegley 1993; Lumsdaine 1993; Cigranelli 1993).
This paper asks two questions: what is the nature of the publicly-pro-
claimed ODA policies of the Roh and Lee administrations—i.e., are they for 
national interest or humanitarian goals—and does ODA data actually realize 
proclaimed ODA policies and reflect the Lee government’s recent humanitar-
ian-leaning ODA policies?
We will begin by reviewing different studies on the determinants of 
ODA and suggest how we may proceed with an empirical analysis of South 
 Korea’s ODA; next we provide a brief overview of South Korea as a recipi-
ent of ODA, to shed light on how South Korea’s ODA may provide a differ-
ent modus operandi to the global ODA community. Following that will be a 
comparative analysis of the ODA policies of the more liberal Roh Moo-hyun 
administration (2003–2008) and the more conservative Lee Myung-bak ad-
ministration (2008–present). We will present findings from a comparison of 
ODA activities from 2000 to 2010 in order to examine whether the policies are 
borne out with ODA data. In our conclusion we provide a summary of the 
findings and suggest directions for further research.
Different Perspectives on the Determinants of  ODA
There is a growing body of studies on poverty pointing to its myriad causes 
and its resolution (Birdsall 2001; Narayan 1999; Sachs 2005; Sen 1999). Re-
flecting a more comprehensive understanding of poverty and its resolution, 
189 world leaders signed the Millennium Declaration at the United Nations 
(UN) in 2000, agreeing to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
and uniting in the fight to halve the population living under extreme poverty 
by 2015. The OECD as well has played a critical role in working with the larg-
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est donor countries to formulate guidelines for ODA.
While international organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, and 
the OECD have participated in the fight against poverty and have urged ODA 
donors to respond from a humanitarian and global perspective, donors have 
often provided aid for their own national interests, whether it is to help sup-
port their previous colonies and private business interests, enhance their 
geopolitical influence, or secure energy and other natural resources. Thus, 
many studies have attempted to analyze the determinants of donors by ex-
amining their aid activities.
Studies on foreign aid started in the 1950s after WWII, primarily focusing 
on the U.S. and Western European cases. These studies can be grouped into 
two categories: those that focus on the effects of aid on recipient countries, 
and those that examine the determinants of aid in donor countries. It is be-
yond the scope of this chapter to provide a full review of the myriad studies 
on aid allocation; we will instead examine a few key studies that analyzed 
aid determinants using aid allocation data of donor countries and were in-
fluenced by international relations theories.
We can divide the studies into two groups according to the researchers’ à 
priori assumptions about aid: those belonging to the realist perspective, and 
another group in the idealist perspective. The former gained support during 
the Cold War when researchers assumed that aid policies were driven by 
strategic interests of nation-states (Black 1968; Eberstadt 1988). The realist 
perspective argued that nation-states exist in a Hobbesian state in which the 
primary objective of international relations is survival. Thus, realists pri-
oritize security and assume that foreign aid serves the strategic interests of 
the donor. Classical realists associate national security with relative advan-
tages in military power and opportunistic alliances (high politics) while they 
minimize or dismiss the economic or humanitarian motives behind aid (low 
politics). However, neorealist scholars have underscored the importance of 
the economic dimension of national security (Gilpin 1987).
The idealist perspective on aid and the neoidealist spin-offs interpret 
international relations in a more cooperative way. They criticize the realist 
perspective’s assumption that interstate behavior is characterized primarily 
by competition and pursuit of security (Kegley 1993; Lumsdaine 1993; Ci-
granelli 1993). The idealists argue that foreign aid is provided largely by hu-
manitarian concerns, and its purpose is to promote economic development 
and reduce poverty of recipient nations—i.e., the recipient’s needs take pre-
cedence over the donor’s needs. Thus, measuring the effectiveness of aid is 
a matter of examining economic development and poverty reduction in the 
recipient nation, rather than looking at the donor’s interests. Although there 
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are many ways to measure the recipient nation’s needs, the most widely used 
variable is per capita income. The reasoning is that the poorer the country, 
the more it is in need of aid.
The labels of “realist” and “idealist” are innately biased and favor the 
former; below, in an effort to avoid à priori assumptions about the determi-
nants of aid, we will use the terms “national interest” to refer to the realist 
perspective, and “global and humanitarian” to refer to the idealist perspec-
tive.
More recently, studies on ODA have identified multiple determinants for 
aid, including economic interests (such as promotion of trade and foreign 
direct investment), foreign relations (political interest; the international 
prestige of being a donor; enhancement of national security; influence over 
the recipient nation’s political and institutional systems), and humanitar-
ian concerns. In addition, relationships derived from past colonial ties often 
have a positive influence on aid flows (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 34). Many 
studies have found that either economic or political interest has played a 
critical role in the early phase of foreign aid programs of many donor na-
tions (Stirling 1981; Nester 1992; Grilli and Riess 1992; Neumayer 2003).
A revisionist perspective on aid was developed after a series of stud-
ies by McKinlay and Little (1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979) examined how aid 
was allocated in Germany, France, the UK and the United States. McKinlay 
and Little’s studies have been credited for providing a logical framework 
for aid analysis. These studies empirically demonstrated that donors often 
provide aid from both national interest as well as humanitarian perspectives, 
although there are discernable shifts in their policy direction over time. It has 
now become standard in aid allocation studies to include both types of vari-
ables that control for donor’s national interests as well as recipient nation’s 
needs (global and humanitarian). The rationale is that donors will naturally 
have mixed interests in terms of ODA; ODA is not provided based solely on 
one set of interests.
Many empirical studies have been conducted to identify the determi-
nants of ODA in developed countries, i.e., OECD/DAC member countries. 
McKinlay and Little (1977) divided the targets of the United States’ ODA 
during 1960–1970 and developed two models: the recipient needs model, and 
the donor interest model. For the former, they used variables such as GDP 
per capita, per capita calorie consumption, number of doctors per 100,000 
people, and real growth rate of GDP per capita; for the donor interest model, 
they used variables such as profits from development, international political-
economic relations, security, political interest, and stability of the domestic 
political system. In their subsequent work on the ODA of the United States, 
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they concluded that political and security interests were more important de-
terminants than humanitarian consideration for the recipients (McKinlay 
and Little 1979).
McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991) introduced the Tobit model to test 
the ODA activities of the UK, with an emphasis on UK’s former colonies. 
Gounder and Doessel (1997) tested the motives of Australian overseas aid 
to Indonesia using GNP per capita, trade deficit, aid per capita, military as-
sistance per capita, outward foreign direct investment, and export.
Other studies compared ODA allocation and selectivity based in many 
donors. Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) tested the bilateral ODA activities of 
OECD/DAC member countries for the period 1980–1999 by using the variables 
of real GDP per capita, population, economic growth rate, level of primary 
education, infant mortality rate, export, import, FDI, and the democracy 
index. Their study showed that at the end of the Cold War, the tendency to 
favor former colonies was reduced when trade alliance with recipient coun-
tries increased (Berthelemy and Tichit 2004, 272–273). Dollar and Levin 
(2004) examined ODA selectivity of OECD/DAC member countries and mul-
tilateral aid organizations for 1989–2003 focusing on population, GNI per 
capita, the democracy index, the economic freedom index, distance, export, 
a dummy variable for colonial experience, and emergency relief.
Many studies on ODA determinants have utilized both the national in-
terest and global and humanitarian perspectives, and have found that ODA 
determinants tend to comprise both elements and often change over time. 
In this study, we present a summary comparison of ODA data between 2000 
and 2010 in order to capture how South Korean ODA policies and activities 
have changed.
South Korea as a Recipient of  ODA: 1945–1995
In order to understand the symbolic significance of South Korea as a donor, 
it is important to understand its longer history as a recipient of ODA. The 
nation holds a unique position in OECD/DAC as one of the poorest countries 
in the world that has joined the most advanced industrialized economies as 
an emerging donor. When OECD/DAC was established in 1961, South  Korea’s 
GNP per capita was $61, making it one of the least developed countries 
(LDCs) in the world.
South Korea’s history as a recipient of ODA began in 1945 after it was 
liberated from Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945). The southern part of 
the Korean Peninsula was governed by the United States until 1948, and the 
United States provided aid from the Government Appropriations for Relief 
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in Occupied Area (GARIOA) and Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Area 
(EROA) programs (Lee 2004: 35). GARIOA was emergency relief aid to assist 
with U.S.-occupied areas in need of basic subsistence including food, medi-
cine, and fuel, while EROA was for infrastructure in U.S.-occupied areas (35). 
U.S. aid during its occupation period totaled $409.4 million under the two 
programs (35). In addition to grant aid, the United States also provided con-
cessional loans from the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner 
(OFLC) with a total of $24.9 million, thus bringing the total ODA provided 
by the United States to $434.3 million (35–37). The United Nations Relief 
and Reconstruction Agency also provided emergency relief aid as well as 
infrastructure (37).
The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) was officially established 
in August 1948, but it continued to receive grant aid as military and econom-
ic assistance (Lee 2004, 32; Kim 1997). The Korean War (1950–1953) devas-
tated over 80 percent of the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea became an 
important recipient of military and economic aid during the war period as 
well as in the post-war reconstruction period. About 70 percent of all grant 
aid South Korea received from the world was concentrated between 1945 and 
1960; the United States was the largest donor, with aid totaling $3.1 billion, 
worth about $60 billion in current prices (ODA Korea 2010).
Between 1961 and 1975, South Korea experienced a period of rapid 
economic development and foreign capital was provided more in conces-
sional loans, graduating from grant aid, which decreased substantially by 
the end of the 1950s. The newly-pronounced aid policy of President Ken-
nedy in 1961 transformed the focus of U.S. aid from stabilizing economies 
to economic development and growth (Macdonald 1992, 290). This policy 
shift meant that grant aid would be replaced by concessional loans requiring 
more responsibility and ownership from the recipients. The shift coincided 
with South Korea’s new push for economic development in the early 1960s, 
and the nation utilized concessional loans for its development plans (Kim 
1997; Lee 2004, 55). In the first half of South Korea’s economic develop-
ment (1961–1975), 50.7 percent of ODA was provided in grant aid versus 49.3 
percent in concessional loans (Lee 2004, 59). More importantly, while the 
United States provided 63.6 percent of ODA to South Korea in 1961–1975, it 
became a much less important provider of ODA during 1976–1990, when it 
provided only 14.6 percent of ODA. During this period Japan provided 57.4 
percent and other nations provided 28 percent of ODA (Lee 2004, 57). ODA to 
South Korea totaled $3.94 billion in 1961–1975 and decreased to $3.51 bil-
lion in 1976–1990 (Lee 2004, 57). Table 1.1 presents the total ODA to South 
Korea from 1945 until the late 1990s.
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By 1975, South Korea’s GNP per capita reached $574, and it was thus no 
longer eligible for a low-income economy classification by the International 
Development Association and could no longer receive soft loans (Lee 2004, 
66). In 1995, South Korea finally graduated from recipient status when it 
paid off the structural adjustment loan to the World Bank.
Grant aid and concessional loans provided to the South Korean govern-
ment acted almost like domestic capital, allowing the ROK government to 
utilize these funds to support its industrial policies (Kim 1997). It would 
therefore be difficult to understand South Korea’s remarkable economic de-
velopment from the 1960s without examining the role of ODA. 
Analysis of  South Korea as a Donor of  ODA: 1967–present
South Korea as an Emerging Donor of  ODA
South Korea first participated as a donor in 1963 when it worked with US-
AID on a training program, but it was not until the late 1980s when South 
Korea emerged as a donor of ODA. In 1987, the South Korean government 
established the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) to handle 
concessional loans, placing it under the Export-Import Bank of Korea (also 
known as Korea Eximbank). In 1991, the Korea International Cooperation 
Agency (KOICA) was established to handle grant aid. Table 3.2, total ODA 
provided from 1987, shows that South Korea’s ODA increased very rapidly 
since the early 1990s after the establishment of its two main aid-implement-
ing agencies.
TAbLE 3.1
South Korea as a Recipient of ODA (1945–1999)
1945–1960 1961–1975 1976–1990 1991–1999 Total
Grants 
(USD millions)
$3,045.6 $1,999.0 $750.4 $1,202.5 $6,997.5
Grants/ODA (%) 98.3 50.7 21.4 54.0 54.8
Concessional loans 
(USD millions)
$52.3 $1,942.4 $2,760.4 $1,023.7 $5,778.8
Concessional loans/
ODA (%)
1.7 49.3 78.6 46.0 45.2
Total 
(USD millions)
$3,097.9 $3,941.4 $3,510.8 $2,226.2 $12,776.3
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Lee 2004, 74.
TAbLE 3.2
South Korea as a Donor of ODA (1987–2010, USD millions)
Total 
ODA
Bilateral ODA Multilateral 
ODA
ODA/GNI 
(%)Subtotal Grant Loan
1987 23.50 1.42 1.42 -- 22.08 0.02
1988 34.00 2.10 2.10 -- 31.90 0.02
1989 33.80 5.04 3.27 1.78 28.75 0.02
1990 61.16 12.25 3.26 8.99 48.91 0.02
1991 57.47 31.52 25.04 6.48 25.96 0.02
1992 76.80 45.22 30.99 14.23 31.59 0.02
1993 111.56 60.12 32.68 27.44 51.44 0.03
1994 140.22 60.07 38.45 21.62 80.15 0.03
1995 115.99 71.46 50.11 21.35 44.53 0.02
1996 159.15 123.31 53.41 69.90 35.84 0.03
1997 185.61 111.34 54.77 56.57 74.27 0.04
1998 182.71 124.70 37.21 87.48 58.01 0.05
1999 317.49 131.35 38.95 92.40 186.14 0.07
2000 212.07 131.18 47.78 83.41 80.89 0.04
2001 264.65 171.54 52.97 118.57 93.11 0.06
2002 278.78 206.76 66.70 140.06 72.02 0.06
2003 365.91 245.17 145.46 99.71 120.74 0.06
2004 423.32 330.76 212.09 118.68 92.56 0.06
2005 752.32 463.30 318.00 145.30 289.01 0.10
2006 455.25 376.06 258.95 117.11 79.19 0.05
2007 696.11 490.52 358.33 132.19 205.59 0.07
2008 802.34 539.22 368.67 170.55 263.12 0.09
2009* 1,094.1 791.8 441.8 350.0 302.3 0.11
2010* 1,341.1 990.5 520.5 470.0 350.6 0.13
Sources:  1987-2008: Export-Import Bank of Korea; 2009: 17-20; 2009-2010: Office of the Prime 
Minister 2009.
Notes: Figures for 1987-2008 are based on net disbursements. 
* 2009 and 2010 figures are based on estimates and are in Korean won billions.
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South Korea’s ODA began with multilateral aid, primarily consisting of 
its contribution to international organizations devoted to development as-
sistance (see Table 3.3). This gradually changed to bilateral aid, which by 
1991 was twice the size of the contribution made as multilateral aid. In 1993, 
South Korea’s ODA volume reached over $100 million for the first time, and it 
continued to grow quite rapidly throughout the 1990s, reaching $200 million 
by the year 2000.
Since LDCs and low-income countries lack the capacity to repay loans, in 
keeping with the OECD/DAC guidelines for assistance most large donors tend 
to provide ODA as grant aid (OECD various years). Therefore it is interesting 
to note that South Korea’s ODA configuration in bilateral aid changed from 
more in grant aid to a higher percentage of aid in concessional loans dur-
ing 1996–2002. While there are many countries that provide concessional 
loans, they tend not to count it toward their ODA contribution. We should 
examine more carefully in future research why a larger share of bilateral ODA 
was in concessional loans during the administrations of Kim Young Sam 
(1993–1998) and Kim Dae-jung (1998–2002).
In 2003, there was a rather abrupt shift in favor of grant aid within bi-
lateral ODA. In 2002, concessional loans were at one of their highest shares 
with 67.74 percent while grant aid was at 32.26 percent (see Table 3.4). This 
TAbLE 3.3
Configuration of Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid (2000–2010, %)
South Korea OECD/DAC Average
Bilateral Multilateral Bilateral Multilateral
2000 61.86 38.14 67.08 32.92
2001 64.82 35.18 66.97 33.03
2002 74.17 25.83 69.93 30.07
2003 67.00 33.00 71.99 28.01
2004 78.13 21.87 68.42 31.58
2005 61.58 38.42 76.87 23.13
2006 82.61 17.39 73.72 26.29
2007 70.47 29.53 70.43 29.57
2008 67.21 32.79 71.14 28.86
2009 72.37 27.63 69.70 30.03
2010 73.86 26.14
Sources:  2000-2008: Export-Import Bank of Korea 2009; 2009-2010: Office of the Prime Minister’s 
Office 2009; OECD/DAC database on web.
Notes: 2000-2008 figures are based on net disbursements; 2009-2010 figures are based on estimates.
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changed in 2003 to 59.33 percent in grant aid versus 40.67 percent in conces-
sional loans, changing the pattern of bilateral ODA established 1996–2002. 
This clear turning point in South Korea’s ODA activities reflects the more 
progressive Roh administration’s foreign policy. Although the Kim Dae-jung 
administration was also perceived as more liberal than earlier regimes, the 
Roh administration was freer to pursue more liberal global aid policies than 
Kim, who from the beginning of his tenure had to focus on rebuilding the 
South Korean economy after the devastating Asian financial crisis (1997–
1998). This pattern of more grant aid versus concessional loans in bilateral 
ODA has continued to 2008, but as we will see has been reversed when we 
examine projection data for 2009–2010.
Although South Korea’s ODA/GNI is still at about 0.09–0.1 percent, far 
below the OECD/DAC average of 0.25 percent, its ODA volume reached over $1 
billion, enabling it to accede to the OECD/DAC as of January 2010.
TAbLE 3.4
Configuration of Bilateral Aid (2000–2010, %)
Grant Aid Concessional Loan
2000 36.42 63.58
2001 30.88 69.12
2002 32.26 67.74
2003 59.33 40.67
2004 64.12 35.88
2005 68.64 31.36
2006 68.86 31.14
2007 73.05 26.95
2008 68.37 31.63
2009 55.80 44.20
2010 52.55 47.45
Sources: 2000-2008: Export-Import Bank of Korea 2009; 2009-2010: Office of the Prime Minister’s 
Office 2009.
Notes: 2000-2008 figures are based on net disbursements; 2009-2010 figures are based on estimates.
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Comparison of  ODA Policies of  the Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) and Lee 
Myung-bak administrations (2008–present)
As the South Korean economy expanded, its role in the world grew, and its 
ODA volume increased as well. South Korea’s pattern of ODA disbursement 
began to change towards a greater percentage of grant aid versus conces-
sional loans, and its ODA volume continued to increase rapidly from 2003. 
The Roh administration (which took office in February 2003) began to push 
for more aggressive ODA policies including creating a policy framework for 
ODA (2005); increasing ODA volume; shifting geographical orientation of 
South Korea’s ODA from Asia to Africa (2006); and applying for membership 
in OECD/DAC (2007).
In a September 2005 keynote speech to the UN General Assembly, Presi-
dent Roh announced that South Korea would fulfill its global responsibil-
ity in addressing poverty and hunger in the world, and pledged to expand 
its ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa (MOFAT 2005a). Not long after, in November 
2006, current Secretary-General of the UN and then-ROK Minister of For-
eign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki Moon gave the keynote speech at the first 
Korea-Africa Forum, in which 27 African countries and five heads-of-state 
participated (MOFAT 2005a).
The first Policy Framework for ODA was presented in November 2005, 
in line with the MDGs and the OECD/DAC donor guidelines. South Korea’s 
ODA strategy was to provide support for the MDGs’ poverty eradication and 
sustainable development. Grants were to be used as important tools for for-
eign policy, and LDCs were to be selected based on humanitarian goals (MO-
FAT 2005b). On the other hand, the EDCF focuses on supporting “developing 
countries with strong economic ties with South Korea or those with a great 
potential for the economic cooperation in order to enhance the national 
economy of Korea and developing countries” (EDCF 2008, 2011). Since South 
Korea’s exports to developing countries account for about 70 percent of its 
total exports, the EDCF suggests that concessional loans to these countries 
can be mutually beneficial. Thus, while grants focus more on the poverty 
eradication of developing and least developed countries, the EDCF focuses 
more on countries with considerable export relations with South  Korea, 
which are often more developed than those being supported by grants. 
This bifurcated ODA policy reflected South Korea’s ODA system at a 
time in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) was in 
charge of grant aid with KOICA as the main implementing agency, while the 
Ministry of Finance was in charge of concessional loans, controlling the 
Export-Import Bank of Korea as the primary implementing agency. Many 
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other ministries and local governments were engaged in their own grant aid 
programs, which in 2008 led the OECD/DAC Special Review team to conclude 
that South Korea’s aid system was not only bifurcated between grant aid 
and concessional loans without a strong and clear coordinating mechanism, 
but was also a fragmented system of grant aid agencies involving over thirty 
institutions (OECD 2008). Table 3.5 presents how ODA is managed in South 
Korea with different ministries and aid implementation agencies. Under the 
Roh administration, the Ministry of Finance was substantially strengthened 
TAbLE 3.5
ODA Classification and Major Institutions (2008)
ODA by Type
Coordinating 
Ministry
Implementing 
Agencies
Bilateral ODA
(67.2%)
Grant (68.4%)
Bilateral grants
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
and Trade 
(MOFAT)
Korea 
International 
Cooperation 
Agency 
(KOICA); 
Various 
ministries; 
Local 
governments
Technical 
cooperation
Food aid
Humanitarian/ 
Emergency 
relief aid
Debt 
forgiveness
Support 
through NGOs
Concessional 
Loan (31.6%)
Economic 
Development 
Cooperation 
Fund (EDCF)
Ministry of 
Strategy and 
Finance (MOSF)
Korea 
Eximbank
Multilateral 
ODA (32.8%)
Grants 
and capital 
subscriptions 
to 
International 
organizations 
(100%)
UN and other 
international 
organizations
MOFAT MOFAT
Concessional 
lending to 
international 
organizations 
(0%)
IMF and other 
international 
organizations
MOSF MOSF
Source: Official Development Assistance Korea, http://www.odakorea.go.kr.
Note: Figures based on 2008 net disbursement.
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when it was given the added responsibility of budgeting and became the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF). This important difference between 
the Roh and Lee administrations has made coordination difficult between 
MOFAT and the MOSF, with the MOSF in control of the budget, and MOFAT not 
on equal footing to negotiate and coordinate aid activities. These difficulties 
are exacerbated by the two ministries’ disagreement on South Korea’s aid 
goals and policies—MOFAT tends to favor grant aid and untied aid, while the 
MOSF tends to favor concessional loans and tied aid. Thus, it is not surprising 
with the added influence of the MOSF that we have seen a shift toward more 
concessional loans with the 2009 and 2010 projection data.
The Roh administration, already aware that South Korea’s ODA institu-
tions were too numerous and fragmented, in 2006 established by presidential 
decree the Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC). 
Located in the prime minister’s office, its membership ranged from ministers 
of ODA-related ministries to civilian experts, and its objectives were to es-
tablish the larger vision of South Korea’s ODA policy, and more importantly, 
to coordinate its bifurcated and fragmented ODA system. However, lacking 
both personnel and budget, the committee could only play a minor role. 
This changed later in 2010 after the National Assembly passed the Basic 
Law on ODA in December 2009, stipulating that the coordinating mechanism 
should be solidly established in the prime minister’s office to support the 
CIDC’s function.
At the second CIDC meeting in July 2007, chaired by the prime minister, 
the ODA Mid-term Strategy (2008–2010) was discussed and confirmed. This 
strategy laid out the South Korean government’s goal to increase the volume 
of ODA; to build a foundation for maintaining policy coherence; and in par-
ticular, to build more trust in South Korea’s ODA policy in the international 
community by presenting its ODA goals and directions, e.g., its wish to join 
the OECD/DAC (MOFAT 2009).
The Roh administration made it clear that ODA was an important for-
eign policy goal, and that it would provide more ODA commensurate with 
its economic prowess in the world. The series of ODA policies created by the 
Roh administration appear to be in line with the public image of this admin-
istration as more progressive than its predecessors. The progressive stance 
in the domestic arena seemed to have resonated with Roh’s liberal stance in 
foreign policy, including ODA.
In sum, the most important achievements of the Roh administration for 
ODA include recognition of ODA as an important foreign policy goal; align-
ment of South Korea’s ODA vision with MDGs and support for LDCs and Sub-
Saharan Africa; declaration of its intent to join the OECD/DAC; an increase 
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in ODA volume; and improvement of the domestic ODA system, including an 
improved coordination mechanism among different ministries and imple-
menting agencies of ODA, in line with global standards as recommended in 
the OECD/DAC guidelines.
The Lee Myung-bak administration, which took office in February 2008, 
has been seen as more conservative in many aspects of its domestic and for-
eign policies. It has been dubbed as a “pro-business” government, reflecting 
President Lee’s long career in the construction business and his pro-growth 
economic policies. This administration announced that “creative pragma-
tism” was its key modus operandi, and defined it as an emphasis on sub-
stantive results, the promotion of realistic problem-solving methods, and 
the use of creative methods to implement policy goals (Presidential Transi-
tion Committee 2008). The overall policy framework included the elements 
shown in Figure 3.1; its emphasis on a market economy differed from the 
Roh administration, which was more focused on distributional welfare poli-
cies and programs. It was a signal that the Lee administration would have 
pro-business economic growth policies.
Lively Market
Economy
Government 
Serving the 
People
Active Welfare
Global KoreaCountry Rich
in Talent
Creative Pragmatism
FIGURE 3.1 Lee Myung-bak Administration’s Overall Policy Framework
Source: Office of the President 2009a.
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In spite of the apparent differences between the Roh and Lee adminis-
tration’s policy frameworks, the ODA policies seemed to be consistent. ODA 
was seen as a vital element in the Lee administration’s vision for “Global 
Korea.” In his inauguration address, President Lee laid out the vision for 
South Korea as a responsible and contributing member of the global com-
munity committed to playing an important role for world peace and sustain-
able development. Global Korea includes four key agendas: energy, free trade 
agreements (FTA), peace-keeping operations (PKO), and global development 
efforts, including ODA (MOFAT 2009).
It is interesting and noteworthy that ODA Korea3, the official home page 
maintained by MOFAT, has a Mid-Term ODA Strategy almost identical to that 
3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade opened this home page on October 1, 
2007 as one of the ministry’s important outlets for publicity for ODA. This site provides 
updated information about South Korea’s ODA and aims to encourage the participation 
of the public (MOFAT 2008).
Aimed at the Millennium Development Goals’ target date of 2015,
The First Step (2008–2010) is to “Set grounds for ODA.”
The Second Step (2011–2015) is to “Advance ODA.”
•	 Eradicate poverty in developing countries
•	 Achieve development goals of developing countries
•	 Contribute to capacity building in developing countries
Increase the volume of aid 
and the ratio of grants in ODA
•	 Expand ODA level 0.128% of GNI by 2011
•	 Raise the portion of grants
•	 Utilize “Poverty Eradication Contribution”
•	 Reach the international level
•	 Set up supplementary institutional 
mechanisms
•	 Raise competitiveness of Korea’s ODA 
industry in the international market
•	 Select strategic partner countries
•	 Align with development strategies of 
recipient countries
•	 Increase synergy effects among various 
forms of assistance projects
•	 Systemative Korea’s development 
experience and lessons learned
•	 Adjust development strategies applicable 
to developing countries
Increase “untied aid”
Promote strategic assistance projects Share Korea’s development experience
FIGURE 3.2 South Korea’s Mid- to Long-term ODA Policy Framework
Source: Office of the President 2009a.
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of the Roh administration, thus attesting to the continuity of ODA policies 
between the two administrations (see Figure 3.2).
As noted above, in 2007 the Roh administration requested that the OECD 
conduct a special review of South Korea in preparation for its ascendance to 
OECD/DAC (OECD 2008). The review was conducted in 2008 and the results 
presented late that year (OECD 2008). It concluded that South Korea’s frag-
mented aid architecture was the main barrier to enhancing aid effectiveness. 
In spite of the creation of the CIDC in the prime minister’s office, it was clear 
that having over thirty ministries, agencies and municipalities involved in 
ODA without a clear coordinating mechanism was seen as a major obstacle in 
improving South Korea’s aid activities. Thus, the OECD/DAC recommended 
that South Korea create a legal framework that could provide a solid basis 
for ODA goals and system, and that the fragmented aid system should be 
consolidated into one system or at least should develop a functioning coor-
dinating mechanism (OECD 2008).
The OECD/DAC also noted that a relatively large share of tied and par-
tially tied aid was a problem. OECD/DAC member countries had already re-
duced the share of tied aid to 0.14 percent by 2006 (OECD 2007), so the OECD/
DAC noted with alarm that South Korea’s concessional loans reached 31.6 
percent of all bilateral aid in 2008, compared to DAC members’ average of 
less than 10 percent. Immediately prior to Lee’s 2008 Independence Day ad-
dress, the CIDC was convened, and the goal to join the OECD/DAC by 2010 and 
to increase its ODA volume by three times and its ODA/GNI to the OECD/DAC 
average of 0.25 percent by 2015 was approved, in spite of resistance from 
the MOSF.4 The MOSF was cautious about increasing South Korea’s ODA vol-
ume and advancing South Korea’s ODA system with the global financial crisis 
looming large and projections for economic recovery unclear. Nonetheless, 
the ODA policies set in place by the Roh administration were reaffirmed by 
the CIDC and announced by Lee in his address. This set the tone for his ad-
ministration’s overall ODA strategy and policies.
In March 2009 the Presidential Council on Korea’s Nation Branding 
(PCNb) announced ten action plans (PCNb 2009), about half of which were 
related to boosting South Korea’s role in the global community; the plans 
4 The Ministry of Finance during the Roh administration was expanded to the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) in the Lee administration, which put the bud-
geting function into the Ministry of Finance. This new ministry’s functions resemble 
those of the Economic Planning Board of the 1960–70s. This has meant that the other 
ministries have to seek approval from the MOSF for their budgets. In regards to ODA, this 
has made it very difficult for MOFAT to negotiate the terms of ODA with MOSF on an equal 
level.
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included enhancing its ODA, dispatching 3,000 aid volunteers around the 
world, and promoting the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), the Korea De-
velopment Institute’s hallmark program for sharing South Korea’s economic 
development know-how with developing countries (PCNb 2009; Office of the 
President 2009b).
The Lee administration has promoted several action plans, including 
ones aimed at improving the ODA system, increasing the share of untied aid, 
and expanding KOICA overseas volunteers. The administration established 
the Roadmap on Untying Aid, and aimed at untying all grant aid and fifty 
percent of concessional loans by 2015 (Office of Prime Minister 2009).
In his 2010 New Year’s address, President Lee made a strong plea for an 
increase in South Korea’s ODA and for the nation to pursue an ODA policy 
that reflects and builds upon its own experience as an aid recipient. In partic-
ular, he stressed that South Korea must be respectful of recipient nations and 
provide aid without being motivated by national interests—such as energy, 
resources and commerce—and thus clearly uphold OECD/DAC principles.
In sum, the Lee administration’s ODA policies were very much in line 
those promoted by the Roh administration, and in keeping with the recom-
mendations made by OECD/DAC in its special review. Lee has argued that 
South Korea should play an important global role in poverty reduction by 
sharing its economic development and democratization experience. After 
the “Basic Law on ODA” was passed in the National Assembly in December 
2009, the prime minister’s office created a new Director General’s office in 
charge of ODA. Thus, at least in its rhetoric, the Lee administration’s policy 
direction regarding ODA has been consistent with the Roh administration, 
and the administration has reaffirmed its commitment to fulfill a South 
 Korean global role commensurate with its global economic ranking.
The OECD/DAC special review of South Korea highlighted four key as-
pects of a globally-responsible donor (OECD 2008); we have summarized the 
ODA policies and programs of the Roh and Lee administrations in respect to 
those four aspects in Table 3.6. The findings show that there is consistency 
between the two administrations in terms of top leadership commitment 
toward ODA. Important differences are in the legislation and ODA system. As 
discussed earlier, the ODA system in South Korea has been fragmented into 
a large number of implementing agencies and bifurcated at the policy level 
into two main ministries—MOFAT and MOSF. The Basic Law on ODA, which 
was passed in the National Assembly in 2009, stipulated that all grant aid 
should be coordinated by MOFAT and all concessional loans by the MOSF. 
Since concessional loans are only administered by the Export-Import Bank 
of  Korea, it is MOFAT that is left with the massive coordination task of orga-
TAbLE 3.6
Comparison of ODA Policies: Roh and Lee Administrations
Roh Moo-hyun Administration 
(2003-2008)
Lee Myung-bak Administration 
(2008-present)
Political Will of  the President
South Korea will fulfill its global role to 
address poverty and hunger (UN General 
Assembly Meeting Keynote speech, September 
2005).
South Korea’s ODA will be in line with MDGs  
and OECD/DAC guidelines for donors.
Triple South Korea’s ODA to Sub-Saharan  
Africa (First Korea-Africa Forum, 2006).
Declared South Korea’s wish to join OECD/DAC 
by 2010.
Reaffirm South Korea’s commitment to join 
OECD/DAC, and triple its ODA volume and 
increase ODA/GNI to 0.25% by 2015 (August 15, 
2008 Independence Day Speech).
South Korea’s ODA and PKO will be 
commensurate with its economic ranking in 
the world (August 15, 2008 Independence Day 
Speech, National Brand 2009, etc.)
Re-double ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa by 2012 
(Second Korea-Africa Forum, November 2009)
South Korea’s ODA should be humanitarian  
and not seeking national interests such as 
energy and other natural resources (New 
Year’s Speech 2010).
ODA Legislation
No overarching legal framework.
National Assembly fails to pass the ODA law.
KOICA (grant aid implementing agency 
under MOFAT), and Economic Development 
Cooperation (concessional loan implementing 
agency in the Export-Import Bank of Korea 
under MOSF) each have separate/independent 
laws.
Basic Law on ODA was passed in the National 
Assembly (December 2009).
ODA System: Ministries and Implementing Agencies
Committee for International Development 
Co-operation (CIDC) created in the Prime 
Minster’s Office to help coordinate aid policies 
and system.
Policy Level: MOFAT (grants), MOSF  
(concessional loans).
Implementing Level: KOICA (grants, technical 
cooperation), EDCF (concessional loans) and 
over 30 ministries and municipalities in grant 
aid.
CIDC strengthened with a Director-General’s 
office (2010).
Policy Level: MOFAT (grants of all ministries  
and municipalities), MOSF (concessional loans).
Implementing Level: KOICA (grants, technical 
cooperation), EDCF (Concessional Loan) and 
over 30 ministries and municipalities.
MOFAT to coordinate all grants implementing 
agencies.
MOST to coordinate all concessional loans.
ODA Vision and Policy Objectives 
Align with MDGs.
Align with OECD/DAC guidelines for donors.
South Korea’s comparative advantage and 
development experience will be the basis of 
South Korean ODA.
South Korean model of ODA is sought.
Promote South Korea’s global image as a 
responsible and humanitarian player in terms 
of ODA and PKO activities commensurate with 
its economic ranking.
Separate ODA policy from resource diplomacy.
South Korean model of ODA is developed.
Sources: Compiled by authors based on data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (various years); 
Office of the President 2009a, 2009b; Office of the Prime Minister 2009.
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nizing highly-fragmented grant agencies, as noted earlier. 
A more fundamental coordination is called for between MOFAT and the 
MOSF, one that will be handled by the newly-enhanced CIDC. The latter will 
now have an office, personnel, and requisite budget to help with the coor-
dination of grant aid and concessional loans. It will have to find a common 
vision and set of objectives for grant aid and concessional loans, which had 
up to now acted more or less independently from each other. The CIDC will 
now have to produce one common vision and strategy for all ODA, one list of 
major recipient countries, one Country Assistance Strategy for each recipi-
ent country, and so on.
However, even with an enhanced CIDC in the prime minister’s office, 
this coordination will not be easy; with the MOSF’s upgraded status as a 
super agency wielding budgetary oversight, MOFAT will need to seek its ap-
proval for its budget, including ODA. Even though the global aid community 
has deemed that grant aid is more helpful to recipients, and in particular to 
LDCs, and that a bifurcated aid system hinders delivery due to duplication of 
administration and lack of coordination, and increase in transaction costs, 
and that it hinders economies of scale needed in large programs, the MOSF 
has been steadfast in its opposition to many of these recommendations. This 
is partly due to South Korea’s own experience of utilizing concessional loans 
for its industrialization and partly to protect its own institutional raison 
d’être. Although a unified ODA system is recommended by the OECD/DAC and 
backed by many civil society organizations in South Korea, the MOSF has so 
far rejected this type of system, which it fears in the long run will undermine 
itself and its control over ODA.
The remaining task is to determine if these policies have actually been 
realized—if the Lee administration’s professed intent to have a more hu-
manitarian goal-based ODA is supported by an examination of the empirical 
aid data.
Comparison of  South Korea’s ODA Activities, 2000–2010
To understand to what extent actual ODA activities have changed between 
the Roh and Lee administrations and whether South Korea’s ODA has moved 
more in line with that of advanced industrialized donor countries, we com-
pared ODA implementation statistics in two categories: multilateral aid ver-
sus bilateral aid, and grant aid versus concessional loans.
In terms of the former, OECD/DAC recommends that donor countries pro-
vide as much multilateral aid as possible to reduce the number of bilateral 
donors recipient countries must face, and thus reduce coordination com-
plications as well as the multiple conditionalities that can accompany each 
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bilateral donor. Thus, the OECD/DAC recommends that donors work with 
other donors for trilateral aid, and most importantly, utilize international 
organizations that are well organized and have a proven track record. On 
average, OECD/DAC member countries provided about 29 percent in multilat-
eral aid and 71 percent in bilateral aid in 2008 (OECD 2008). Table 3.3 above 
shows that, except for the years 2004 and 2006, South Korea’s bilateral ver-
sus multilateral aid composition was quite similar to the OECD/DAC average. 
However, that appears to be changing with the 2009–2010 projected figures, 
which tend to show that South Korea’s multilateral commitment is slowly 
falling behind that average. Furthermore, by examining the sub-categories 
of South Korea’s multilateral aid, it clearly is primarily going into paying 
South Korea’s dues to international financial organizations where the nation 
has a membership and in which said organization has a share in any devel-
opment assistance activity. Thus, a careful examination of South  Korea’s 
multilateral aid reveals it is not yet sufficiently devoted to multilateral orga-
nizations with strong development cooperation activity in developing na-
tions. This drop in the ratio of multilateral versus bilateral aid may be a 
sign that the Lee administration is turning back the clock on progress in this 
aspect of ODA effectiveness.
In the second category of comparison, in terms of grant aid versus con-
cessional loans, the OECD/DAC and advanced donor nations have strongly 
recommended that South Korea move away from concessional loans and 
provide more in terms of grant aid (OECD 2008). A comparison of the com-
position of bilateral aid data shows an alarming trend: South Korea’s con-
cessional loans have begun to rise sharply since 2009 estimates (see Table 
3.4). Our empirical analysis shows a significant shift in South Korea’s ODA 
allocation starting 2007, one which became more pronounced in 2008. The 
findings for 2007 and 2008 reflect ODA activities of the Roh administration, 
although the Lee administration came into office in early 2008. The find-
ings show that the earlier ODA activities from 2000 to 2006 reflect stronger 
national interests although the governments—the Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun administrations—were more progressive than the current Lee ad-
ministration. Since the data we have for 2009 and 2010 are projections, we 
need to closely monitor the actual implementation data to examine whether 
concessional loans have indeed risen sharply since the Lee administration 
took office. This would be directly contrary to the president’s public procla-
mation that South Korea’s ODA will be more aligned with global standards, 
moving away from concessional loans and more toward grant aid. Further 
hard evidence on the pattern of ODA allocation will be required to assay if 
the Lee administration has indeed honored its rhetoric for more humanitar-
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ian-based ODA.
Although we do not yet have the ODA data for 2009, we examined the 
aid estimates for 2009 and 2010 in order to shed light on the possible direc-
tion ODA activities are taking in the Lee administration. Figures in Table 
3.3, albeit limited, show an interesting shift in trend in bilateral aid. They 
show that while the share of grant aid was consistently higher during the 
Roh administration, the difference has begun to decrease since the Lee ad-
ministration; in particular the estimate figures for 2009 and 2010 show that 
a reversal of grant aid versus concessional loans has occurred. This is both 
alarming and contrary to what President Lee has announced as his admin-
istration’s ODA policy—i.e., one that is humanitarian and separates South 
Korea’s national interests from its ODA. If these professed policies were to be 
realized, we would have expected to see that grant aid would be increased, 
or at minimum, kept constant relative to that of the Roh period. This is ad-
mittedly only one indicator given the limitation of empirical data for 2009–
2010, but it reveals a disparity between the administration’s stated policies 
and actions. Once the aid data from 2009 becomes available a more in-depth 
analysis will be required in order to fully examine whether the Lee adminis-
tration’s ODA policies are borne out with its aid activities.
Concluding Remarks
Studies on ODA and its determinants have focused primarily on U.S. and 
Western European cases. Using theories advanced in international relations, 
social scientists have examined whether aid is provided in the national inter-
est of the donor nation, and whether it is provided with the professed goal 
of aid—i.e., humanitarian and based on global needs for poverty reduction 
and sustainable development. South Korea has recently been accepted to the 
OECD/DAC as its twenty-fourth member, which signals that it is now joining 
the ranks of advanced industrialized countries as a globally responsible na-
tion.
The Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–present) has in most respects 
been considered more conservative than its preceding two administrations, 
and has overturned a few key policies of the Roh Moo-hyun administration. 
Thus, it came as a surprise when President Lee himself spoke very force-
fully that South Korea must provide greater assistance to the world to fight 
poverty from a humanitarian perspective. In his 2010 New Year’s address, he 
made it clear that South Korea’s ODA policies and aid disbursement must be 
separated from its energy diplomacy and other national interests.
In this chapter we have attempted to understand the Lee Myung-bak 
South Korea’s Official Development Assistance Policy
94
administration’s ODA policy, one that seems anomalous vis-à-vis the admin-
istration’s other domestic and foreign policies. We examined the extent to 
which the ODA policies of the Lee administration are consistent with those 
of the preceding Roh administration. The comparative analysis showed that 
there appears to be quite a bit of consistency in the ODA policies. Further-
more, in some areas such as legislation and ODA system, the Lee administra-
tion was able to improve what had existed or had been lacking in the Roh 
administration. In sum, the policies regarding ODA have advanced beyond 
the Roh administration, and have shown a consistent pattern of policy de-
velopment.
However, the linear regression results show a different pattern. While 
the data for 2000–2006 supported the hypothesis that South Korea’s ODA 
activities are more in line with national interests, it started to show a more 
humanitarian trend by 2007, and was more pronounced in 2008. Thus, we 
can conclude that South Korea’s ODA activities were more narrowly focused 
on national interests during the early part of the Roh administration, until 
that began to change around 2006.
What is not clear is how to interpret the Lee years. Although the poli-
cies and the president’s stated commitments tend to favor the humanitarian 
perspective, there are some alarming signs that ODA activities (based on 2009 
and 2010 estimates) may be turning the clock back to more national interest-
based activities. In particular, the share of concessional loans as compared 
with grant aid started to increase in 2009, a reversal of the pattern we have 
witnessed since about 2003. Although this is just one indicator, it suggests 
that contrary to what the administration has touted, South Korea’s ODA is 
not oriented toward LDCs or for real poverty reduction and economic de-
velopment of the poorest countries in the world, but headed toward lower-
middle and upper-middle income countries, which have a better capacity to 
repay the loans, and consequently to Asia, where many of these countries 
are concentrated. If these trends are found with empirical evidence, they 
run counter to Lee’s declaration that South Korea’s ODA will be provided for 
humanitarian purposes to LDCs and that its aid allocation to Sub-Saharan 
Africa would be increased. We do not have yet have the empirical data for 
the Lee years, so it is probably premature to conclude that the ODA activi-
ties are based more on national interests. However, the limited estimates we 
have seen suggest there is a gulf between professed policies and actual aid 
practices.
Examination of South Korean ODA policies and activities provides an 
interesting glimpse of ODA issues for an emerging donor, one that must also 
harness public support in order to continue with its ODA programs. South 
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Korea struggles to find its global image amidst the tension between being an 
aggressive economic power versus a globally responsible citizen. The analy-
sis here shows that South Korea is at a crossroads in terms of how it should 
uphold the global paradigm of humanitarian aid in contrast to its need to 
work for domestic constituents who may not yet be ready to embrace its new 
role in the world.
As mentioned above, further 2009 data is needed to fully examine ODA 
activities as compared to policies under the Lee administration. There is 
also a need for more in-depth studies about how ODA decisions are made in 
South Korea in order to shed light on how an emerging donor—one without 
a history of being a colonizer, and with a nascent humanitarian vision of 
aid—can carve out its own model of ODA.
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Policy Recommendations for the 
Korean Economy
Byongwon Bahk
Ever since I was appointed Director General for Economic Policy in 2001 and put in charge of South Korea’s overall economic policy, I have consistently emphasized that job creation and management of  
the balance of  payments should be the main criteria for formulating and 
evaluating economic policies.
The former would not seem unusual in many countries, but in South 
Korea (hereafter simply Korea) steady improvement in employment has long 
been taken for granted; unemployment became an issue in Korea only for 
a brief period after the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. The balance of pay-
ments, or how to secure sufficient foreign currency to import capital goods 
and natural resources, has been the Korean economy’s Achilles’ heel. The 
recent worldwide crisis clearly showed that the current account balance is 
the final source of creditworthiness, especially when there is turbulence in 
the capital account.
Below I shall demonstrate that the most efficient and effective way to 
simultaneously achieve these two goals—job creation and management of 
the balance of payments—is to make the services industry internationally 
competitive.
Bleak Prospects for Job Creation
As we all know, growth and job creation both depend upon investment. 
After the Asian financial crisis, and coincidently with the advent of leftist 
administrations, investment has been in a prolonged slump. This may be 
a simple consequence of the exhaustion of investment opportunities and 
increased risk aversion on the part of both enterprise and financial investors.
The Korean government, like others, has encouraged investment but 
largely in vain. Very roughly, the addition of 300,000 jobs annually is nec-
essary for the Korean economy to continue a virtuous circle—on average, 
about five percent annual growth. During the ten years after the Asian finan-
cial crisis, Korea was unable to achieve that.
Even though more than 300,000 jobs were annually added during the 
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latter four years of the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998–2003), it was 
largely nothing more than a rebound from the loss of 1,276,000 jobs in 1998; 
and taking into account the needed annual growth, it left a deficit of 545,000 
jobs. There was no additional job recovery under the Roh Moo-hyun admin-
istration (2003–2008) and 236,000 jobs were added to the deficit.
Some attributed stagnation in investment and job creation to the psy-
chological uneasiness in business circles about the leftist government. This 
is only partly true. The current Lee Myung-bak administration came into 
power (2008) with a campaign pledge to achieve seven percent growth and 
600,000 jobs a year on average—not regarded feasible by most economists. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the actual jobs added over a three-year period were 
145,000 (2008), -72,000 (2009), and 323,000 (2010), and in mid-2011 the re-
cord shows an increase of 400,000 over the previous year. Even we assume 
the final result of 2011 will be 400,000, the first four years of the Lee Myung-
bak administration created 800,000 jobs, falling far short (400,000) of the 
necessary level of growth. In sum, 1.2 million more jobs should have been 
created in Korea over the past 14 years.
Now that a neoliberal government has been in charge for more than four 
years, it is no longer possible to lay the blame on past administrations. The 
failure to create necessary jobs in three consecutive administrations only 
proves that an economic development strategy based on the manufacturing 
sector and exports, one extremely successful in the past, no longer works; 
nor will this dated strategy create necessary jobs.
If significant progress is to be made in the remaining years of the cur-
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rent administration, precise diagnosis and deliberate prescriptions are re-
quired. Diagnosis begins with acknowledging a harsh reality: additional job 
creation can only be expected in an extremely limited range of businesses 
within the services industry.
Agriculture began to lose jobs as early as 1976, when it recorded its peak 
employment of 5,514,000. For 15 years thereafter, agriculture experienced a 
sharp employment decline, losing 186,000 jobs every year between 1976 and 
1991. The rate of decrease has recently been decelerating; the average yearly 
loss of jobs in the sector is 60,000 since 1991 (as shown in Figure 4.2).
The manufacturing sector, which led the development of the Korean 
economy and whose exports continued to shore up the whole economy in 
the midst of the worldwide economic crisis, has been losing jobs for a long 
time. After recording its peak of 5.22 million jobs in 1991, until which time it 
had seen an average annual increase of 163,000 jobs, it began to lose jobs at 
a rate of 65,800 jobs a year until 2008. (Note, however, that this average was 
skewed by the loss of 627,000 jobs just in the year 1998. And note also that 
in 2010 and 2011, jobs in the manufacturing sector suddenly significantly 
increased due to an increase of exports depending upon depreciation of the 
local currency, the won. No one is sure how long it will be before the manu-
facturing sector can again contribute to job creation. Most economists, in-
cluding those in the government, are very skeptical.)
Even though the services and social overhead capital (SOC) sectors con-
tinue to produce jobs, their yearly contribution has fallen from 514,700 jobs 
for the period 1989–2002 to only 308,100 since then—a drop of almost half. 
Given the loss of jobs expected in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors 
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(roughly 120,000 per year), the services sector, which is the only sector that 
produces new jobs, must create over 420,000 jobs a year to prevent increased 
unemployment and to maintain the virtuous circle of the economy. In recent 
years, the actual increase in services sector jobs recorded more disappointing 
numbers: 260,000 (2008), 179,000 (2009) and 200,000 (2010).
This must be due to the fact that some sub-sectors of the services in-
dustry have also begun to lose jobs, as Table 4.1 illustrates. Compared to 
2000, 253,000 jobs have been lost in the wholesale and retail trades until 
2010; in just two years from 2008 to 2009 alone, 153,000 jobs were lost in the 
restaurant and hotel businesses. The sum of these two sub-sectors in 2009 
accounted for 30.8 percent of services employment and 23.6 percent of the 
total employment of 23.5 million. If these two sub-sectors are added to the 
declining groups of agriculture and manufacturing, it amounts to 47 percent 
of total employment. Thus the remaining half of the economy must bear the 
entire burden of job creation—an extremely difficult task.
Recalling that an 300,000 additional jobs a year are required to absorb 
the still-increasing population of the economically active and avoid a rise 
in the unemployment ratio, the performance in 2008 (gained 145,000) and 
Table 4.1
Recent Changes in Services Sector Employment (thousands, %)
2000 2008
Average 
increase (%) 2009 2010
2010 
increase
Wholesale/Retail 3,833 3,635 -0.66 3,600 3,580 -20
Restaurant/Hotel 1,919 2,042 0.78 1,936 1,889 -47
Transportation 1,068 1,203 1.50 1,247 1,280 33
Communication 192 269 4.31 652 668 16
Finance/Insurance 752 827 1.20 652 808 42
Real Estate/Lease 351 488 4.21 500 517 17
Business Services 1,010 1,920 8.36 1,788 1,906 118
Public Services 758 840 1.29 1,032 960 -72
Education 1,191 1,747 4.91 1,831 1,799 -33
Health/Soc. Welf. 428 852 8.99 998 1,153 155
Recreation/Sports 365 532 4.82 390 380 -11
Personal Services 886 1,356 5.46 1,211 1,216 5
Household Serv. 186 150 -2.65 147 150 3
Int’l Institutions 19 16 -2.13 13 13 1
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSiS).
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2009 (lost 72,000) is very disappointing. Even though the number recovered 
to 323,000 in 2010 and about 400,000 in the first half of 2011, these numbers 
are too heavily dependent upon manufacturing, health and social welfare 
services, and business services. Many believe that the sustainability of job 
creation in manufacturing is questionable and jobs creation in social ser-
vices is too much dependent upon government expenditures that cannot be 
increased indefinitely.
For example, a large number of the new temporary jobs were artificially 
created in the public services sector by government expenditure in 2009 (re-
fer back to Figure 4.1). Without 192,000 jobs created by the public sector, the 
number of jobs lost in 2009 was actually 264,000. The disappearance of the 
“additional” contribution by the public sector in 2010 shows that job cre-
ation by the public sector has limited meaning, and that we cannot depend 
upon it for creation of sustainable jobs. The recent increase in health and 
public welfare services  sector jobs is partly due to genuine need, but might 
be at least partly, I have to say, “artificial.”
Recent job statistics are rather confusing, primarily due to temporary 
jobs artificially created by government expenditure. In the year ending July 
2010, the major contributors to job creation turned out to be manufactur-
ing, construction, and business services, while the public sector lost 182,000 
jobs. But this data noise does not change the reality that we cannot expect a 
lot of new jobs in manufacturing, nor that the additional jobs gained by the 
construction sector are partly attributable to the Four Rivers Project. Such 
efforts by the public sector to provide temporary jobs are necessary, but we 
cannot allow ourselves to be misled by non-sustainable job creation tied to 
temporary government expenditure: Korea needs to catch up and gain 1.2 
million jobs.
Balance of  Payments Deficit and Outflow of  Job Opportunities  
in the Services Sector
After the Asian financial crisis, except for 1998 itself, the deficit in the ser-
vices balance of payments (bOP) rapidly increased, reaching $13.3 and $12.0 
billion in 2006 and 2007, respectively (see Figure 4.3). The services deficit 
increase ended in 2008 due to the soaring exchange rate, one which initially 
was the consequence of the worldwide economic crisis, and later was inten-
tionally left unattended. The bOP dropped to $5.7 billion (2008) and $6.6 
billion (2009), but very soon began to increase again, reaching $11.2 billion 
in 2010. But since the manufacturing sector has been producing a surplus in 
the trade in goods large enough to cover the deficit in the services trade, it is 
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Table 4.2
Balance of Payments of Major Sub-sectors in the Services Industry (USD millions)
2007 2008 2009 2010
Total -11,967.3 -5,734.1 -6,640.5 -11,229.4 
Patent Loyalties -3,398.7 -3,274.1 -3,988.5 -5,818.8 
Business Services -7,408.5 -14,279.4 -15,005.2 -16,836.4 
Cultural/Entertainment -481.6 -363.9 -323.1 -381.1 
Government Services 611.5 270.2 419.0 178.6 
Communication -365.9 -425.0 -502.2 -575.0 
Construction Services 7,869.4 11,078.6 11,746.8 9,607.7 
Insurance -585.4 -277.4 -394.7 -468.6 
Financial Services 3,304.4 3,094.7 1,572.5 1,986.6 
Computer/ICT Services -203.7 -267.8 -182.8 -242.3 
Transportation 4,480.5 7,998.0 5,242.3 9,252.4 
Travel -15,836.9 -9,291.7 -5,220.9 -7,904.3 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System (eCOS).
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not easy to persuade the public that government reform of the services sec-
tor is necessary to make it competitive.
Looking into the details of the services trade deficit during the period 
from 2006 to 2010 (shown in Table 4.2—we began to make detailed statistics 
of services bOP only in 2006), the deficit in business services trade grew from 
$7.2 to $16.8 billion, and the deficit in royalties for patents, etc. from $2.6 to 
$5.8 billion. These deficits are already built in and are unaffected even by the 
depreciation of the Korean won over the course of the worldwide economic 
crisis.
The travel deficit has also been rising very rapidly, from virtually zero in 
2000 to $15.8 billion in 2007, but it then decreased to $5.2 billion in 2009, as 
it turned out to be quite sensitive to the exchange rate. But attention must 
be paid to the fact that inbound travel didn’t increase noticeably. Outbound 
travel responded to the exchange rate much more sensitively, but recovered 
very rapidly, recording a $7.9 billion deficit already in 2010 and $4.5 just in 
the first half of 2011, as we experienced after the Asian financial crisis.
In the services sector, only transportation, where both shipping and air 
transportation have been from their births exposed to international competi-
tion, has been recording increasing surpluses, including an $8 billion surplus 
in 2008. The number dropped to $5.2 billion in 2009 due to the worldwide 
recession but promptly recovered to a $9.3 billion surplus in 2010. Financial 
services have also exhibited a similar pattern.
I highlight the chronic deficit in the services bOP not because the bOP def-
icit itself is a cause for concern, but because it is clear evidence that services 
in Korea are for the most part not competitive. Desperately needed demand 
and job opportunities are being lost there—and this is why making the ser-
vices industry competitive is the most important, efficient, and effective way 
for Korea to overcome the present crisis and continue sustained growth.
Other means of creating jobs and improving the bOP are less effective 
and efficient. For example, job creation by the public sector cannot last 
long, and younger job seekers do not regard such temporary jobs desirable. 
Fostering high-tech industries such as the so-called greenomics industries—
trendy recently and certainly desirable in the longer term—takes too much 
time to bear fruit, and can create only a limited number of jobs for a highly 
educated and trained minority.
For the improvement of bOP, an increase of exports or a decrease of 
imports is not a very desirable or feasible alternative because it would aggra-
vate trade frictions with other countries. Moreover, the traditional importer 
countries, such as the United States and the EU, can no longer afford con-
tinuing increases in imports. They now expect that Korea, China, and other 
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successfully developing countries will share the burden of being locomotives 
to pull along the world economy by creating more domestic demand and in-
creasing imports from other countries. It is time for Korea and China to try 
to find sources of growth and job creation in their own domestic markets, 
thereby also contributing more to the recovery of the world economy.
Korea’s Current Services Industry: Ample Room for Development
Below I further elaborate why we should pay more attention to the services 
industry and enable it to stand on its own.
Korea’s share of services in gDP and total employment, compared to 
those of advanced countries, is shown in Table 4.3. The comparison vividly 
shows us that there is ample room for services to grow, while the share of 
manufacturing is naturally dwindling (see Table 4.4).
That there is room for further growth for services can also be ascer-
tained by the changes in consumption. In the ten years following 2000, con-
sumption for services grew by 2.0 times, raising its share in total household 
consumption from 54.3 percent in 2000 to 57.3 percent in 2010 (Table 4.5). 
Durable goods consumption showed the lowest growth, confirming its satu-
ration. Look at overseas consumption! It increased by 3.2 times over the ten-
year period up to 2010, and pushed up its share in total household consump-
tion from 2.0 to 3.4 percent in that year. In 2008, it sharply dropped to the 
2005 level, but recovered promptly and will continue to increase if we cannot 
create competent domestic suppliers who can replace foreign competitors.
Consumption changes within the services sector also are significant in 
identifying the most prospective business lines for growth and job creation. 
As detailed in Table 4.6, consumption in medical and health care services 
grew fastest, while that for transportation stayed almost at the same level, 
with its share contracting from 12.8 to 11.3 percent in 2000 and 2010, re-
spectively. Communication and entertainment are the next most promising. 
The slightly disappointing figures for education, dining out and travel are 
certainly due to the leakage of demand abroad.
The competitiveness of services is pivotal not only for job creation and 
bOP improvement—by keeping more demand in the domestic market—but 
also for maintaining, as long as possible, the competitiveness of manufactur-
ing.
The productivity of the services industry of Korea is just 58 percent of 
the manufacturing sector. Compared to the productivity of services in OeCD 
countries, it is again about half, 44 percent of the United States and 55 per-
cent of Japan. This productivity disparity may be partly because shares of 
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Table 4.3
Shares of Services in GDP and in Employment (2009, %)
Korea US (’08) Japan (’08) UK France Germany OECD (’06)
GDP 60.7 77.5 71.3 78.2 79.4 72.7 71.8
Employment 68.5 80.9 69.9 78.6 73.0 69.6 66.9
Source: OeCD Statistics (OeCD StatExtracts).
Table 4.4
Changes in GDP and Employment Structure (1970–2010, %)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Share in GDP Manufacturing 16.9 21.9 24.0 25.2 27.5
Services 40.4 42.8 46.4 51.2 52.4
Share in 
Employment
Manufacturing 13.2 21.6 27.2 20.3 16.9
Services 32.4 37.0 46.7 61.2 68.8
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSiS).
Table 4.5
Changes in Consumption Structure (2000 vs. 2010)
Shares in Household 
Consumption (%)
Increase 
(2010/2000)
2000 2010 (times)
Domestic Consumption 99.9 98.4 1.823
Durable Goods 18.0 15.0 1.544
Non-Durables 27.7 26.1 1.743
Services 54.3 57.3 1.955
Overseas Consumption 2.0 3.4 3.189
Household Consumption 100.0 100.0 1.851
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSiS).
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the less-productive business lines (e.g., wholesale and retail trades, restau-
rants and hotels) are too high compared to those of other OeCD countries, 
and shares of high value-added, knowledge-based services (such as finance, 
and business services) are too low.
Whatever the cause, this low productivity affects other sectors. We al-
ready saw that business services produce the largest bOP deficit, one that did 
not decrease even in this round of economic recession. This means business 
services are the least competitive part of the Korean economy, and the weak-
ness of this sector can negatively affect the competitiveness of all the other 
industries that have to outsource business services from them.
For example, inefficient logistics services can incur more costs to ex-
porting manufacturing companies and undermine the competitiveness of 
the whole economy. If Korea’s fashion design services were as strong as in 
France or Italy, the fates of the country’s textile, garments, and shoe indus-
tries would have been much different. A more serious problem is in educa-
tion services. Education that neither satisfies the needs of students nor of 
the companies hiring them causes a vast amount of additional costs to the 
economy and, moreover, pushes many students abroad.
The Korean services industry’s lack of competitiveness is essentially a 
result of its relatively low exposure to international competition. In the past, 
services were regarded as non-tradables, and many thought that important 
ones—such as finance, transportation, telecommunication, and broadcast-
ing—should not be entrusted to foreigners. And through the period of ex-
Table 4.6
Changes in Services Consumption (2000 vs. 2010)
Shares in Household 
Consumption (%)
Increase in Household 
Consumption (real terms, %)
2000 2010 2010/2000 Av. Inc. Rate
Medical/Health 4.22 6.53 2.15 7.96
Transportation 12.83 11.34 1.21 2.08
Communication 4.05 5.20 1.78 5.95
Entertainment 6.67 8.65 1.80 6.05
Education 6.13 6.58 1.49 4.07
Eat Out/Travel 8.33 7.96 1.33 2.87
Others 12.31 12.27 1.50 4.13
Services Subtotal 46.51 66.69 1.99 7.14
HH Consumption 100.0 100.0 1.39 3.35
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System (eCOS).
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port-led development, most of them were regarded as merely a means to 
support export and manufacturing. Even when Korea began import liberal-
ization in the late 1970s for the sake of price stabilization and enhancement 
of competitiveness, opening of the services market to foreign direct invest-
ment (FDi) was belated—even today FDi in services is not very welcomed.
Protection, natural or artificial, and a lack of competition are the best 
excuses for governments to intervene with regulations, and regulations usu-
ally lead to further protection and subsidies. And after that, a vicious circle 
of regulation, protection, and subsidy continues. There are still numerous 
legal and virtual barriers to FDi in services. Perhaps it is a lack of will or 
intention to induce FDi in services, or, more fundamentally, ignorance about 
the benefits of FDi is the reason. Korea’s share of services in FDi is only 49 
percent, the third lowest among OeCD countries. The consequence: shares of 
foreign companies in total sales and employment in the services sector are 
both less than half of the OeCD average.
What is more astonishing and ill-boding is the great leap forward by 
China and India in the world services export market. Their shares in the ten-
year period 1998-2008 have doubled and tripled, while Korea’s is stagnant. 
Shares of most advanced countries are declining (Table 4.7). Why was Korea 
able to achieve astounding performance in the export of goods, yet make no 
advancement in the export of services?
One reason is that in some parts of the services industry we have other 
structural problems hindering innovation and growth. Korea has a peculiar 
system of business conglomerates, the so-called chaebŏl. In many cases, 
each chaebŏl group has its own subsidiaries for services like sales outlets, 
logistics, design, advertisement, system integration, insurance, and securi-
ties and asset management. These captive relationships do not leave much 
incentive to the subsidiaries to innovate and compete. Smaller, independent 
companies in these service areas lack access to large and meaningful projects 
that would be vital for them to accumulate successful track records.
Table 4.7
Changes of Shares in the World Services Export Market (1998–2008, %)
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
United States 17.8 18.8 17.1 14.9 14.5 13.8
France 6.3 5.4 5.3 5.1 4.5 4.2
UK 8.3 8.0 8.3 8.7 8.3 7.5
Korea 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.0
Source: World Trade Organization, Statistics Database.
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On the other hand, in many other parts of the services industry, sub-sec-
tors are composed of too many tiny self-employed and quasi-self-employed 
business entities that do not have any margin to invest and to innovate. The 
negligible share of R&D investment for services is the natural consequence 
of this lack of competition and competence to innovate.
Above I have explained that making services competitive is the way to 
create jobs and improve bOP while at the same time preventing an unpro-
ductive services sector from undermining the competitiveness of the whole 
economy. It turns out that there is another area of the Korean economy that 
shares similar problems with services: agriculture.
Agriculture Has the Same Problem on a Smaller Scale
Nowadays, agriculture seems to be an almost forgotten sector of the econ-
omy. It now accounts for only 7 percent of employment and 2.5 percent of 
gDP. Agriculture—because it has the same problems as the services sector, 
albeit on a smaller scale, placing a heavy and ever-growing burden on the 
economy as a whole—is worthy of a brief discussion.
Korea is constantly losing jobs in agriculture, although most of them 
are the consequence of belated retirement and hence do not cause serious 
social issues. The increasing current account deficit due to the import of 
agricultural products is also widening infinitely. The difference is that this 
deficit is regarded as inevitable, thus attracting no efforts to improve it. As 
with services, agriculture has a similar structural problem—it is composed 
of numerous petty farmers who lack the capacity to innovate or invest to 
realize innovation.
The producer support estimate (PSe) increased from 8.3 trillion won in 
1986 to 24.2 trillion won in 2007. It accounts for 60 percent of total agricul-
tural production, and as Table 4.8 reveals, is much higher than the United 
States (10 percent) and the EU (26 percent), and even higher than Japan 
(45 percent), a country notorious for protection of its agricultural market. 
Another feature of support for agriculture both in Korea and Japan is that 
it mostly consists of price support instead of fiscal expenditure. The result 
is high food prices and then high wages, directly undermining the competi-
tiveness of restaurants and tourism, and indirectly the competitiveness of 
the whole economy. Protection of agriculture decreases the supply of land 
for non-agricultural purposes and results in the notoriously high prices of 
Korean and Japanese real estate.
We need to pay at least a proportional amount of attention to agricul-
ture, not only because any amount of deceleration in job losses and reduc-
Byongwon Bahk
111
tion in the bOP deficit in agriculture can be helpful, but to relieve the burden 
on the manufacturing sector and the economy as a whole. Since the diagno-
sis is similar to that of the services sector, the prescription is naturally also 
quite similar. Before we can understand the right prescription for services 
and agriculture, however, we need to understand how Korea succeeded in 
manufacturing and export of manufactured goods.
How Korea Succeeded in Manufacturing and Export of  Goods
It is well known that Korea in the early 1960s differentiated itself from other 
developing countries by an export-oriented development strategy dependent 
upon production factors borrowed from advanced countries. It borrowed 
not only factors such as capital, machinery, raw materials and parts, and 
technology, but also marketing and managerial skills. Korea even borrowed 
the brands of companies of advanced countries, especially at the beginning 
stage of exports, paying royalties for that privilege. There may have been 
times when an excessive price was paid for such dependence, but the nation 
did not hesitate to rely upon others, whenever necessary, to catch up. This 
borrowing or dependence strategy goes hand in hand with the export-ori-
ented strategy. To make quality products marketable in the world market, it 
is necessary to employ the highest level technologies, facilities, and brands, 
all of which might not be necessary to make products simply to meet do-
mestic needs.
This export-oriented borrowing strategy was not only applied to light 
industries in the 1960s, but also to heavy and chemical industries during the 
1970s. The cases of Hyundai Heavy Industry, which successfully obtained 
twelve very-large crude carrier (VlCC) orders even before it had constructed 
its first shipyard, and Hyundai Motors, which in 1975 began to export its first 
model, the Pony, are vivid examples. Countries much larger than  Korea were 
generally less successful in pursuing the development of heavy and chemical 
Table 4.8
International Comparison of Korean PSE (2007; USD millions, %)
Korea Japan EU US Canada
PSE 25,461 35,230 134,317 32,663 7,001
Price Support 23,144 29,546 32,546 9,227 2,295
Fiscal Expenditure 2,317 5,636 101,772 23,436 4,706
PSE/Production (%) 60 45 26 10 18
Source: OeCD, Agricultural Policies in OeCD Countries 2008: At a Glance.
Note: Korean PSe in won billions: 1986, 8,290; 1990, 13,569; 2000, 21,726; 2007, 24,154.
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industries because they were reluctant to depend upon other countries and 
were more focused on import substitution. Korea, on the other hand, had to 
depend upon foreign facilities and technologies from the beginning because 
it held no production factors, and it aimed to export from the start.
At the time, Korea had only land and labor to offer, and it received mea-
ger compensation for the production factors it provided. Korea’s only source 
of comparative advantage was a well-educated and disciplined workforce. 
From the 1960s through the 1980s, the majority of the smartest youth at-
tending university chose to study engineering—whether chemical, electrical 
and electronic, mechanical, shipbuilding, or metallurgical engineering—just 
as the government encouraged them to do. The students’ choices turned out 
to be a surprisingly exact match with the mainstay industries of Korea since 
the 1990s—a prime example of human resources development deciding the 
future economic structure of a country.
The government provided support to the manufacturing sector in the 
form of financial and tax incentives until the mid-1980s, and thereafter in 
the form of human resources development and technology R&D. Govern-
ment leadership in R&D activities played an increasingly important role as 
the industrial structure became technology-intensive. Public investments in 
human resources and technology development remained largely in the realm 
of manufacturing. In the area of intangible services, they were not very sub-
stantial until recently. The role of the government was also extremely impor-
tant for SOCs; on this front, the Korean government has performed its role 
relatively well.
Another factor in Korea’s economic success was, ironically, its early im-
port liberalization; from the late 1970s, government economists began to 
emphasize the necessity of import liberalization as a measure necessary for 
price stabilization. To overcome strong objections from business circles, it is 
necessary to mobilize support from the general public and political circles, 
and price stabilization was the perfect justification. The Comprehensive 
Economic Stabilization Measures (April 1979) were the turning point away 
from a government-led, export-oriented development strategy to a market-
led, open-door competition-encouraging strategy. The measures laid down 
the basic guidelines for the Korean economy to this day. In the late 1980s, 
import liberalization was almost complete for manufactured goods, while 
most agricultural products remained protected.
Even in the process of building its heavy and chemical industries (HCis) 
in the early 1970s, Korea pursued exports from the outset. Korea’s HCis were 
not for import substitution as in many other countries. The existence of the 
Economic Planning Board (ePb), which consistently opposed protection and 
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supported liberalization and price stabilization, was one important differ-
ence. The government urged companies to be prepared to export from the 
very beginning, and made it clear that protection, a synonym for import 
substitution, would not be available for a long time. Recall that Korea began 
HCi projects in the early 1970s and import liberalization in the late 1970s.
Even though Korea has succeeded by depending upon foreign production 
factors and by pursuing timely import liberalization, Korean businesses have 
predominantly preferred loans over direct investments in order to maintain 
control over themselves, and politicians, the public, and some government 
officials supported this approach. Even domestically, Korean businesses are 
very reluctant to induce investment. This resulting over-dependence on debt 
(domestic and foreign) was definitely the most important reason the  Korean 
economy was so vulnerable to international financial turmoil as witnessed 
during the Asian financial crisis.
Finally, in my view, rivalry and competition among the chaebŏl,  Korea’s 
version of business conglomerates, proved useful as it in turn made the 
chaebŏl more competitive in the world market. In practice, this oligopolistic 
competition model seems more effective than the theoretically perfect com-
petition among numerous small competitors. Theoreticians may object, but 
in reality we all know that size does matter, at least in most cases.
The Problem with Korea’s Services and Agriculture
What, then, is wrong with the agriculture and services sectors? First, the 
players in these sectors are still very reluctant to rely upon others by induc-
ing FDi to compensate for inadequate production factors. In principle, FDi is 
now “allowed” in all sectors in Korea. In reality, however, there are numerous 
regulations and obstacles to investment in services or agriculture in Korea. 
(In most other countries, FDi is something to be welcomed and induced, not 
just reluctantly allowed.) For example, investment in broadcasting and tele-
communications is strictly limited, even for domestic investors. Hospitals 
and schools can be built and run only through donations, and, under strict 
regulations, loans—investment is simply not allowed. Most of these regula-
tions are not especially intended to block FDi, since they are applied equally 
to domestic investors. But the end result is low performance in the induce-
ment of FDi in the services sector.
Statistics show it is becoming increasingly difficult to induce FDi into 
Korea, not only in manufacturing but also in services. China has an indis-
criminate appetite to induce FDis, offers much better conditions for them, 
and shows a much more flexible approach to FDis in services. Geographic 
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proximity and a similarity in development strategy has placed Korea in di-
rect competition with China in inducing FDis. But many Koreans still worry 
about the possible loss of the domestic services market to foreign competi-
tors. 
Korean leaders must educate the people about a harsh reality: there is no 
need to worry that, by simply allowing them to invest in the country, foreign 
competitors will enter Korea’s domestic market. To the contrary, we will 
have foreign competitors if and only if the nation does its best to succeed in 
inducing them. 
In the case of agriculture, even investment or management by domestic 
capital and companies is still strictly regulated, a legacy from years past 
when agriculture was virtually the only source of wealth. The constitution 
of Korea still stipulates that only farmers can own agricultural land, sug-
gesting that agriculture is strictly the domain of farmers. If Korea had, be-
ginning in the early 1960s, attracted FDi, capital, technology, and manage-
rial skills from advanced countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
France, Korean agriculture and its food processing industry would look very 
different—and much more successful—today. 
To put it bluntly: the Korean agriculture and services sectors today are 
managed in the same way as China, India, and many other socialist coun-
tries managed their economies in the 1950s and 1960s.
Second, the players in these sectors still refuse to open their markets. 
They offer endless excuses: protection of infant industries, national secu-
rity, food security, the public interest, cultural identity, social welfare, and 
so on. But does anyone really believe they are more concerned about these 
“patriotic” causes than merely making profit? These are simply excuses to 
avoid competition. Thus, among Korean services industries, only shippers 
and airlines, which, from the outset, had no choice but to compete with 
foreign companies, and hence to depend upon foreign equipment and tech-
nology, are competitive and efficient. But there are some other more recent 
examples: in July 1991 giant global retail distributors were allowed to enter 
the Korean market, a step that only made their Korean competitors stronger 
and eventually confident enough to attempt to move abroad themselves.
Third, the Korean market will never itself be large enough for world-
class players. In other words, Korean companies can never become global 
players if they remain complacently active only in the domestic market. But 
services companies have not been eager to attempt to export their services 
or move abroad. Korea has quite a few manufacturing companies that suc-
cessfully established themselves in the world market; in the services sector, 
however, there are none. In agriculture also, if Korea focused on capital- and 
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technology-intensive products and injected appropriate production factors, 
instead of clinging to land- and labor-intensive items such as grain, Korea 
could have already become competitive in agriculture, in a much shorter pe-
riod of time than was needed to build a globally competitive manufacturing 
industry.
Finally, in the good old days, services were regarded as non-tradables 
and, quite naturally, not exposed to competition from abroad. This is no 
longer true. As the cost of travel and communication gets lower—even neg-
ligible in case of the latter—many kinds of service businesses are increas-
ingly exposed to foreign competition in the form of consumers’ movements 
or services through information and communication technologies (iCT). On 
the domestic scene as well, the barriers which traditionally separated broad-
casting from telecommunications are rapidly disappearing as iCT technology 
develops, and the established media’s market predominance is evaporating.
Here we see the fastest and least costly path to additional economic 
growth and job creation in the services industry and agriculture. All we 
need to do is to be loyal to economic principles and benchmark what we 
have already done to nurture the manufacturing sector: deregulate and open 
markets to expose them to domestic and foreign competition; induce FDi 
to make up for missing production factors; encourage moves abroad; and 
remove discriminations unintentionally favoring the manufacturing sector 
against the services sector. 
Changes Urgently Needed in Important Specific Sub-sectors
The first thing Korea needs to do is to completely end a number of built-in 
discriminations against the services industry. For example, most government 
support, such as tax exemptions and reductions, R&D subsidies, and pref-
erential financing, are given only to small and medium enterprises (SMes). 
Thus, being classified as an SMe is the first step toward eligibility for govern-
ment support. In this regard, services businesses were discriminated against 
because the criteria for their classification as SMes were much tighter than 
those for manufacturers. The situation is now much improved, but until 2001 
a company in some lines of service businesses with thirty or more perma-
nent employees was regarded as a large company and thus denied benefits 
for SMes, while all manufacturing companies with fewer than 300 employees 
were classified as SMes.
Even today, services companies have to purchase electricity at a price 
26.9 percent higher than the cost of its production, while manufacturers pay 
only the production cost; until 2001, the situation was even worse: manufac-
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turers actually paid 10 percent less than the cost. This partial leveling of the 
playing field in 2001 was achieved after long effort. When I first raised this 
issue, the ministry in charge promised to end the remaining absurd disparity 
within three years, but the reform has been repeatedly postponed.
Offering real estate for factory construction is regarded as the stron-
gest inducement the central and regional governments can extend to attract 
manufacturing investment, and accordingly Korea has numerous industrial 
estates. But I am unaware of a single local government that has ever offered 
business space in an effort to attract service businesses.
There are numerous other laws and practices that discriminate against 
the services sector, whether by design or by negligence. At the current pace, 
removing them will take far too many years. Since space does not permit a 
detailed sector-by-sector examination, I will below focus on the critical is-
sues that urgently need to be addressed in key sectors.
Tourism, Recreation and Sports
Tourism and sports are fundamentally labor- and land-intensive businesses. 
Land in Korea is extremely scarce and expensive, indeed, sometimes not 
available at all, because almost no land there remains developable. Almost 
every hectare of land in the country is regulated to preserve and protect vari-
ous public goods, including military facilities, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, 
cultural assets, and nature. In earlier days, rice paddies were sacrosanct, and 
thus the protection of agriculture offered the strongest justification against 
land development. Now, as the nation suffers from an oversupply of rice, 
the most vocal opposition to development comes from environmentalists. 
There are many other means to protect the public goods mentioned above, 
but in Korea there is an inexplicable, almost single-minded focus on land-use 
restrictions.
Governments, both central and local, have long sought to provide 
ready-made industrial sites to manufacturers at the cheapest possible prices, 
equipped with electricity, water, and sewage treatment facilities, and access 
to roads—even going to such lengths as constructing worker lodging for 
small factories. Although recently the government has repeatedly empha-
sized the priority of promoting services industries as a way to boost domes-
tic demand, apparently no local government has ever offered land at low rent 
for use by entertainment and sports companies.
Korea is perhaps the only country where government is not seriously 
interested in helping investors secure the necessary land and business space 
for services businesses. Governments there have been concerned about the 
long-term, rapid rise in the price of real estate and, understandably, they 
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have tried to keep land ownership by companies for business limited to a 
necessity level. But now sluggish investments have reduced or eliminated this 
worry, and even if land speculation remains a concern, governments can and 
should try to provide land or office space by lease instead of sales—provid-
ing real estate by lease is a good strategy to exclude speculators. The time 
has come for local governments to offer land and office space at negligible 
rent to attract recreation and knowledge-based services businesses.
Medical Care and Education
Medical care may be Korea’s most promising services business. With a rapid-
ly aging population and increasing personal income, Korea itself will likely 
see a very rapid growth in domestic demand for medical services. Moreover, 
within only a couple of hours by air, a vast demand exists in Japan and 
China for better medical services. (Like Korea, Japan and China have service 
sectors that are weak compared to their manufacturing sectors.) A lopsided 
flow of the best human resources into medical services since the 1980s and 
competition among hospitals for the newest and best medical facilities and 
equipment have made Korean hospitals extremely competitive.
The main obstacle to the growth of the Korean medical services sector 
is the popular attitude that medicine is a calling too noble to be governed 
and sullied by economic principles and the pursuit of profit. Thus, medical 
services in Korea are uniformly regulated by a single National Health Insur-
ance System (NHiS).
The popular ideal in Korea is a perfect national health insurance system 
with equal coverage for all. Unfortunately, the pursuit of this ideal has stifled 
competition among hospitals to provide new and improved services. With 
all hospitals providing the same services, defined and priced by the NHiS, 
patients are left with only narrow choices. It is difficult for globally competi-
tive hospitals to emerge and for advanced medical technologies to be devel-
oped. Wealthier Korean patients themselves travel to the United States for 
the finest care, and the idea of attracting large numbers of foreign patients 
to  Korea remains a distant dream.
Korea’s barring investments in hospitals and schools and universities is 
another problem. Capital for these may be raised only from donations and 
borrowing, because only non-profit corporations are allowed to run hospi-
tals and schools. Investment in Korea is, by definition, for-profit. The issue, 
however, is not in fact about whether to allow profit-seeking by running hos-
pitals and schools. Individuals with medical licenses can and do own and 
operate hospitals to earn money; and entrepreneurs are free to run private 
tutoring institutions for profit, as long as they do not hang out a signboard 
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containing the word “school” in it. (In Korea, the term “school” may be used 
only by educational institutions under the strict control of the Ministry of 
Education. They have a legal monopoly on issuing “diplomas”—their only 
comparative advantage over private tutoring institutions.)
Indeed, tutoring companies are prospering in Korea in a competitive 
market, and students and parents rely on them more than schools. Mean-
while, public and private schools are stagnant under the pretense and self-
deception that they guarantee equality of education. They have closed their 
eyes to the fact that, in 2007, they lost at least $50 billion to foreign competi-
tors who attracted Korean students. 
The non-profit corporation regulation is purely technical: it focuses on 
the means of raising capital and is not actually intended to prohibit profit-
making by medical and educational institutions. However, internationally 
competitive hospitals and schools cannot be built with only simple supplies 
like stethoscopes and syringes, and chalk and blackboards. Millions of dol-
lars are required to establish and operate world-class hospitals and universi-
ties. Unless the government deregulates and diversifies ways of capital fund-
ing for schools and hospitals, patients and students will continue seeking 
advanced care and education abroad, and Korea will lose substantial oppor-
tunities for economic growth and job creation.
Education must solve another problem if it is to convince well-to-do 
young people to remain in Korea instead of going abroad to study. The ideol-
ogy of “equal education” has long stifled competition and choice in elemen-
tary and secondary education in Korea. The country’s most vocal and influ-
ential teachers union has adamantly rejected proposals to evaluate students, 
because evaluations would naturally reveal the differences in performance 
among schools and teachers. The union firmly believes that evaluation and 
competition are not part of the educational system.
There have been numerous attempts to allow competition in at least a 
handful of schools, such as when the Ministry of Finance and the Economy 
(MOFe) provided the Ministry of Education (MOe) with 1.6 trillion won in 
the 2002 supplementary budget, in exchange for an agreement by the MOe to 
allow thirty independent private high schools—ones with greatly increased 
autonomy in the selection of their students and in decisions about their tu-
ition and fees. The deal resulted with only six such schools.
Since that time further attempts have been repeatedly made, but the 
scope of these “reforms” has been so limited that they have not yet had 
any significant effect on competition with private tutoring institutions or 
on the number of students going abroad. Worse yet, some recently-elected 
superintendents of education in provincial elections, including those elected 
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in Seoul and Gyeonggi (Kyŏnggi) provinces, are affiliated with the above-
mentioned union. Making domestic secondary education more attractive 
than foreign education and introducing competition and autonomy is sure 
to become even more difficult.
The last and desperate attempt by economic ministries to make a 
breakthrough on this front was a compromise: allowing foreign hospitals 
and schools to operate in limited areas in Korea, such as the Free Economic 
Zones (FeZs) and Jeju International Free City. Although enacted at the end 
of 2002, no significant success has been achieved. (I myself established the 
FeZs, and have to confess that I could not make them free enough to attract 
foreign investment in high-end services. I thought FeZs themselves, once 
established, and with regional governments hosting them, would fight for 
more freedom. But they did not.) In contrast, since the early 2000s, Singa-
pore has been attracting foreign universities and schools not only for Singa-
pore students but for all students in neighboring countries. Singapore now 
hosts iNSeaD, Duke, MiT, and so on. This success neatly shows the difference 
of approach and way of thinking between the two countries.
Child Care and Social Services
Among the numerous needed institutional reforms in the services sector, 
especially in the realm of so-called social services, the most important are 
in the child care and broadcasting industries. Unfortunately, in the Korean 
government, oversight of these industries does not fall under economic min-
istries. Thus, economic factors are very often overwhelmed by social, and 
sometimes ideological, considerations. For example, fees for child care cen-
ters are still regulated and suppressed, limiting the development of child care 
services at a level far beneath the potential.
Telecommunications and Broadcasting
FDis in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries are not very 
welcomed and are limited up to certain levels; this is because most consider 
the telecommunication industry to be important for national security and 
feel that the broadcasting industry should not be allowed to be run by for-
eign capitalists in order to protect the nation’s cultural identity. This way of 
thinking might have made some sense when the wired telecommunication 
network was a natural monopoly and when there were only a few broadcast-
ing stations because of technical reasons of electromagnetic wave availabil-
ity. In this new world of smart communications and satellite and internet 
broadcasting, such arguments are meaningless. We need more deregulation 
with these industries.
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Entertainment and Cultural Industries 
Korean television dramas are now very popular in most Asian countries and 
 Korean singers are well received, not only in Asia but also even in Western 
countries, signs that show it may be possible for Korea to develop various 
facets of its entertainment industry. 
Many kinds of culturally-related businesses—including entertainment, 
design, and advertising—are based upon and derived from more pure forms 
of arts and culture. Government should nurture the arts not only for their 
own sake but also to enrich and strengthen the foundation of businesses that 
draw upon the arts. 
The Korean government, like others around the world, is trying to do 
so, but mostly by supporting the suppliers of the arts. But nurturing the 
arts and cultural activities does not seem very effective in the face of low 
interest for them. Boosting demand for them would be far more efficient. 
For example, we need to encourage consumers to spend more on cultural 
products and performances and encourage schools to allocate more time to 
turn out more future music and art lovers, instead of giving subsidies and 
tax favors to suppliers of the arts. Support for suppliers usually spoils them, 
while nurturing demand can better help them.
High-tech and Greentech
There is little need to be concerned about Korea’s high-tech and cleantech in-
dustries, because both the government and private sector are knowledgeable 
and quite capable in these areas. The great weakness of the Korean economy 
lies in its services and agriculture industries. People engaged in those sectors 
do not even understand the problems they face, much less know how to solve 
those problems. Policy efforts for those doing well tend to be redundant, 
and instead should be focused on those who are not able to solve their own 
problems. Korea is doing well on all other fronts, but if the nation cannot 
advance along these fronts as well, its economy will remain fettered.
Concluding Remarks and the Korea-US FTA Agreement
I have argued above that Korea needs development of its services industry to 
sustain necessary job creation and bOP management; that the success strat-
egy of the manufacturing industry should be benchmarked by the agricul-
ture and the services industries because of their dependence upon foreign 
advanced countries and enterprises to make up for a lack of production fac-
tors such as capital, technology, management skills, and brands; and that the 
Korean domestic market must be opened to enhance competition.
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In this context, I believe the best economic policy decision Korea has 
made since 2000 is its current pursuit of omnidirectional FTas. When FTas 
were first made with Chile, the eFTa (European Free Trade Association), and 
Singapore, Korea also underlined the possibility of increasing exports with 
its FTa partners. Since then, we have come to recognize that increasing ex-
ports is no longer the most important policy goal for Korea’s economic well-
being, but that opening markets and inducing FDis for the development of 
high-end service businesses should instead be the priority.
Since then, Korea has begun to pursue FTas with countries bigger, stron-
ger, and more advanced than itself, and successfully concluded negotiations 
with very significant economic partners such as the United States, the Eu-
ropean Union, India, and aSeaN. Negotiations with Japan have been halted 
and delayed, but we expect to begin formal negotiations with China quite 
soon. 
We chose the United States and the EU as the first counterparts for 
meaningful FTas because we thought they are the most advanced in services 
businesses. Even though the Japanese and Chinese markets can be more im-
portant for Korea, neither has an advanced services industry and hence we 
cannot expect very much to learn from them. The irony is that the United 
States, the champion of free trade and still the strongest in service business-
es, has been hesitant in ratifying an FTa with Korea and, after four wasted 
years, has been overtaken by the EU.
Table 4.9 shows FDi into Korea as well as Korea’s outward direct invest-
ment (ODi). The United States remains the number one investor in Korea and 
Table 4.9
Accumulated FDIs into and ODIs by Korea until 2010 (USD millions, %)
FDIs into Korea ODIs by Korea
Country Amount Share Country Amount Share
United States 43,783 25.2 United States 32,760 20.1
Japan 25,975 15.0 China 31,861 19.5
Netherlands 20,034 11.5 Hong Kong 11,967 7.3
UK 10,699 6.2 Vietnam 6,772 4.1
Germany 9,242 5.3 Netherlands 6,109 3.7
Malaysia 7,152 4.1 Indonesia 4,871 2.9
Singapore 6,689 3.9 Bermuda 2,585 1.6
Total 173,584 100.0 Total 163,329 100.0
Source: KEXIM Overseas Economic Research Institute, Overseas Investment Statistics; Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy, Foreign Direct Investment Statistics.
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at the same time the number one destination for Korean investment abroad, 
even though both shares are on secular decline. This strong relationship in 
mutual investments is no less important than the trade relationship, and 
should be maintained as long as possible. The point of FTas these days is not 
just to mutually increase exports, but to strengthen cross-investment.
Considering that China is now by far the Korea’s largest economic part-
ner, and has recently made an FTa with Taiwan, a strong Korean competitor, 
Korea will inevitably hasten to conclude an FTa with China. Will the United 
States and Japan be even further left behind on the FTa front?
Economic Globalization and 
Expatriate Labor in Korea1
Gi-Wook Shin and Joon Nak Choi
In recent years, South Korean policymakers and business leaders have been searching for new engines of economic growth in the services sector while at the same time trying to preserve South Korea’s (hereafter simply 
Korea) engineering prowess. Expatriate labor, or “global talent” working 
in Korea, can be a solution for both problems. Academic research has long 
viewed expatriate labor as a key instrument for enhancing a country’s eco-
nomic competitiveness. As countries have followed this strategy, competition 
to recruit global talent has intensified (Kirkegaard 2007; McHale 2003).
Although Koreans are often seen as nationalistic and inward-looking, 
they view economic globalization as an instrument to be used to compete 
against other nation-states. Thus, despite their deep-rooted sense of eth-
nic homogeneity, Koreans have been surprisingly positive toward various 
globalization-driven policies intended to improve Korean competitiveness 
(Shin and Choi 2008). If expatriate labor is presented as such an instrument, 
 Koreans are likely to embrace it.
This paper investigates two potential sources of skilled expatriate labor 
for the Korean domestic market: (1) foreigners studying at Korean univer-
sities for PhD degrees, as a source of global talent in engineering; and (2) 
second- and third-generation ethnic Koreans living overseas, as a source of 
top global talent in finance and general business.
We will first examine these groups’ current situation in Korea, compar-
ing and contrasting the Korean government’s policies versus those adopted 
by four comparison cases. This comparison highlights potential ways to 
improve Korean policies. We conclude by summarizing these policy recom-
mendations.
1  An extended version of this paper, entitled “Expatriate Labor in the Korean 
Market,” was published by the Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education & 
Training (KRIVET) in 2010. A grant from KRIVET has aided this research and we are grate-
ful to its president, Dr. Daebong Kwon, for his generous support.
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Expatriate Labor Market 
“Expatriate labor” includes a wide range of foreigners working in Korea, 
as categorized in Figure 5.1. Skills, national origin, experience and educa-
tion create distinctions in this typology between the two main divisions of 
skilled labor, including service professionals and engineers, and unskilled 
labor, those who perform tasks commonly labelled as “3D”—dirty, danger-
ous and difficult.
The two population segments selected for this study—ethnic  Koreans 
overseas, and foreign students studying in  Korea—may potentially be tapped 
as sources of global talent. Unlike some other segments, these groups have 
yet to attract much research attention. Second- and third-generation  Koreans 
living in advanced industrial societies face strong pressures to become skilled 
professionals. Although ethnic Korean parents once pushed their children to 
become engineers, they have recently started encouraging their children into 
the higher-prestige professions of law, medicine and business, with the result 
that many overseas Koreans have become top professionals in these fields. 
In contrast, the best foreign students in Korea are studying to become engi-
neers. Policies consistent with these preferences will be more likely to be suc-
cessful. For each group, we examine the status quo in Korea, in terms of the 
underlying situation and extant policies, and then compare it to four cases 
overseas to formulate policy recommendations for the Korean government.
Four countries that employ expatriate labor in different ways are ex-
amined in this study as comparison cases: Canada, the United States, Ger-
many and Japan. Some (Canada and the United States) are multicultural 
“settler states” while others (Germany and Japan) are monocultural nations 
having a jus sanguinis basis for citizenship. In addition, some (Canada and 
Germany) are more aggressive than others (the United States and Japan) in 
recruiting skilled labor. The 2x2 typology in Figure 5.2 explains how these 
countries are similar to and/or different from Korea. While Japan is nearly 
identical to Korea on both dimensions, Canada is very different.
Foreign Science and Engineering Students in Korea
In recent years, manufacturing firms in Korea have had much difficulty re-
cruiting research and development engineers. Table 5.1 shows that as of 
2006 the manufacturing sector suffered a shortage of 2,545 MA and PhD 
holders, and 23,653 junior-college or college graduates.
Korea may attract foreign students to fill this gap like the United States, 
which has been fantastically successful in recruiting the most talented sci-
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ence and engineering students and keeping them as members of its labor 
force.
Current Situation in Korea
Korean universities attract many foreign students. The best Korean universi-
ties may rank below the most prestigious U.S. universities, but are competi-
tive within Asia. As of 2007, there were a total of 49,270 foreign students 
studying in Korea, as indicated by the number of student visas issued by 
the Korean government (KEDI 2008). The vast majority (92.6 percent) have 
come from within Asia, as shown in Table 5.2. Table 5.3 reveals that Chinese 
students are the largest group, amounting to 68 percent of the Asian total. 
Although the humanities and social science disciplines attract the majority 
of Asian students, about 1 in 5 students seek degrees in science and engi-
neering. The next largest group of students comes from North America, 
amongst whom only 383 students sought degrees in engineering and science 
fields.
For students from Asian countries pursuing postgraduate education, 
top engineering universities in Korea are said to provide a better research 
environment than their homelands. Korea has a highly organized system of 
scientific research, experiment-based training, and an established research 
network. Asian graduate students and researchers are now bringing along 
their families to enjoy the better life chances available in Korea. Yet, many 
return to their home countries—particularly to work for Korean multina-
tional firms.
Current Policies in Korea
Improving the Quality of  the Study Abroad Experience in Korea
Some institutions and government agencies have specific arrangements 
for attracting foreign students into Korea. For example, the Korea Institute 
of Science and Technology (KIST) established the International Research 
TablE 5.3
Foreign Students Studying in Korea by Country of Origin
China Japan Vietnam
United 
States Mongolia Taiwan Others Total
Number of 
Students
33,650 3,854 2,242 1,388 1,309 1,047 5,780 49,270 
Proportion 
of Total (%)
68.3 7.8 4.6 2.8 2.7 2.1 11.7 100
Source: Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI), “Foreign Students Statistics in 2007,” 
2008.
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and Development Academy, which recruits highly-qualified foreign students 
and helps them pursue academic degrees while they conduct field-based re-
search. The academy also provides students with tuition and fee waivers and 
living expenses, including lodging and food. As of July 2009, 98 students 
have joined the academy. This approach both trains foreign scientists and 
engineers and promotes collaboration for international scientific technology 
transfer.
The Ministry of Education has made arrangements for supporting for-
eign students studying engineering in Korea. Of special interest is the is-
suance of the “Science Card,” a support system for foreign scientists that 
facilitates the immigration process into Korea. Since April 2002, 1,061 cards 
have been issued.
Although these measures help relieve the material or psychological 
costs of studying abroad, there needs to be a more comprehensive support 
framework for foreign students. Many are funded by their academic advi-
sors or the managers of research projects they participate in. However, the 
administrative and legal procedures for sharing research outputs are not well 
established, causing conflicts between Korean researchers and their foreign 
students over publication authorship, other forms of credit, and the distribu-
tion of funds. Set procedures would help alleviate this problem. Also, quali-
fied foreign researchers should be given opportunities for obtaining large-
scale research projects on their own. 
Attracting more foreign students
The Korean government has instituted the “Study in Korea Program,” 
aimed at attracting foreign students to study engineering and the sciences 
in Korea. The program seems to be successful in increasing the number of 
foreign students, but the quality of these students has yet to come under 
close scrutiny. For instance, interviews with local experts suggest that many 
“students” in two-year programs (perhaps as high as 60 percent) are actu-
ally working in Korea in 3D-type jobs, using a student visa mainly for entry 
into Korea. Also, there appears to be a difference in the quality of foreign 
humanities and social science students in Korea (low) versus engineering and 
technical students (high) (Choi et al. 2008; Kim H. J. 2008).
Since around the turn of this century, the Korean government has put 
forward plans to recruit foreign students into engineering majors, out of 
concern that Korean students are reluctant to enter those fields and that 
the resulting shortage would decrease Korea’s competitive edge in high-
tech industries. According to the Ministry of Education, foreign graduates 
who have majored in engineering and sciences seek a seamless transition 
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between their studies and employment in related jobs, without having to 
worry about visa problems. Recently, the Korean government proposed new 
plans allowing foreign students who achieved their degrees in humanities 
and social sciences to extend their stay in Korea for an additional two years 
after graduation. The government expects that this policy will recruit most 
talented foreign students into the business and producer services sectors, ar-
eas in which labor demand is expected to grow owing to the transition of the 
 Korean economy into a service-based and knowledge-driven one (Korea’s 
Delegate to OECD 2007).
Immigration policy
Immigration policies have been modified to ease the immigration pro-
cess and aid foreigners in seeking employment opportunities. For instance, 
the Ministry of Justice has started to issue “Gold Cards” for technology 
professionals and “IT Cards” for information technology professionals (in 
addition to the Science Cards mentioned above) to recruit a highly skilled 
foreign workforce. Holders of these cards are guaranteed three years of un-
limited entry and departure, as well as permission to hire household assis-
tants. Foreign students in science majors have been added to this program, 
ensuring that there are enough specialized workers in Korea.
Many researchers emphasize that Korea’s foreign labor policy, at its 
core, resembles that of Japan: it aims to recruit a high quality workforce, 
but to restrict the influx of low-skilled labor so that the latter does not im-
pact the employment of domestic workers (Lee and Park 2005; Park 2008). 
These policies, however, are sometimes considered to be discriminatory 
against low-skilled foreign workers. This issue needs further consideration 
and debate. Table 5.4 shows the progress of Korean policies regarding for-
eign labor.
Best Practices in Other Countries
In recent years, many countries have emulated the U.S. Optional Practical 
Training (OPT) program, which allows foreign students a one-year work per-
mit after graduation. Australia has made it easier for foreigners with lo-
cal degrees to obtain permanent residency. Canada has made it easier for 
graduate students to work off campus, and has allowed them to stay after 
graduation. The United Kingdom expanded its one-year visa for graduates 
of science and engineering fields to cover all BA and MA recipients. France 
introduced a six-month renewable visa for current students to allow them 
to search for employment. The German government has provided one-year 
work permits for foreign students who receive a job offer (Kirkegaard 2007).
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United States
The United States has historically retained a large proportion of the sci-
ence and engineering students it educates. Data from the National Science 
Foundation reveal that from 1988 to 1996 roughly two-thirds of foreign sci-
ence and engineering PhD recipients planned to stay in the United States af-
ter graduation. While Chinese (86 percent) and Indian (79 percent) students 
were likely to stay in the United States, Korean (36 percent) and Taiwanese 
(48 percent) students were much more likely to leave. Students from these 
four Asian countries accounted for nearly 80 percent of all foreign recipients 
of science and engineering PhDs awarded in the United States. Kirkegaard 
(2007) expresses concern that as China and India increase their income lev-
els, their students would increasingly resemble Korean and Taiwanese stu-
dents, becoming more likely to return home.
The OPT program is the primary vehicle for retaining foreign graduates 
of U.S. universities. Foreign students enter the United States under the F-1 
TablE 5.4
Adoption of Foreign Labor and Related Institutional Changes
Year Institutions Details
1991 Adoption of the “Industrial and 
Technical Training Program” (ITTP)
Firms that made foreign direct 
investment were allowed to bring 
their local trainees into Korea.
1994 Adoption of the association- 
recommended ITTP
Small sized firms that made no 
FDI were allowed to accept foreign 
trainees as well.
1995 Regulation on the Protection and 
Management of Foreign Industrial 
and Technical Trainees
Trainees were covered under 
industrial accident remuneration 
insurance and health care insurance 
and protected partially by the Basic 
Standard of Labor Act.
2000 Adoption of the Industrial Training 
system
To mitigate problems with the 
ITTP, three-year training period was 
modified into two-year training and 
one-year employment.
2004 Adoption of the Work Permit system The system adopted foreign laborers 
as workers, not trainees. Became 
effective with ITTP remaining valid .
2007 Abolition of the ITTP Adoption of foreign labor was made 
possible only through the Work 
Permit system.
Source: Park 2008, 74.
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student visa, and all F-1 students graduating from U.S. universities have the 
option of taking a one-year OPT period of legal employment in the United 
States. Considering that the OPT is available for a minimal fee, while the main 
employer-sponsored work visa (H-1B) involves a petition process, most F-1 
students remaining in the United States use the OPT for employment before 
transitioning to the H-1B. As of fiscal year 2008, approximately 70,000 indi-
viduals were undergoing OPT. These individuals are split between pre-com-
pletion OPT, which allows student employment in a field directly related to 
their program of study prior to graduation, and post-completion OPT (U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services 2008). Historically, OPT duration has 
been limited to a total of 12 months, which could be split between pre- and 
post-completion OPT. However, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(2008) recently implemented two changes designed to make it easier for em-
ployers to hire F-1 students. First, it extended OPT from 12 to 29 months for 
F-1 students with a degree in science, technology, engineering, or mathemat-
ics. Second, it automatically extended OPT for all F-1 students with pending 
H-1B (long-term working visa) petitions, eliminating the possibility that an 
F-1 student would have to return home despite having an employer-spon-
sored H-1B application currently in process.
Canada
More than 130,000 foreign students study in Canada every year, and 
like the United States, Canada has instituted a program designed to retain 
these students after graduation. This program offers work permits for stu-
dents at certified four-year institutions. For students who study less than 
eight months in Canada, no permits are offered. Students who study eight 
months to two years are offered a work permit for a period no longer than 
the length of time of study. Students who study longer than two years are of-
fered a three-year work permit (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2009).
Germany
Germany is now allowing foreign graduates of its universities a one-year 
period to seek employment there. Citizens of long-standing EU states are 
automatically given an EC Long Term Residence Permit; citizens of new EU 
states, as well as non-EU countries, are granted one year after obtaining a 
university degree to find a job matching their qualifications. Students who 
obtain a job offer are then given residency permits (German Federal Minis-
try of Labour and Social Affairs 2009).
Japan
Unlike the other cases examined here, Japan does not appear to provide 
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any special dispensation to foreign graduates of its universities. Students are 
simply urged to secure employment while still attending school, and file for a 
change-in-status from a student visa to a working visa before the expiration 
of the student visa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009).
Summary
Many advanced industrialized countries have recently entered an “arms 
race” to retain foreign graduates of their universities. Most of these pro-
grams have been modeled on the U.S. OPT program, allowing students a lim-
ited amount of time to secure employment. The one exception is Japan, 
which appears to provide no such dispensation. 
Policy Recommendations
Korea has followed the United States, Canada, Germany, the United King-
dom, and other advanced countries in streamlining the retention of foreign 
graduates of local universities by implementing an OPT-like program. How-
ever, the large perceived gap in quality between foreign science/technology 
and social science/humanities students may necessitate a re-evaluation of 
this policy.
A Restricted OPT-Like Program
Korea is now extending an OPT-like program towards all graduates of 
its universities and colleges. Immigration policies have been modified for 
the purpose of easing the immigration process (e.g., the IT and Gold Cards) 
and helping foreigners better seek employment opportunities. However, a 
universal OPT-like program may not be entirely applicable to Korea for two 
reasons.
First, there is a widespread perception that many foreign students at 
junior colleges are abusing their student visa statuses by working in 3D jobs. 
This perception cannot be checked against factual data, however, because 
this subject has not been researched in sufficient depth. If true, this phe-
nomenon would necessitate a re-evaluation of the student visa program and 
would preclude an extension of an OPT-like program to junior college gradu-
ates.
Second, there is a widespread perception that foreign students at four-
year universities majoring in the humanities and social sciences are inferior 
to those in engineering and the sciences. Again, this perception cannot be 
checked against factual evidence because of the lack of data. Regardless of 
the quality of these graduates, the fact remains that Korea is facing no short-
ages in humanities and social science professions—so this group would sim-
ply be competing with Korean university graduates.
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Considering these two points, we recommend that an equivalent to the 
U.S. OPT be provided primarily for graduates of four-year educational in-
stitutions majoring in science- and engineering-related fields. Although the 
allegations made against junior college and humanities/social science ma-
jors cannot be verified against actual data, extending an OPT-like program 
to these individuals would create competition for Korean college graduates 
regardless of the foreigners’ actual merit. In contrast, the documented short-
ages in top science and engineering labor make the retention of locally-edu-
cated “global talent” a viable task. Furthermore, there is a precedent for the 
differential treatment of science and engineering graduates; for instance, the 
United States grants technical graduates a much longer OPT program.
An Expanded Science Card
We also recommend that policymakers closely monitor the Science Card 
program. As of today, this program only has approximately 1,000 enrolled 
persons, so it cannot be properly evaluated. However, if it proves successful, 
it may be expanded to all individuals who qualify for OPT-like programs. 
Expanded Support for Foreign Postdoctorates
We also recommend that the Ministry of Education collaborate with 
leading research universities to design and implement a postdoctoral fellow 
program aimed at retaining top PhDs in engineering and the sciences. Our 
research shows that Korea has an unambiguous need for engineering PhDs, 
and one of the best ways to retain foreign students with Korean PhDs would 
be to provide postdoctoral fellowships.
An ideal program would be funded and administered by the Ministry 
of Education, but awarded to top researchers at individual universities. Re-
searchers who need research support would write competitive grants to the 
ministry, and the winning grants would receive the services of a qualified 
foreigner with a PhD from a Korean university.
A National Database on Foreign Students in Korea
Our most pressing policy recommendation is the creation of a compre-
hensive national database on foreign students in Korea. Such a database is 
critical because we cannot investigate key questions with existing data.
Existing databases, shown in Table 5.5, capture basic statistics on for-
eign students. However, they do not offer the data needed to ascertain how 
many former students are currently working in Korea, and what their career 
trajectories look like. As far as current data are concerned, the Korean Edu-
cation Development Institute and the Ministry of Education provide statis-
tics on foreign students by three major fields of study: humanities and social 
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sciences; science and engineering; and arts and physical sciences. However, 
to be able to predict labor market supply and demand, very detailed statis-
tics by specific fields of study are needed. The government must collaborate 
with academic institutions to conduct such research.
Ethnic Koreans in the Services Sector
Ethnic Koreans overseas, particularly the top global talent that has been 
nurtured and educated in host societies, could help enhance Korea’s com-
petitiveness in the service industries. Were these talented professionals to 
be recruited to Korea, they could help expand the service sector in  Korea, 
creating entry-level professional services positions to be filled by  Koreans 
graduating with university degrees.
Recruiting ethnic Koreans back to their ancestral homeland is based on 
the concept of diasporic return. As Cohen (1997) suggests, diasporas are 
drawn to their homelands in search of social identity and belonging, despite 
ties to adoptive homes. Such tendencies manifest themselves as “return mi-
gration.” Sassen (1999) finds that there is considerable return migration; for 
instance, 60 percent of all Italians who left for the United States around 1900 
eventually returned home.
Current Situation in Korea
As Table 5.6 shows, there are about seven million ethnic Koreans living 
around the globe. Over half of them reside in Asia, with China having 2.76 
million and Japan 893,000. Outside Asia, North America hosts 2.34 million 
ethnic Koreans; most reside in the United States, with 825,000 having U.S. 
citizenship, 732,000 having permanent residency, and 459,000 holding edu-
cational visas and other short-term visas. Europe hosts the next largest num-
ber, with 645,000 ethnic Koreans. Of this number, 86 percent reside in the 
former Soviet Union, which created this diaspora through forced migration.2
As the children and grandchildren of Korean emigrants, second- and 
third-generation ethnic Koreans have become integrated into their host soci-
eties. In the United States, for instance, Asian-Americans are disproportion-
ately over-represented among the wealthiest quintile of U.S. households (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2005). Korean-Americans have also achieved social integra-
tion, as evidenced by high intermarriage rates. Although ethnic Koreans in 
Japan have faced legal and social barriers to full integration, they have also 
achieved some degree of integration (Ryang 2000).
2 Large numbers of Koreans had fled the Japanese occupation to the Soviet Far 
East. During the 1930s, most of these individuals were relocated to Central Asia for po-
litical reasons.
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List of D
atabases A
vailable for Expatriate Labor Policy
D
ata Set
D
escription
G
overnm
ent A
gency and A
vailable D
ata 
K
orean Statistical 
Inform
ation 
System
C
ollects nationally conducted surveys from
 various governm
ent 
agencies and provides detailed inform
ation statistics on 
population, im
m
igration, labor, and education. A
lso available are 
the num
ber of foreigners staying in K
orea w
ith various visas.
M
inistry of Justice, K
orean Im
m
igration Service: “Statistics on 
Foreigners by Status of Sojourn (1992–2008).”
M
inistry of Public A
dm
inistration and Security: “Foreign 
R
esidents by Provinces and Local G
overnm
ents (2006–2008)”; 
“Basic Survey of N
ationw
ide Foreign R
esidents (2006–2008).”
N
ational Science 
and Technological 
Inform
ation 
System
 (N
T
IS)
Provides inform
ation on highly educated personnel w
ho studied 
in K
orean universities and those w
ho are pursuing their academ
ic 
or professional careers in research institutes or educational 
institutions.
A
lso available are the size of entering college cohorts by field 
of m
ajor, and forecast of labor dem
and and supply in engineering 
and science fields.
M
inistry of Education, Science, and Technology: “Survey of 
C
urrent Situation of Science &
 Engineering Labor. (2008)”
M
inistry of Education, Science, and Technology and K
orean 
Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation: “W
hite Paper 
of Science and Technological Statistics. (2009)”
Em
ploym
ent 
Perm
it System
Provides general introduction of em
ploym
ent perm
it system
 
and also statistical resources for policy and educational services. 
N
um
ber of foreign w
orkers residing in K
orea w
ith various status 
are available.
H
ow
ever, no detailed inform
ation is given about foreign w
orkers 
in term
s of their job-seeking behavior or careers.
E-nara Index
Provides current situations of South K
orea in social, econom
ic, 
political, and cultural aspects using high quality data collected by 
governm
ent agencies.
Provides not only governm
ent-acknow
ledged data but 
secondary data of adm
inistrative resources or predictions.
A
llow
s changes due to governm
ent policy using tim
e-series 
data, and provides easy tools for graphically presenting outputs.
M
inistry of Labor. “C
urrents of Foreign Laborer Em
ploym
ent-
G
eneral and Ethnic K
oreans)
M
inistry of Justice, “A
nnual Statistics of Im
m
igration Service.”
M
inistry of Foreign A
ffairs and Trade, “R
eport of Foreign 
R
esidency.”
Foreign Students 
Statistics
D
ata collected by K
orea Educational D
evelopm
ent Institute 
M
arch–A
ugust 2008 and released N
ovem
ber 2008. D
ata subjects: 
foreign students enrolled or registered as of survey period.
M
inistry of Education, Science, and Technology: N
um
ber of 
Foreign Students R
esiding in K
orea by Institution, C
ountry of 
O
rigin, T
ype of Education, Year
O
verseas K
oreans
D
ata surveyed and released July 2009; collected by overseas 
diplom
atic offi
ces (em
bassies, consulates, branch offi
ces) by 
exam
ining residency reports of overseas K
oreans, issuance of 
passports, reports of local associations of overseas K
oreans
M
inistry of Foreign A
ffairs and Trade: Statistics of O
verseas 
Ethnic K
oreans (by Size and Purpose of R
esidence; A
nnual 
C
hange in N
um
ber)
Source: A
uthors.
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Despite such integration, many ethnic Koreans are attracted to their 
ancestral homeland. This attraction has been encouraged by government 
policies like the F-4 visa, a permanent residency visa giving former  Korean 
citizens and their children unrestricted access to Korean jobs and services 
(Ministry of Justice 2008). As of 2008, 37,740 overseas Koreans lived in 
Seoul under the F-4 visa program.
Many young Korean-Americans work in Korea for substantial periods 
of time. For instance, many Korean-American graduates of top educational 
institutions spend some time working in Korea, especially in English lan-
guage education and related activities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
these individuals go to Korea partly in search of their ethnic identities and 
partly to enjoy the vibrant lifestyle. After a few years in Korea, however, 
these individuals typically return to their adopted homelands to pursue pro-
fessional careers.
Second- and third-generation ethnic Koreans, particularly from the 
United States and Japan, are one of the two focal points of this chapter. 
TablE 5.6
Overseas Korean Populations by Status of Sojourn, 2007 
Region Country Citizens Residents
Sojourners
TotalGeneral Students
Total 4,047,934 1,451,346 1,211,148 334,288 7,044,716
Asia
Total 2,577,953 546,919 751,288 164,216 4,040,376
Japan *296,168 499,553 80,530 17,489 893,740
China **2,244,398 3,112 438,238 76,412 2,762,160
Others 37,387 44,254 232,520 70,315 384,476
The 
Americas
Total 938,650 878,696 396,439 127,378 2,341,163
United States 825,420 732,329 354,031 105,131 2,016,911
Canada 95,062 78,497 21,536 21,533 216,628
Central and 
South America 18,168 67,870 20,872 714 107,624
Europe
Total 531,062 24,456 47,981 41,753 645,252
Confederation 
of Independent 
States (CIS)
518,437 3,342 9,052 3,145 553,976
Continental 
Europe 12,625 21,114 38,929 38,608 111,276
Mideast Total 82 15 9,139 204 9,440
Africa Total 187 1,260 6,301 737 8,485
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Overseas Koreans,” available at Korean.net. Down-
loaded on August 5, 2009.
Notes: * Figure represents total of Korean-Japanese who naturalized into Japan during 1952–2005 
including those with North Korean nationality. Statistics are drawn from the Ministry of Justice. 
** A total of 1,923,800 Korean Chinese with Chinese nationality were reported to be living in China 
by Chinese Census 2000.
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Current policies recognize that many young Korean-Americans and other 
ethnic Koreans return to Korea for short periods of time. However, little 
research has been done to assess this group’s potential as a source of skilled 
labor. Korean-Americans living in Korea often have degrees from some of 
the best universities in the world, giving them the chance to become highly-
skilled professionals. Indeed, many of them return “home” to the United 
States to become doctors, lawyers, scientists, businessmen, and financiers. 
Yet, few choose to settle permanently in Korea. The challenge is to create an 
environment that encourages second- and third-generation ethnic  Koreans 
to become professionals in Korea, instead of heading back “home.”
Current Policies in Korea
In light of globalization and transnational migration, the concept of citizen-
ship or “nationality” has come under scrutiny in many countries (Sassen 
1999).
Korea has been no exception; in recent years, Korean policymakers have 
debated extending dual citizenship to overseas Koreans. The debate has been 
spurred more by Korean domestic politics than the actual needs of overseas 
Koreans beyond the first generation—presumably the ones who would be 
served by the new policies. As some experts argue, dual citizenship is pe-
ripheral to expatriate labor policy: because  Korean immigration policy is 
already hospitable to second- and third-generation ethnic Koreans, few care 
if they can actually obtain Korean citizenship. The existing F-4 “permanent 
resident” visa provides its holders nearly all of the benefits of citizenship, 
without mandatory military service. If any immigration policy refinements 
are needed, it might be to change the duration of the F-4 from the current 
two-year period to five or ten years, to encourage more ethnic Koreans over-
seas to obtain and maintain the F-4 status. 
The debate has intensified since the Lee Myung-Bak administration pro-
posed the new First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, to be put into effect 
from 2008 to 2012. The plan calls for: (1) the recruitment of high-quality 
personnel to advance technological innovation and high value-added tasks; 
(2) the granting of permanent residency to technicians whose skills fill spe-
cific labor shortages; (3) the provision of consumer-centered support ser-
vices (e.g., schools, local cultural centers, social welfare facilities, and civic 
organizations) by local governments; (4) the allowance of dual citizenship 
for Korean citizens eligible for foreign citizenship because they were born 
overseas, as well as for specific types of global talent; and (5) the provision of 
social integration programs for marriage migrant women (Kim E. M. 2009).
Global competitiveness also figures into expatriate labor policy. Many 
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Korean politicians and scholars emphasize the need to invest in a globally-
competitive labor force to continue Korea’s economic growth. This argu-
ment resonates with the need to import high-skilled expatriate labor. So far, 
a consensus exists that Korea should “follow up” on these ideas, but nothing 
stronger has been proposed. In line with this argument, overseas ethnic Ko-
reans can potentially serve as global talent in major segments of the econo-
my, mainly in business and customer services. Medicine, law, finance, busi-
ness, and engineering appear to be particularly conducive to global talent.
Best Practices in Other Countries
Germany and Japan are the most relevant comparative cases here. Like 
 Korea, both have had jus sanguinis views on nationality. In contrast, Canada 
and the United States are both multi-ethnic settler societies that cannot have 
“returnees” based on jus sanguinis.
Germany
Germany has experienced two waves of returnee migration: the first 
wave of returnees has been very successfully reintegrated into German soci-
ety; however, a second wave, in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
has not integrated as well.
The social integration of ethnic Germans into West Germany was ini-
tially extremely successful. West Germany’s Basic Law, in Article 116 (1), 
included refugees or expellees of German origin amongst the definition of 
a “German.” “Expellees” only had to originate from a communist country 
to be labeled a “resettler” meriting residency, and eventually citizenship, in 
Germany. Many of these individuals had ancestors who had left “Germany” 
as long as eight centuries ago (Joppke 2005). From 1945 to 1987, 1.6 million 
“ethnic Germans” entered West Germany. They quickly blended into the na-
tive population and ethnic German returnees from that era became socially 
indistinguishable (Bommes 2006).
An additional 1.6 million returnees, arriving after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, have had a different experience. Initially treated no differently from 
earlier returnees, the new wave was gradually stripped of its special status. 
Although the German government had originally allowed ethnic Germans 
to enter without restrictions, it responded to the increasing volume of im-
migration by restricting annual inflows to 220,000 per year. Furthermore, 
it amended citizenship laws in 1990, 1993 and 1999 to allow non-German 
migrants and their children access to German citizenship, weakening the jus 
sanguinis basis for citizenship. The new wave returnees have a much high-
er unemployment rate than natives, even if it is lower compared to most 
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non-EU immigrant populations in Germany. Overall, ethnic Germans im-
migrants have been transformed into “normal” immigrants (Bommes 2006).
Opposing “liberal” and “restrictive” forces have both contributed to this 
change. Liberal politicians decried the hypocrisy of Germany’s refusal to 
assimilate its Turkish population while providing special privileges to in-
dividuals of dubious ethnic German background. Meanwhile, conservative 
politicians took advantage of a worsening economy, with mass unemploy-
ment and decreasing welfare benefits, to attack generous resettler benefits. 
These conflicting forces resulted in regulations that reduced ethnic German 
immigration (Joppke 2005). Following the 2005 reforms, Germany ceased 
making special provisions for ethnic Germans.
The German experience represents a cautionary tale for Korea. On one 
hand, the first wave of return migration was highly successful, buoyed by 
a cultural environment welcoming even those “returnees” who had little in 
common with their ancestral “homeland,” and by West Germany’s postwar 
re-industrialization. On the other hand, the second wave was less success-
ful, perhaps because of the weakened jus sanguinis basis for citizenship, or 
because West Germany’s reunification with East Germany had created a 
large pool of surplus labor. Either way, the German experience shows that 
diasporic return is most successful when it meets a demand for labor and 
is supported by appropriate institutional frameworks for second and third-
generation returnees.
Japan
Japan is perhaps the closest analogue to Korea, not only as an East Asian 
society that shares many cultural elements, but also as a monocultural soci-
ety that has typically not recruited foreign labor. The recruitment of over-
seas ethnic Japanese, however, represents one key exception.
Much like Korea, Japan has a large diaspora created through outbound 
emigration. From 1885 to 1923, half a million Japanese left for reasons 
that included poverty, unemployment, over-population, and heavy taxes. 
Although emigration had been prohibited during the Tokugawa period, 
emigration companies received official sanction in 1890. However, Japanese 
immigrants soon became unwelcome in most host countries. An exception 
was Brazil. Facing a shortage of labor after the curtailment of the Atlantic 
slave trade in 1850, large coffee planters, later joined by the São Paulo state 
government, encouraged European immigration. They instituted a contract 
labor system where they paid for partial passage to Brazil, transportation to 
São Paulo, lodging and food while a job was arranged, and transportation 
to the place of employment. These measures created intense immigration, 
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with 1.6 million Europeans arriving in Brazil from 1880 through 1900. Bra-
zilian employers, however, soon obtained a reputation for mistreating their 
workers, resulting in the Italian, French and Spanish governments forbidding 
emigration there. While Chinese immigration was considered unacceptable 
on racist grounds, Japan had gained prestige after its victory in the Russo-
Japanese War, so Brazil turned to importing Japanese. By 1940, there were 
205,000 Japanese and Japanese descendants in Brazil, constituting 0.5 per-
cent of the Brazilian population (de Carvalho 2003). In 2000, the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics estimated that there were 1.4 million 
ethnic Japanese in the nation, with 28 percent having some mixed, non-Jap-
anese ancestry.
In the 1970s, Japan began recruiting Japanese-Brazilian labor in large 
numbers. The economic expansion of the era created shortages in unskilled 
labor and despite being prohibited by law, foreign workers, particularly from 
Asia, were used to alleviate labor shortages. Recognizing this situation, the 
Japanese government amended the Immigration Control and Refugee Rec-
ognition Law in 1989, with four major provisions: (1) the number of foreign 
professionals and skilled workers allowed to work in Japan increased from 
18 to 28 categories; (2) Japanese descendants up to the third generation, 
along with their spouses, were permitted entry for an indefinite period; (3) 
sanctions on illegal workers were intensified; and (4) an on-the-job training 
program was recognized under certain conditions. Because these amend-
ments favored returnees of Japanese descent (the dekasegi), the number 
of South Americans coming to Japan skyrocketed from 88,201 in 1991 to 
274,442 in 1998. 81 percent of these individuals were Brazilian. Dekasegi 
are recruited through several channels: Japanese and Brazilian job-brokering 
agencies (the most popular option), directly by companies (about 35 percent 
of the whole), or by networks of friends and relatives working in Japan (de 
Carvalho 2003).
The dekasegi migrate to Japan for economic and identity-related rea-
sons. The most common aspiration is to buy a house and start a business. 
Other motivations include experiencing life in a developed country, ac-
quainting themselves with the land of their ancestors, meeting relatives, and 
learning about Japanese culture. The dekasegi emphasize the positives of 
their experience, encouraging others to follow in their footsteps. Although 
most intend to return to Brazil after a few years, some experts believe it in-
evitable that many dekasegi will bring their families to join them in Japan 
and settle there (see de Carvalho 2003).
The overwhelming majority of dekasegi are in their twenties and thir-
ties, and are from the second or third generations; half of them have attend-
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ed secondary school, and 25 percent have university degrees. While many 
previously worked in white-collar jobs, the majority in 1993 (51 percent) 
worked in manufacturing, with 25 percent in construction and 13 percent in 
service industries. Available data indicates that dekasegi income and work-
ing conditions are similar to that of their Japanese peers (de Carvalho 2003).
Available evidence and academic research suggest that the dekasegi, con-
trary to accounts in the popular media, experience little discrimination in 
Japan. For instance, very few dekasegi interviewed by de Carvalho (2003) 
had actually experienced discrimination in Japan; on the contrary, they 
tended to think that the Japanese had a good opinion of them. De Carvalho 
suggests that discrimination, if any, comes from the dekasegi’s concentra-
tion in low-prestige jobs, not their origin: the Japanese concept of national 
identity is tied to Japanese “blood.” Yet, research suggests that mutual con-
tact between the Japanese and the dekasegi has led to an assertion of mutual 
differences (de Carvalho 2003). The dekasegi are dissatisfied about being 
called “Japanese” in Brazil and “Brazilian” in Japan. They have been orga-
nizing discussions to change this status, despite the Japanese government 
officially recognizing as “Japanese” only those who emigrated in the past 
three generations (Stanlaw 2004).
The dekasegi enter Japan through a variety of visas, including the work-
ing visa category. They also have a special claim on two visa categories: the 
Long-Term Resident category within Specified Visas, and being the child of 
a Japanese citizen.
Policy Recommendations
The current regulations governing the return of second- and third-generation 
ethnic Koreans appear an excellent foundation for recruiting the top global 
talent in the service sector. These regulations are comparable to the Japanese 
treatment of the dekasegi and are superior to current German regulations. 
However, some issues remain to be resolved: (1) the small proportion of 
eligible overseas Koreans who have obtained the F-4 visa; and (2) the lack of 
institutional mechanisms that match the needs of the  Korean economy with 
the appropriate overseas Koreans.
Increase the Duration of  the F-4 Visa
The current F-4 visa fits the needs of ethnic Koreans in the United States, 
Japan, and other advanced countries. Allowing return migrants unfettered 
access to employment and residency, this visa serves as an excellent founda-
tion for policies designed to recruit the top global talent amongst overseas 
ethnic Koreans.
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Yet only a miniscule proportion of eligible overseas ethnic Koreans actu-
ally hold the F-4 visa—just 45,384 amongst the nearly three million ethnic 
Koreans in Japan and the United States, according to the Korea Immigration 
Service as of June 2009. This is largely because the F-4 is designed for ethnic 
Koreans actually residing in Korea, instead of those potentially returning 
to Korea. For the F-4 to be used for the recruitment of elite professionals 
instead of as a convenience tool for individuals already coming to Korea, we 
recommend that the F-4 be reconceptualized as a visa for any ethnic  Korean 
residing overseas in an advanced country.
Although this reconceptualization would occur in several steps, a first 
step would be to increase the duration of the F-4 from the current two-year 
period to five or ten years. Currently, ethnic Koreans who obtain the F-4 visa 
but end up leaving the country cannot renew the visa—even though it is 
easily renewed in a domestic immigration office.3 If the duration of the visa 
were increased, ethnic Koreans who end up leaving Korea can more easily re-
turn. As individuals who have already spent time in Korea are the ones most 
likely to return, this policy would have maximum impact without disrupting 
the current policy framework.
The extension of the F-4 is consistent with the recommendations in Vi-
sion for Society 2030 (Presidential Commission on Policy Planning 2006) 
which suggest that Korea simplify visa application and immigration poli-
cies for non-ethnic Korean global talent.4 The Commission’s recommenda-
tions focus on the permanent residency and Special Occupations (E-7) visas. 
For ethnic Koreans, however, the F-4 would be a more efficient vehicle, as 
applicants would simply need to prove their Korean ethnicity, rather than 
having to establish permanent residency via long-term sojourns, or provide 
evidence of their “special talents.”
Construct a Systematic Recruiting Framework
We also recommend that the government partner with quasi-governmen-
tal organizations, such as the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 
3 The renewal process has become increasingly streamlined. As recently as 2007, 
F-4 renewal required two separate trips to an immigration office, separated by a week’s 
worth of processing time. F-4 renewal now requires a single trip and only 15 minutes of 
processing time.
4 Note that the Presidential Commission on National Competitiveness (PCNC) 
confines the categories of “global talent” to those with visa status of E1 (Professorship)–
E7 (Special Occupation) with the exception of E6 (Arts & Performance) and D8 (Corpo-
rate Investment), according to the Immigration Enforcement Ordinance. This contrasts 
with our categorization of global talent and skilled labor, according to which the latter 
corresponds closely to the PCNC’s global talent category. 
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(KOTRa), as well as industry organizations like the Federation of Korean In-
dustries, to construct a cohesive system designed to match overseas  Koreans 
with specific needs.
The Korean government already runs “Contact Korea,” a special-pur-
pose agency under KOTRa, providing job placement consultation for foreign 
workers and assisting foreigners with immigration procedures in collabora-
tion with the Ministries of Justice and Labor. In addition, Vision for Society 
2030 proposes to introduce a “visa nominator” system whereby the overseas 
offices of Korean public agencies, trade agencies, and large Korean corpora-
tions are allowed to nominate specific foreigners for visas via HuNet  Korea, 
an online visa nomination and review system. We strongly support these 
policy propositions, not only for non-ethnic Koreans, but also for the pur-
poses of return migration.
We note that such policies are most likely to be most effective in the 
financial services and general business fields. Overseas ethnic Koreans can 
potentially serve as global talent in five occupations: engineering, medicine, 
law, finance and general management/business. Of these professions, en-
gineering, medicine and law do not represent promising opportunities for 
recruiting overseas Koreans. Increasingly few Korean-Americans and Kore-
an-Japanese consider engineering a desirable occupation; rather, they are 
drawn to medicine and law. However, Korean professional associations in 
medicine and law have strongly opposed the domestic recognition of profes-
sional credentials awarded overseas. No such barriers are present in financial 
services and general business fields—especially since top overseas Koreans 
can help domestic industries become more competitive and create new jobs 
for  Korean university graduates.
Enhance Data Collection
Our final policy recommendation is to create two national databases: 
one of overseas ethnic Koreans, and another of global talent positions that 
need to be filled amongst Korean businesses. The task is not only to facilitate 
the matching of skilled ethnic Koreans with suitable and open positions in 
Korea—but also to generate data that will suggest future policy improve-
ments.
Extant databases relating to this issue have major limitations, summa-
rized earlier in Table 5.5.
The Korean Statistical Information System and the Employment Permit 
System provide basic immigration statistics, but give few details on the life 
histories of overseas Koreans. Specifically, they provide no details on the rea-
sons why ethnic Koreans return to Korea—beyond the general type of visa 
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issued—and no data at all on the reasons why they leave. More generally, the 
“Overseas Koreans” report provides basic statistics for all overseas Koreans, 
without examining their current conditions, specific expertise, and level of 
education. Additionally, these databases have yet to compile a list of jobs 
that are suitable for overseas Koreans, like the Japanese have done with the 
dekasegi.
Given the current state of these databases, we recommend data col-
lection efforts. First, gaps in demand of and supply for professionals and 
skilled labor should be forecast, especially in producer and customer service 
sectors like finance, accounting, corporate law, consulting, and engineer-
ing and the sciences. Second, this system should be integrated with HuNet 
 Korea, matching specific candidates with specific job needs.
Beyond these suggestions, valid for all expatriate labor, a more specific 
database should focus on the needs of Koreans living abroad—why they 
would (or would not) return to Korea, what their skills are, and what their 
needs might be. Specifically, government agencies should collect data on the 
number of second- and third- generation ethnic Koreans who reside over-
seas, and the skills they possess. Another urgent task is to identify ethnic 
Koreans with highly valuable skills who already have jobs in Korea and to 
assist them in building up their careers. A nationwide survey may be con-
ducted for this purpose. Finally, additional research should focus on current 
F-4 holders, especially on the reasons why they would leave Korea. Beyond 
this, we recommend research on the life histories of overseas Koreans in gen-
eral, and the ones currently residing in Korea in specific. Overseas Koreans 
entering Korea, as identified by specific visa categories, could be asked to fill 
out a short description (one or two lines) why they are entering Korea. On 
their departure, they could be asked the same.
Conclusion
Our investigations reveal that the Korean economy would benefit by utiliz-
ing global talent in two distinct fields. Korea would benefit from an enlarged 
talent pool within the service sector, especially in finance and general busi-
ness management, to fulfill its ambitions of becoming a financial and busi-
ness hub. Korea would also benefit from renewing its engineering talent so it 
can maintain its traditional strengths in manufacturing and design.
Our investigations have also uncovered potential sources for each type 
of labor. On one hand, the top global talent in business and finance could be 
recruited from the millions of second- and third-generation ethnic Koreans 
living primarily in the United States and Japan. Korea already has a substan-
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tial institutional infrastructure for such recruitment, and compares favorably 
to two roughly comparable cases, Japan and Germany. On the other hand, 
global talent in engineering could be recruited from the foreign students who 
are studying at top universities in Korea. Although Korea should institute 
something like the U.S. Optional Training Program, care should be taken to 
distinguish truly qualified foreign students from others.
Our most pressing recommendation is to collect data more systemati-
cally, especially on the life-courses of ethnic Koreans overseas as well as for-
eign students in Korea. Both groups have some attachment to Korea, and 
could potentially fit into Korean society. However, there is much we have yet 
to learn about these potential future Koreans.
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